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Modern Thought

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Latest Phases

BY

J. WILSON, Ph. D.

AUTHOR OF "PHRASIS," "PRACTICAL LIFE," "LIFE WITHOUT A MASTER," "LIVING THOUGHTS," "NEW VIEWS ON OLD SUBJECTS," ETC., ETC.

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TO

MY WIFE

FAITHFUL AND DEVOTED CONSORT
THROUGH LONG AND TRYING YEARS
FROM YOUTH TO OLD AGE
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED.

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INTRODUCTORY

Every one who starts out upon an undertaking of any kind should have some settled plan before him, and some distinct purpose in view. It is not effort alone that counts, in this world, but effort properly directed and followed up with continued exertion. The author of this work has always had a clear and well defined notion of what he was trying to accomplish, in all his writings. In his later works, which are mainly philosophical in character, it was not designed to surprise the reader by strange utterances and novel conceptions, but rather to call his attention to certain important facts which he already knew, but to which he, perhaps, had not given that study and reflection which the importance of the subject demanded. Three of these volumes were devoted to questions of a social and political nature; the fourth, published recently, is confined largely to the metaphysical aspect of the case. The present volume is simply a continuation of the same discussion, with much new matter introduced.

This work to which the author is now calling the attention of the reading public is not designed to be a treatise on metaphysics, or indeed upon any other subject.

There is no pretense that it is complete in any sense; it is not systematic in plan, nor artistic in its arrangement. The world has profound and systematic treatises enough already. The author's simple aim has been, and is still, to present interesting and important thoughts to the reader in the clearest, most tangible and most forcible manner possible. If the book were burdened with a mass of extraneous matter; if the sentences were involved and elaborate, and if the niceties of detail were carried to excess, as they often are, the leading thought could not stand out distinctly before the mind as might be expected in a didactic work of this character. Too many books have already been written to justify a theory or defend a system; in too many cases, the efforts of the authors are directed, not so much toward ascertaining the facts of the case as to the developing and popularizing of their own favorite productions. In most instances, this one leading fact seems to be lost sight of, namely, that nature itself recognizes no laws, no system, no symmetry nor harmony, in any field or in any department of life.

And here it may be remarked that people generally suffer not so much from want of knowledge as from failure to apply properly the knowledge that they have already acquired. Many people lack industry, and too frequently they are quite disinclined to make use of the information which they have obtained, either from books, from conversation or their own experience. The trouble is that only a few things appeal to such people, and in that category, unfortunately, sound literature and wholesome advice do not happen to be included. It is well understood that most of the information upon which men act in everyday life comes from the books that they read, or from the people with whom they are accustomed to

associate. How important then it is that they should select the right books to read and the right persons with whom to associate! How desirable it is always that they should make the best use possible of the opportunities that are offered to them from day to day!

It is not what others may do for us, but what we shall do for ourselves, that ensures final success in life. We may, and often do, put too much trust in others, or we may have too much confidence in our own strength and wisdom. Judgment and sense are given to us, as they have been given to no other creatures. We have, besides, sagacity to serve us in emergencies. Fortified and protected as we are in this and other ways, why should we not make a success of life? We may not be called great, we may not have gained applause; we may not have become rich, and not even happy, in the ordinary acceptation of the term; and yet what hinders us, any day and every day, from being both comfortable and contented? And, indeed, what more could any sensible man ask? The happiest person in the world never gets beyond this limit. The leading trouble in this connection arises from the unfortunate fact, well known in the experience of the race, that *very few people know when they are happy;* it should be observed that to be happy and not know it, affords but slight satisfaction, if it affords any at all.

To make a success of life, and to become satisfied and happy, we do not need a new God, nor even a duplicate of the Supreme Being that we have had all along. We do not need a new God any more than we need a new state, or a new King. What we now need, and it is the only really important thing at this moment that we do need, is a new man, or *new men!* Forty gods, or five

thousand, in the present emergency, would not do us the slightest good. One Socrates, one Plato, one Solon, one Pericles, duly recognized as leader, would be worth a car-load of such gods and goddesses as they had in ancient Greece and Rome. When men change their nature, and with that their habits, desires and dispositions, then and not till then, will the world change, and life will appear better and brighter than it ever did before.

All the teaching that we have thus far had, and all our thoughts and reflections, lead us to this conclusion at last, that *the world is, and always will be*, as man makes it. It is a serious delusion to believe for a moment that *either God, the Devil*, or *the King had anything to do with making the world as we find it. It is wholly the work of man.*

If we do right, we shall find that those with whom we deal will also be inclined to do right. Again, if we frown upon others, why should not others frown upon us? They most certainly will. And so it will be found that when we smile, others by mere force of imitation or suggestion will also smile in return. That is not a law of nature—for nature has no laws, we know—but it is one of nature's commonest manifestations.

There is no need of discussing, either here or elsewhere, the doctrine of freedom of the will, liberty or necessity, predestination or its opposite. It is not a question proper for discussion at this time, in this place. It is a question to be settled in practical life, and we are not able to see that either mathematics or metaphysics can help us along in this matter in any way. It is not a question of what can be proved on one side or disproved on the other, but what have we learned in practice on the merits of the question? We know, as everybody knows, that we can take the right road or the wrong one, just as

we please. We can go straight ahead to ruin or disaster, or we can change our direction and take a new departure at any moment. When we come to the question what we had better do in any emergency, we shall find that the decision depends, not upon what God or fate decides, but how we happen to think or feel.

It is time to start anew in life and try *to do business on our own account.* When shall we begin the experiment? If we go on doing as we have done, trying to follow the fashions and doing "like other folks," who knows, or rather who doubts, where and how we shall end at last? Having followed the advice, the tastes and the wishes of other people all through life, why not begin, even at this late day, to follow our own judgment and consult our own tastes at least for a change? It is pleasant, we know, to swim with the tide, but it is rather dangerous at times. Appearances are frequently deceiving, and voyagers often deem themselves quite secure, when really there is serious danger ahead.

This world, unquestionably, was never made for man's personal enjoyment and those who start out to live the life of a glutton or a voluptuary are sure to learn at last that they have purchased their pleasures at a very extravagant price. It does not follow at all, that when a man has acquired a fortune in some way, either honestly or dishonestly as the case may be, that he must start out at once and buy a yacht or an auto, an elephant or two, or that he must institute a harem, like other folks. There are more sensible ways than this for people to distinguish themselves or get their name in the papers. Such pleasures as we have mentioned will no doubt furnish amusement for a time, but when the bill comes to be paid and the accounts are settled up, it will be found that those

luxuries hardly correspond in value with the expense incurred. People are altogether too fond of doing foolish, even silly things, and their vanity very often carries them far beyond rational limits. It is a mistake to imagine that men uniformly act from a rational motive. It more frequently happens that they act without any motive; they act rather from passion and impulse. They have, usually, but one object in view—to secure wealth and pleasure—and while they are in pursuit of such objects, they are usually oblivious to other things which are doubtless of much greater importance.

MODERN THOUGHT

Thought has its own particular domain and its own value. Under certain conditions, it is quite indispensable, but under no circumstances is it able to accomplish anything alone. If we had nothing but thought, we should never have valuable results, and the world would amount to nothing. Thought is always worthless without action, and action, again, is always worthless without thought. Thought and action must work together, but in all cases thought must precede and direct action. Thought can never boast of what it has done, for alone, as we have intimated, thought never achieves anything.

It is well to bear in mind that workers are never thinking men, and thinking men, again, are never workers. They must both do their part, and to succeed, they must co-operate. Preaching, we know, may do some good, but the hard work at last must come from some other source. As a matter of history, we might state that very few people listened to Jesus Christ, or even to St. Paul. People now are no better in any respect than were those who lived in Bible times; perhaps they are no worse. Certain it is, the people of the present day, like those of the past, are not fond of teaching or preaching in any form.

To them there are many things more interesting than teaching, no matter how it is conducted. Very few men want to be made better than they are; they are good enough already. They simply want to be made richer, handsomer, happier and more prosperous than they were —that is all. People usually know what they want without being told. Why bother them with things that they do not want? All the time and labor expended in that direction is sadly misapplied. What single inducement is there for any man to step out of his way to advise or instruct other people at any time? Speaking generally, we may add, most people are selfish, indolent, stupid and willful. There are exceptions to the rule, we admit, but it is well to bear in mind that they are simply exceptions in every instance. Why should we be apprehensive about the fate of other men in any case? Why importune or annoy them, especially when it is evident that they are trying to enjoy themselves? They have heard about truth and virtue all their lives, in a roundabout way. Just now they would prefer some other kind of diet.

It may not be amiss to notice here that some people cannot safely trust themselves to their own thoughts on certain questions. Many men need guidance and support all their lives. They never, for some reason, outgrow their childhood state. In cases where people are sure to think wrong—and such cases are quite numerous—perhaps it would be just as well if they were not allowed to think at all, on difficult questions. When people venture into deep water, they are apt to get frightened and lose their standing quite unexpectedly. Poor navigators need looking after, either in deep or shallow water.

And now we come to another point of considerable importance. It is a serious question to decide at all times

what people should teach; but it is always a more important question to decide, how will those who listen, or those who read, understand those who come forward to offer their instruction? It is not only desirable that people should be instructed, but they should be well instructed. The teachers are thinkers and they do an important work, but they are not real workers. In all cases, the real workers are the followers, the believers, the converts. The heavy business always falls upon them, rather than upon the original reformers. Christ did something to introduce and establish Christianity, but it was only a little. If he did anything remarkable in his three short years of active life, it has never been recorded. Certain it is, we do not find it in such writings as we have at command. Paul did more, but it was only comparatively little that he did. It was three hundred years after Christ before much was accomplished to make Christianity a permanent and popular institution.

Ordinarily, the founder's work, in all movements, is greatly overrated. We notice the greatness of what has been accomplished, and we are apt to imagine that the founder did all of the work. As a rule, the work that any one man does alone is quite insignificant. It took time, a long time, with a vast deal of hard work, to establish the Christian religion. The whole civilized world, all of Europe at least, seemed to conspire and combine to establish this remarkable church. The most powerful and effective agency in rearing this structure was, undoubtedly, the Roman Empire and Greek culture.

The world indeed needs talkers and writers; but its advancement would not be very rapid if the workers did not come forward and put their shoulders manfully to the wheel. Not what Christ said or thought, and not what

Paul said or thought, settles the question, but *what does the world think, what does the world say?* That is the question that we at all times are interested in considering. It is our own thoughts and feelings that control our movements, at the last moment, and not the thoughts and feelings of those who lived and died a thousand or two thousand years ago.

To move the world, we must not only have a lever, but also some substantial support on which the fulcrum may rest. The support in this case is located in the belief and feelings of men. Men know the facts and the truth, but they do not always estimate them at their full value. How shall we arouse men, and how shall they ultimately become inspired or enthused? How shall we give to them new life, higher hopes and nobler aspirations? The answer to that question we are not able to give just now. It was hunger and rage that moved men in the days of Danton and Robespierre. Will not milder motives and measures more peaceful answer the purpose in the coming crisis?

Why should men be neglectful of thought? Why should any particular study be discouraged or discarded? Everything that is done for us, or by us, is done through the medium of thought. We live only so far as we think; without thinking, we could neither see nor feel. As we shall notice in all of our discussions, *we believe and act only as we think*. Why should we not devote some time and attention to the examination of thought? What other subject exceeds this one in importance?

In Germany, within a few years past, a new literature has made its appearance, consisting of works which treat of thought, its development and control. Of course, metaphysics has been known as a study for long ages, but in

the works under consideration, questions in metaphysics, or psychology, are viewed from new standpoints, and the inquiries proceed in a new direction. We find whole volumes, some large and some small, devoted to some special branch of the study. We find works on Will, on Attention, on Memory, on Motives, on Spirit Life, on Intelligence, on Character, on Feeling, etc.

The questions of Metaphysics are undoubtedly fundamental in character; we cannot go back of or beyond them, and if we should attempt such a departure, we should find ourselves wandering in the regions of the unknown. It is generally supposed that the line between Physics and Mental Science is clearly and definitely established, but this is really not the case. It is true that in the Sciences, as they are called, we have objects before us and we can see them with our eyes, and thus we may ascertain the facts of the case through study and inspection. But, as is well known, we have quite as much trouble to discover the real facts and agree upon questions of truth in Physics as in Metaphysics. All that we find presented in any instance is simply theories and opinions, and in these, as we know, men differ.

Astronomy, for example, is not only one of the sciences, but it is often called an "exact science." But what shall we regard as settled in Astronomy? It is not even known that the earth is round; we are certain that it is in no sense a ball. We are not absolutely assured of a single statement or claim that is made in connection with this science. We know absolutely nothing on this subject; everything in Astronomy is beyond our reach. If

one side is permitted to claim everything, the other side should be permitted to deny everything. And when doctors disagree, as they usually do in cases like this, who shall be called upon to decide? We are taught that the spheres are held in their places by that mysterious force known as gravitation. But where is the evidence? Even where so called evidence is produced, we are not compelled to accept it as truth; but where there is no evidence, we certainly must doubt.

Edward Carpenter, in *Civilization, Its Cause and Cure,* has given us some sensible and substantial views, on the operations of science and the visions of scientific men. He may not be able at all times to tell us what is true, and why it is so, but his discernment is sufficiently penetrating, we apprehend, to enable him to distinguish error from truth in the ordinary problems of Physics. Evidently, he does not believe all that he reads, and some things which cannot be duly verified he declines to accept, even after the statements have been printed in books and endorsed by eminent men of letters.

Mr. C. says, speaking generally: "The attempt at any given time to set up an explanation of phenomena which shall be valid in itself and without reference to the mental conditions of those who set it up, necessarily ends in failure; and the present state of confusion and contradiction in which modern science finds itself is mainly the result of such attempt. * * * The method of science is the method of all mundane knowledge; it is that of limitation or actual ignorance."

In the material world, when we see things, we imagine that we really see them, and perhaps we do. But what do we know, what have we learned from merely seeing things? For all practical purposes, when we see things,

we are not made wiser by our experience. To learn is something that arises from memory after we have finished seeing. Learning is something that comes from thought, reflection, investigation. Seeing alone is something casual, a mere diversion; but to learn implies study and effort. These facts should be known and appreciated in teaching at all times.

So far as the affairs of practical life are concerned, there is just as much darkness and there are just as many doubts and difficulties to be found in Physics as in Metaphysics. In either department, men can give their theories, their ideas, their assumptions at any time—and that is about as far as they can go ordinarily. It is quite well understood among inquirers that nothing is settled or determined in Metaphysics; and it must be conceded that in Physics the results are by no means more encouraging. The more the student inquires and learns, the deeper in doubt and despair he is certain to find himself.

It should not be forgotten, in treating on these subjects, that material things uniformly have an immaterial side. Wherever there is a body, there must be a spirit, in theory at least, some moving, thinking principle with which the body is associated and by which it is directed. The two are inseparable parts, and together they constitute a whole. This principle applies unquestionably to living beings, and there is no reason why it should not extend to things that are known as inanimate.

Those who have studied the subject carefully and who know whereof they speak are uniformly ready to concede that the world knows very little of the "true inwardness" of material things. What is there in the science of Geology that we are certain about? What can we predicate with confidence of the history of the rocks, or of the

earth? We talk about the facts of Biology! But how many facts or conclusions in Biology are we certain about? How many facts in Chemistry, or even in Medicine? What can we declare with any assurance as to the nature and working of light, heat, sound, electricity, magnetism, and scores of similar agencies? Our ideas are generally mere playthings with which we seek to amuse ourselves, replacing them from time to time, as we do, with some new diversion, *some new plaything*.

The subjects that will engage our attention in this work are just such topics as have been considered by leading thinkers of civilized races in other countries, for hundreds and even thousands of years past. As we have intimated, these questions though simple are really such as lie at the foundation of all belief, and especially of those beliefs which are of a moral, religious or metaphysical character.

In considering matters of thought, the reader should bear in mind that thinking, or at least study and inquiry, is always by the few, for the few, a fact that will appear and reappear on the pages of this work more than once. There is a striking aversion, on the part of mankind generally, to anything and everything in the form of concentrated thought and attention. Such things savor too much of hard work, and with the average man this disinclination in regard to effort of any kind seems to be noticeable in all races, including both the civilized and the uncivilized. Those men who might properly be called students or inquirers are extremely rare characters. Indeed, among men generally, to think, to consider, to ponder, and finally to concentrate thought and remember, is a feat that is practically impossible. They do not understand that such things come within their province—and really it does

not appear that they actually have any gift or propensity in that direction. Hence it comes that study, for the mere sake of study and science, is something that, among the masses of mankind, is left exclusively for the few people who are fond of disquisitions.

The prevailing impression, in this commercial age of ours, is that there is no money to be expected from such exertion or such an investment. It is so much easier, and more pleasant, to adopt the conclusions of other people, who have investigated the matter and who are considered authority on the subject, that this course is the one that is usually pursued by people of all classes. Time and effort are saved by this arrangement, and it is more agreeable all around. This method may be called thinking and studying by proxy, and the practice has been common enough among men in all ages. We notice this substitute particularly in such departments as philosophy, science, religion and art. The masses ordinarily are but little posted on these subjects, and so they are willing to place themselves wholly in the hands of those whom they imagine that they can safely trust.

Every country has its Magi, its medicine men. They are often regarded as superior beings, but the careful inquirer will never lose sight of the fact, well enough established as it is, that all men are of the same stock finally, and there are no beings to be found who are known to be possessed of a divine or superhuman nature. Men are found to differ in gifts and ability, but usually this difference is due to natural or explainable causes. Certain it is, if the same efforts were put forth in all cases, with the same amount of study and application, these differences would mostly, if not wholly, disappear. It is well understood among observing men that so far as eminence

in work or success in life is concerned, it is due rather to continued practice and persevering effort than to any extraordinary or unusual gifts of nature.

However, the better we become acquainted with the world, and the deeper we penetrate into its history, the more clearly we shall see that men do not always follow reason either in arriving at their conclusions or in forming their habits. Reason, it will be found, has but very little to do with the actions of man, and that fact explains why it is that the history of individuals generally is so different in most cases. Nature has been equally bountiful to all, giving to each equal advantages. But of what avail are advantages to any one who makes no use of them? And so it is with men all over the world. Some are constantly making an effort to help themselves, and others are simply waiting for some friend or relative, or some powerful agent, to come and help them!

In looking before and about us, we notice that men are taking different routes, and most of them have different destinations in view. Men drop into different classes, different groups. This is not Nature's work, it is not God's work, nor the work of fate. God and Nature have nothing to do with classes or groups. Men drop into one class or the other not because they must, but because they choose, or because of their indifference. The place where a man lands always depends, largely, upon the route he takes; it also depends somewhat upon the company he keeps and the class that he falls in with at the beginning. Again, we say, men choose their own class, and so they practically, at the very outset, determine their own career.

It is a remarkable fact that the Greeks mastered the subject of Philosophy more completely than has ever been done by the moderns; and it is undoubtedly the fact that

progress or advancement in civilization does not depend upon the age of a people, but rather upon the nature of their employments and upon their course of life. A people might continue to live in the savage state indefinitely, if something did not occur to change their course and start them off on some new career of development.

People in the savage state do not think, do not reflect, do not study. They never make any advancement either in arts, science or religion. They never learn, since they have no source from which to obtain their lessons. They know something of the useful arts, and a very little about religion, but it is not possible, in their state, ever to make any important progress. Indeed, in their case, nothing ever occurs to render advancement either necessary or possible.

To make civilization possible, people must, as we shall see farther on, concentrate in towns and cities; they must enter upon new conditions; they must have new wants and new aspirations, and they must engage in a new life-work. There must be barter and trade, and in most cases there is commerce. There must be study and reflection; people must travel more or less, and there must be money in circulation. People in both the savage and the enlightened state seem to be able, in practice, to get along passably well without religion, and especially without ethics; but wild people generally have some religion, and it is a noticeable fact that Greece and Rome, India and Egypt, highly civilized as they were, developed religion to an extent perhaps never known before nor since. They seem to have considered it quite indispensable to their continued existence, and so they carried their gods with them wherever they went. They felt confident that there could

be no permanent success without their assistance. Indeed, a conquering people, like the Romans, always believe in gods; so do robbers and pirates. Riches and slavery are also necessary to the continuation and advancement of civilization.

The Greeks made greater advancement in civilization than any other race, except possibly the Babylonians. The Greeks had slaves at their command, and thus having no work to perform, and few cares, they had plenty of time on their hands, for debate, study and investigation. The two greatest philosophers that the world has yet known, Plato and Aristotle, were Greeks. They both lived and died before the Christian era. The wisdom and excellence of their writings was such that they were generally regarded as sacred, and in the Middle Ages they ranked with the Scriptures.

It was one of the leading tenets in Plato's teaching that there is no reality except in an ideal world, and many of the greatest writers of the present day agree with him in this belief. Even Pyrrho taught that there is no fixed standard to enable us to decide between right and wrong, and no doubt this is the correct view of the matter. Aristotle taught the same doctrine. Indeed, the people of Greece had no such idea of what is right and what is wrong, and what is vice and what is virtue, as enlightened men are known to have all over the world at the present day.

Aristotle, we may add, died and left no followers. Such things often occur. How could a truly great man have followers? Men such as he are never understood in the first place. Aristotle had the common fate of all men of his class; he was never appreciated, be-

cause nobody really knew him. To quote a biographer: "He was misconceived, over-rated, under-rated, and both praised and blamed on wrong grounds." How could he be understood? He was 2,000 years ahead of his time; or what is the same thing, *the people were 2,000 years behind him.* In fact, he is not really dead yet. People sometimes do not die when they are supposed to have died! Besides, some people die harder than others.

As we are about to close our remarks under this head, we introduce in this place certain excerpts from other writers, and we shall continue to do so under other heads in the course of the work. In some cases we introduce a line, or a few lines, for the sentiment that is presented. But our main aim has been to strengthen our own position and to add special interest to the discussion before us. We have given the evidence of writers of distinction in their line, not as authority—for there is really no authority, and usually one man's opinion is worth as much as that of another man—but to demonstrate that the author of this work is not so radical or erratic as he might seem to be to many. His views are generally new to the public, simply because people find neither the time nor the inclination to read or inquire, and hence they are usually behind the times. All of this writer's views and thoughts can be found in some form, in the works of some other author—a little here and a little there in each case—if the inquirer will take the trouble to hunt up the publication, and provided the work is brought down to date.

But it must be remembered that the same thing may appear a hundred times, in different books, and yet that fact alone would be no proof of any connection or relation, so far as authorship is concerned.

In this case, the author has given special attention to certain works. All of these, with a few exceptions, are of very recent date, and the object of introducing a notice of them at this time is not to review or recommend them, but to indicate to the public the trend of philosophic inquiry, especially in Germany, at the present day. Besides, they are all works of more than ordinary merit, and they deserve to be perused by the general reader, as well as by the devoted student. These are all works that have fallen into the writer's hands very recently. There are other works on similar subjects, no doubt of equal merit, that the writer has not seen. Indeed, there are, doubtless, many of them.

In no instance have we treated these works comparatively. We have made it a point to take what answered our purpose, and to pass the rest by without comment. That in some cases more was taken from one book than from another, of course had nothing at all to do with the merits of the books.

What we present in this connection will also enable the general reader to form some notion of the advancement made, in recent times, by thought, especially in the field of metaphysics. The world moves, and literature certainly has something new to offer in many directions; even the term psychology is coming to be used more frequently than metaphysics.

We begin with a few short selections from different authors:

There is no such thing as intellectual truth—a truth which can be stated as apart from feeling.—Carpenter —Civilization, 83.

There is no such thing as a permanent moral code. —Carpenter, 109.

Change the feeling of an individual, and his whole method of thinking will be revolutionized.—Carpenter, 85.

"Tell me what for philosophy thou hast, and I will tell thee what for character thou hast."—Fichte.

Here we might add that to change a man's whole character, we have only to change his blood—or his food, his habits, or his drinks. The slightest influence, either properly or improperly directed, will change a man's character. Even the weather, or the appetite, will change a man's thoughts and feelings, and hence his conduct. The weather will even change the tone and working qualities of a violin. Why should not man also be affected?

Kant, like many other men, was an idealist. He taught that we do not see things, but the appearance of things, in all cases mere images. Every object is an appearance, a phenomenon, simply a conception. So far Kant was right, and those who differ from him are wrong.

Among the many things that Aristotle viewed correctly was matter. He taught that matter has no real, practical existence. Matter is something that is to be presupposed, but it always eludes us. It is something to look at and think about, but when we attempt to grasp or confine it, very quickly it vanishes into thin air.

Every man has his own dialect, his own treasury of words.—Dyroff, 95.

All sensation is truly and properly in the mind. The

eye is the natural organ of sight, but the natural organ sees as little as the artificial does (the glass).—Upham's *Disordered Mental Action, 69.*

Learners must first be believers.—Locke.

The sure and only way to get true knowledge is to form in our minds clear, settled notions of things, with names annexed to those determined ideas.—Locke.

Talking with a friend is nothing else than thinking aloud.—Addison.

The truth is that we understand nothing. Matter and mind are known to us only by certain properties; these properties are quite distinct from each other; but in regard to both, it is entirely out of our faculties to advance a single step beyond the facts which are before us. Whether in their substratum or ultimate essence, they are the same, or whether they are different, we know not and never can know in any present state of being.—Abercrombie, *Int. Powers.*

There is no trace of a separate, independent, self-supporting, spiritual agent rising above all the fluctuations of the corporeal frame. The medical practitioner assumes that to every mental change there corresponds a physical change.—*Mind and Body,* Bain.

With regard to all our senses, the truth seems to be that the first notions conveyed are of a very limited and imperfect kind. Our real knowledge is acquired only after considerable observation and experience.—*Int. Powers,* Abercrombie.

Distance and magnitude are not the primitive objects of vision.—Abercrombie.

Without this general knowledge previously acquired, our various senses acting individually could convey to us no definite notion of the properties of external things.—Abercrombie *Int. P., 48.*

The original of our knowledge lies in perception and reflection.—A.

It is a singular fact that nearly all philosophers, from Plato to Hume, agree in maintaining that the mind does

not perceive external things themselves, but only their ideas, images or species.—Abercrombie, 35.

Bishop Berkeley, who lived and wrote full 200 years ago, was, as his writings show, one of the clearest-minded men, and one of the soundest and most careful reasoners, that the world has yet produced; but he is known only by name to most of the literary men of the present day. His writings are just the same as they always have been, but unfortunately, they have gone out of fashion! A few samples of his teachings will doubtless be acceptable to our readers:

It was his opinion, like that of many to-day, that distance, like motion, is something that cannot be seen. In practice, men do not measure distance by feet and inches, and such measurements give a most uncertain notion of length or height. Number is a creation of the mind of man.

Qualities apart from things, and apart also from man's notions, do not exist. Berkeley had a very correct idea of the force and office of words. He thought it a mistake to say that words signify ideas.

Objects that we see are really a part of ourself, or we could not see them. We see only our own ideas at all times.

Nature makes no explanations. We see only appearances. Qualities are only sensations and ideas of ours that come reflected back to ourself. These, of course, we never see or perceive. They, like most other things, are not objects, but only things to think of.

Things that we imagine are as truly in our mind as things that we perceive. To perceive is to imagine that we see.

EINFUHRUNG IN DIE PSYCHOLOGIE
(INTRODUCTION IN PSYCHOLOGY)

Dr. Adolf Dyroff, University of Bonn, 1908

This is by no means a large volume, but it contains a good store of valuable thoughts. It is devoted to the study of the mind, the feelings, the soul, but in a new and very interesting manner. Instead of drawing exclusively upon reflection and imagination, as the practice was up to a very recent date, in treating on mental and philosophical questions, we see in this work evidence of careful observation and well directed inquiry.

The following paragraphs will serve to indicate the direction and character of the work:

The object of psychology is the soul-life of man, the psychic. The soul-life is a thing of full reality.—3.

So unpretending, so unimportant, so infinitely rapid and perishable a thing as our feelings, our dreams, our thoughts and our will-impulses are, and even as they may seem to the man who struggles in the stream of time, so is it yet something surely from life itself.—3.

We are shown what great power the feelings and passions have in every human soul, and we are also shown that every soul-life depends on itself.—4.

The help-means to which psychology turns, are, as they are in all other sciences, above all, experiences. But they are experiences of a peculiar nature. That what we meet with in ourself, cannot be grasped with the hands, nor examined with the eye, nor measured in metres, but we simply come across them in our experience. Therefore, in the last line, observation of self is continually the outgoing point of all inquiry.—5.

Whoever teaches others concerning psychological things, uses the many experiences which each individual has had with himself, or which he might have, under favorable circumstances. To children and fools

no one offers psychology—it would be a waste of effort. They would understand little of that.—6.

To draw the outlines of soul-life neatly and closely, is not without difficulties, for all soul processes are more or less united with bodily processes.—8.

There is a peculiar kingdom in reality which is known to us before natural science, and that is the kingdom of consciousness.—10.

What passes within me can I neither myself see with my eyes, nor can another. I can myself perceive it only with the spiritual eye. We cannot see our own seeing, nor hear our own hearing, nor taste our own taste. What we see is blue, but our seeing is not blue. —11.

Modern natural science and philosophy hold real things for wholly colorless, and only the impressions pass for red, white, yellow.—20.

We are only a part of nature—the whole world does not mirror itself in us. In no man are things mirrored exactly as in others.—25.

In all feelings or impressions is there before all a peculiar relation to physical impulses.—26.

The soul is an instrument for the grasping or comprehension of things, which are very different from itself. The compass of its power is not very great, but its capacity for changing and fitting in is astonishing. —31.

The best gift for existence is, and remains, a well-equipped and cultivated sense.—31.

Our feeling is a thing of self-perception. How differently we feel from one moment to another! How different we feel to-day from what we felt and thought yesterday; how different the child and the man, especially the old man! How different the boy at thirteen and the youth at sixteen!—98.

Feeling utterances are well known symptoms of feelings.—101.

The relation of feeling-content to our "I" lies at

the surface. We call ourselves joyful or sorrowful, and not the outer things.—101.

Will and feeling are near related. The will, as we see, continues itself into feeling.—108.

A work in German that deserves especial mention in this connection is *The Art in State*. Ludwig Pfau, 1888. It seems to be not widely known, or at least it is rarely referred to; but certainly as a work showing the intimate relations existing between science, art, philosophy and religion, it stands unsurpassed to-day. It is a profound study in the domain of art and philosophy, clear and cogent in its reasoning at all times, and uniformly sound in its conclusions. The work is filled with great truths, the evidence of a penetrating mind and deep reflection. We must content ourselves with quoting only a few sentences:

So little is there a spirit without matter as matter without spirit.

There is only one real evil, and that is error.

The history of mankind is at bottom only the history of truth.

The idea is not the soul of a body, it is the soul of an unlimited number of bodies.

Clearly, every experience is in itself a meaningless act.

Without experience there can be no thinking; but without thinking, there can be no knowing or appreciating of experience. Of itself, thought *creates nothing*.

Every virtue founds itself upon a vice; every vice develops itself into a virtue.

All punishment is physical brutality. But no power in the world is able to punish a reasoning being who is absolved for his conduct by his own conscience.

Our God idea is no present of Christianity, and so much the less, as unbelieving Heathens, Greek philosophers, already five hundred years before Christ

preached, stood upon a platform of knowledge which a believing Christian can never reach.

A world-movement like the Christian, which is a product of a foregoing immeasurable development, and whose *factors are hundreds of people and thousands of years*—to wish to localize this in the Judaic province of Galilee, is simply silly!

INTELLIGENZ UND WILLE

Prof. Dr. E. Meumann, Leipsig, 1908

To this admirable and interesting work we give an unusual amount of attention for the reason that it is typical of its class, and it will give, perhaps, a better idea of the present state of psychological research, and of the direction taken in later teachings and discussions, than any other work with which we happen to be acquainted. We have taken many suggestive paragraphs from the work, and we regret that we could not find room for more of a similar character.

It is a very different work from *Kritik of Pure Reason*—with its Transscendentalen Aesthetik, Transscendentalen Urtheilskraft, Transscendentalen Scheine, Amphibolie, Phaenomena, Noumena, Schematismus, Modalitat, Paralogismen, Architektonik, Praedicabilien. We doubt whether that work was ever fully understood by any one except the learned author himself. The subject is difficult enough for the general reader when only the German language is used, but when a host of Greek and Latin terms are thrown in, the task is measurably increased. We are glad to see in the work before us, that the author contents himself with plain modern German. It makes a far more readable book for that reason.

No one questions but that Kant was a profound scholar and a careful and close reasoner, but he had a system, and this he adhered to with unwonted firmness. Very much of what he wrote is a back number

to-day. It may be true enough from his standpoint, but just now the public wants something different, and in a great many interesting German works, what is desired to-day can readily be obtained. Kant occupied the stage, as an author, for something over a hundred years. He would have lasted longer if he had lived in a different age. We do not know that he had a single true follower at last. He had a world of admirers, but we have in mind disciples. Indeed, we all know that those who adopt the thoughts of some one else seldom have any thoughts of their own to follow. Hegel, Fichte and others may have been wrong, but they had their own ideas, and naturally enough they advocated them. Such men make poor followers for philosophers at all times. In most cases, the ambitious disciples, so-called, of Kant, used his teachings as a foundation on which to build up a new philosophy of their own. They never saw things, and they never wanted to see things, as the great philosopher himself saw them. They imagined that they knew better about the matter than Kant himself. They praised him, these philosophers did, but they went off finally in some other direction. Just so the followers of Christ did, especially St. Paul, and this is the usual course in most cases of this kind.

Words are only signs, substitutes, symbols.—154.

Thinking comes to be a symbolical and representative action.

All is imagination, symbols—we never reach, we never approach, the thing itself, the truth properly so called. Dr. M. shows that plainly enough. The best effort we can put forth is first to observe and study. But that alone does not enlighten us. We get nothing new in that way. We must also think, imagine, dream, and at best that only gives us a new thought—always a thought, a belief, an impression, no matter what we may endeavor to do. We have to do only with things that we remember, that we think of, and what we do

not remember and do not think of, is simply for us a blank sheet.

Words are only the simplest of signs, but yet with signs all our mental work is done.

Words are sound-pictures, or language movements, which have not the slighest resemblance to their meaning, being partly arbitrary and partly conventional. The word is in no way a copy of the meaning which it represents. Words are merely representative.—155.

Intelligence is thinking and judgment (what we know is, at all times, only what we think and believe); and the thinking man is only the reflecting and judging man (who at last has nothing better to offer than merely his *opinion*).—157.

Fancy or imagination, is a combining, an operation, at all times. (The business of men generally, is to build up and take down.) Men judge, weigh, consider. —158.

The author shows on many pages of his work that about all that is brought forward by our most popular writers, is what they imagine, what they think—and no matter whether the subject comes under the head of physics or metaphysics. It is so very much easier for people to write what they think, what they remember, what they have heard, than to write merely what they know and can prove! Everything with writers generally is representative. What men write is at best uncertain, and the words they use as the instruments of expression are, to say the least, variable and hence inconclusive and unreliable. What can we accomplish in the way of securing truth with the use of arbitrary signs that have no meaning, and hence can convey none?

Genius is unthinkable without deep and abundant feeling and without an intensive and enduring will. There is no pure intellectual genius. There must be more than the usual *impulse* to do. Every genius makes a heart-work of his study and aim.—172, 174.

In life we are much more ideomotorish-acting than really willing-active. But little of action comes from will—much that is done is automatic. We all act from impulse, incitement, habit, rather than from direct effort. The instinctive actions of man are something wholly different from the instincts of animals. There is much less motive, however, in the actions of man than is generally believed. Some people believe men have a motive for all that they do. But that is not so. There is much in the effect of association, and much in the incitement coming from outside sources. Custom has a great influence upon our action and our resolutions at all times. Animals do little thinking and most of their action has its origin in suggestion, habit, association and imitation. So it is with young children. There is much imitation in the acts of all men. —207, 208.

Feelings are expressed by movements, gestures and action generally.—248.

Perhaps character cannot be actually transformed, but its direction can be changed; it can be hampered and neutralized, by education, by outside influence of various kinds. Neglect, misdirection, inattention and lack of development have a great influence upon the history of man.—266.

A will without foregoing intellect in any sense is a psychologic impossibility. The lower a man stands in the scale, the more he is inclined to depend upon will rather than upon intellect.—277.

The will, the wish, has greatly to do with our career in life. Fichte's philosophy was more the product of his character than of his logical conclusions.—283.

It is entirely out of the question that something new should be discovered by thinking, something peculiar in the operations of the soul.—151.

It is a fact in the development of the mind that people who have lost one or more of their senses have an increase in imaginative powers to compensate for

the loss in the domain of sense. Milton's best work in the poetic field came after he was entirely blind.—132.

Exercise and practice long continued does much for the strength and efficiency of both body and mind. Powers once acquired are lost by want of practice. Through practice we can secure technical fitness or skill in art.

Unfortunately there is a natural enmity between a good memory on one side, and independent thinking and the forming of independent judgments, on the other.—116.

Every thought is fancy, and all thinkers are visionary more or less. Imagination exhibits its powers in every combination, in every construction, and *in every work of art.* Where truth begins, or where it ends, no one knows. So it is with fiction, myth, dreams, imagination.

There is no will without a "can." In its essence, it is the carrying through of an undertaking decided upon.—214.

CHARAKTER-BILDUNG

(CHARACTER-FORMING)

Dr. Theodore Elsenhans, University of Heidelberg, 1908

This work is deserving of all the attention that may be given to it by the thoughtful and devoted student. It treats of an old subject from new standpoints, in a very able, intelligent and considerate manner. As a guide or help to the teacher, it doubtless will be found highly acceptable. It abounds in new and sound thoughts.

The following selection of important paragraphs will throw some light upon the contents of the work, and will indicate the direction taken by the author in his investigations:

The sensual nature must be suppressed, in order

that the will may be determined through moral law alone.—24.

All feeling is sensual, but the impulses of moral sentiment must be free from all sense conditions. No kind of interest, no inclination, not even love, may determine moral character.—25. The only reliable moral impulse is "respect for moral law."

Virtue is nothing but inclination to duty.—27.

The idea of God is not inborn; whole races have been discovered who knew no God.—32.

The spirit, the mind, is nothing else than a collection of ideas, and new combinations.—33.

It belongs to the domain of education to bring forth genial, talented men, and it comes as a problem of the state to develop talents through education.—33.

There are cases in which we must speak of acquired dispositions, whose origin falls before the period of birth.—37.

Even in childhood, must the bodily condition be considered in its connection with the whole character of the child.—40.

Observation enables us to see that quickness or slowness of speech, of walking, of bodily movements generally is throughout characteristic of the whole individual.—44.

The power which lies at the foundation of all activity, is thought.—109.

To the ripening of the moral character, belongs the strengthening of the moral conscience.—121.

That we concede a relation between bodily and mental gifts, that we regularly infer certain definite spiritual properties from the bodily phenomena, is a known experience. We conclude that in the muscular, stout-built child of the farmer we shall find a different mental equipment from what we should find in the bodily make-up of the tender child of the highly educated. Especially should the features of the face betray the inborn character and disposition.—63.

According to Ribot, intelligence is not a fundamental part of character. Such parts, or features, are found in instincts, tendencies, impulses, desires, feelings.—69.

Is character something constant, or is it subject to changes? On that subject the ablest writers differ. All depends upon how you look at the question, and where you begin. Schopenhauer is confident that character never changes. Dr. Elsenhaus, with his intelligent view of things, is confident that character is affected not only by education but by all the external influences around.—80.

The character of man is no simple thing, but a very complicated phenomenon, the product of a great number of influences.—83.

The play of the child is not idle sport, as we had supposed; it is development and progress. It is of far greater importance for the child than people usually imagine, in the formation of character.—85.

The character of men, and even our own character, appears to us as a mixture of features inborn and things acquired—91.

Every individual generally receives the content of his spiritual life from the community in which he lives and with which he associates.—91.

The origin of character never comes without the co-operation of other men—an influence which is sometimes designed and sometimes not. The child comes in contact with its comrades and with grown people, and unobserved, powerful influences are thus going on continually.—95.

RELIGIOUS BELIEF

We have been giving considerable attention in all of our later works to the subject of Religion, because it is a living, moving, urgent question, fundamental in character and of the greatest possible interest to society as a whole.

Just now, the condition of things in connection with this problem—and with social and political questions as well—is radically different from what it was twenty five years ago, not only in America, but seemingly throughout the civilized world. We would not say that religious questions are settled at last. But certainly new facts have come to light, and new conclusions have been arrived at on this all-important subject. What we do say, and what all progressive thinkers admit, is that there has been, within a very few years, a radical and most remarkable change among intelligent and observing men on this whole question of religion.

This revolution is, like all revolutions in thought and belief, quiet and undemonstrative in character, and yet none the less is it strikingly effective. People may still believe in God and the Bible, but not in God and the Bible as people did fifty, a hundred, or a thousand years ago. How the change will finally settle down, and what will be the position taken by former believers in this all-absorbing and comprehensive doctrine, it is quite impossible for any student of thought to say just

now. He must simply wait and see. In that direction, there is nothing that needs discussion at this time. Certain it is, religion will not disappear—it will be presented in a new form and a new dress, doubtless, in accordance with the spirit of the age and the good sense of mankind. What is wanted just now is a new interpreter. Of course he will be a man, an ordinary man—but above all things, he should be the *right kind of man, with the right doctrine to advocate* and the right message to deliver.

In a work of this kind, at this time, there is something to be said upon the origin and development of religion, its character, and its influence upon the history of mankind. Religion is a product of man's thought and imagination, and as such it should be treated in all philosophical discussions. It is at all times purely mental, and it is therefore abstract in its nature and strictly intangible. Religion under any and all conditions is simply belief, and what we believe is merely what we think, what we feel. People have different religions simply because they were born different, in different climes or countries, and they were reared under different circumstances, with different associations and under different influences. Every man is born unquestionably with a tendency to a thought and belief that differs materially from that of other men.

The nations that lived before our time, and that finally faded away and were lost to view forever, came to realize the fact that they had to have at least one god for every town, every city, and indeed one for every family. Without a god, how could people get along in the world? The common belief among ancient peo-

ples, and to a large extent among moderns also, was that without gods to protect, assist and advise us, there would be no living in this world! And the people who so believed, be it remembered, were quite as enlightened as the people are who live and flourish today. In fact, we are all polytheists, as we shall find when we come to understand fully ourselves and our belief. We should dismiss at once the ridiculous notion that *we* are the center of the universe, as many people have believed in the past, and that *we* have all the truth, wisdom and virtue that is to be found on earth.

Even Rome, proud and powerful as it was, played the spiritual or religious part of the drama with striking success. A great many people embrace religion who do not believe in it at all. They have learned that it is a fine thing for the family and that for state purposes, on state occasions, it is practically indispensable. No one doubts that it is a good thing for the wives and children, and so it is for the public as a whole. It is a great mistake to believe that religion was ever intended for everybody in the commonwealth. Some people do not want it, others will not have it, and so they dispense with it entirely. It is with religion as it is with laws and many other things. Many people have a total disregard for the laws, and many are ready to trample on them at any time.

At the earliest practicable moment, the reader should get the impression removed from his mind that it is the mission of religion to make men better than they are, at any time or in any place. Over and over again it has been said, and said truly, that religion has not, necessarily, anything to do with morals. If we should

substitute the word "politics" for "morals," the claim would seem, no doubt, much better founded. There is, from the beginning, an intimate relationship existing between the church and the state. They usually operate together, because their interests come near to being identical. They could not do without the help of each other, and that is a fact fully realized by both parties. The author of *Babylonische Geisteskultur* very properly states that "the founder of a new state becomes the founder of a new religion."

People are trying, at the present day, to get along without gods, temples, priests and sacrifices, but history demonstrates clearly enough that the experiment uniformly proves a failure. Even the Israelites went back to their gods. Having only one god, is like the monogamic system in marriage. It does not suit everybody. It is evident that we must have some stable foundation for our general belief, and that can be found only in religion. Without some sort of supreme being, we can have no state, no laws and no morals, because there is absolutely no foundation on which they may rest. The question immediately comes up: Can we dispense with the state, the laws, and morals? Nothing could inspire the soldier on the battlefield like the belief in gods, and particularly the belief that the Almighty fights on his side! What would the armies of Egypt, of Babylon, of Alexander and of Mahomet have achieved without religious zeal and enthusiasm to urge them forward? The ancients found gods exceedingly useful, and they did not stop simply with one or two. Greece and Rome had deities by the

thousand. Indeed, was the census of gods ever actually taken?

Men have worshipped their ancestors in all countries, at least in primitive times; and in every community the elders have been held in the highest regard by their fellow men. All people seem to have had deities, at some time in their career, that were worshipped more or less devotedly. These gods, like those of Greece and Rome, usually appeared in the human form. Where impossible forms and shapes were presented, as in certain cases, we find beings that were monsters rather than gods. Moving upward, heroes were seen to gradate into gods; and moving downward, gods gradated into heroes. There never was any clear line of distinction between these two classes of creatures, men and gods. We have never learned from any source how heroes became gods, nor when gods became men. We know that gods fight for their favorites in war like men, but they never tarry after the battle, and while they fight like heroes, they vanish like gods. They are too elusive to be captured.

Even in the remote past, the thinking portion of mankind understood very well that *gods have no existence outside of the mind of man;* and the form in which they appear and the achievements with which they are credited correspond in all cases with the conception of the deity that is found to prevail among the enlightened people of the time. As men make their gods, so it is well known that these beings change from age to age to correspond with the images and thoughts that are popular with the masses. There is a flexibility and elasticity about this religion that Christianity, which is

a book-religion, does not possess. It must not be forgotten that every god is simply an idea that has *grown and developed* in time, like any other *idea*. This is all that any god ever was or ever could be.

What is true of the gods is of course true of religion as a belief. Men feel themselves inspired on religious matters, and finally they have a dream, a vision, a revelation direct from above! Some of them have a private talk with the Supreme Being, and in a few instances a claim has been put forward that a remarkable set of plates has been found!

We know very well how religions have come to be established. They come from feeble beginnings and are developed slowly. They always originate in a story, a fiction, a bit of imagination, from the brain of man. It is well known that a story never loses anything, and a religious story of course does not. Every man tells what he believes, and he suppresses what fails to answer his purpose. We know that religions differ because stories differ, and stories differ because men fail to think and see alike. As a matter of fact no two individuals ever have the same religion, since they never see things in the same light. People, we know, never have the same thought, and they do not use the same language. Religion is the product solely of *belief*, and belief is the personal acquirement or possession of man.

No religion, we apprehend, ever was founded without a resort to trickery and deception at some stage of the proceeding. How could it be otherwise, when the whole scheme, unquestionably, is *the product of ordinary imagination?* Those who start out to found re-

ligions are honest enough in their way, but when lies are so current, so convenient, and so difficult to detect, why should not these people, these medicine-men and wonder-workers, condescend to tell a fib occasionally, just for the good of the cause? It is well known that a little imagination has a tendency to embellish any story, and thus it can be rendered more interesting without any additional expense. And what harm could it do, really, when nobody ever knows the difference?

The people of this planet as we know them are natural born world-makers and designers of gods. They are endowed with certain inventive powers that adapt them for just such a task as this. Every people, so far as we know, tells its own story on this subject, in its own imaginative way. The story of the creation of the world and the early appearance of man has been told very circumstantially, in much the same way, by many writers. It seems that after the world was made and everything was in working order, the next step taken as a natural sequence was the publishing of a code of laws—setting forth what man must do, or at least what some men must do, and what must be left undone. And it is really remarkable to notice to what an extent these codes agree, even in cases where the peoples themselves are, seemingly, in no way related!

The Chinese got their code, their laws, their religion, from Confucius, who by the way was an ordinary mortal, and he never for a moment pretended to be anything else. He never even saw God at any time, nor did he find any plates. But, we really do not see how he ever got along without them. Joseph Smith had a real nice set, said to be direct from God! Ma-

homet got his word of God from Gabriel, or he said he did. He got it on the installment plan. Moses got his laws in tablet form, on the Mount, where they were left by the Lord. Moses did not see God face to face at any time, though according to scripture, Ex. 33-23, he was permitted to have a rear view. Gautama, too, who founded the leading Hindoo religion, was an ordinary man, like Zoroaster and others. He got along pretty well without plates and was not invited to see God at any time. He failed to get an interview.

It may be noted in this place that Philosophy, like Religion, is wholly a matter of belief, and not of knowledge. Do we wonder that no two men ever have the same belief? Why should they? They do not have the same mouth, the same nose, the same eyes and ears, the same thoughts, the same feelings; they do not have the same opportunities and they are not subject to the same influences. They do not have the same teachers or teachings. Why should they think, or act, or feel, or believe alike on any subject? Certain it is, *they never do.*

What has our philosophy, our religion, to do with the philosophy or religion of some other person? Every man has his own questions to ask, and he is entitled to such replies as best meet his own conditions. Perhaps he does not wish for any reply at all. So be it. Fortunately, *two men may differ, and both may be right.* That is something, we know, that very often happens. Truth is never an exclusive matter to be appropriated, even for one moment, by any select or favorite few. There is enough truth in this world to

go around and give every man and woman his or her equitable portion, simply for the asking.

When we come to Greece and Rome and inquire about the conditions of Philosophy and Religion in those countries, we find things so mixed, as between gods and men, that it is difficult to distinguish one class from the other; and when it comes to the distinction between philosophy and religion, it is quite impossible to determine where one begins and where the other ceases. After all, this is by no means strange. We have in fact but one world, one thought, one religion, one philosophy for all mankind. We have so many worlds and ideas and images and religions as we appear to have, merely *because we have so many different people*. If there were but one man in the world, things would necessarily become unified and harmonious. In such a case, it would be impossible to have discord. It takes two at least to start dissension. Religion in itself is a unit; the multiformity arises solely from the divergent views and thoughts of men.

In this place quite as well as elsewhere, we feel that we may dwell briefly upon the power and dominion of man. It must be evident to any one who takes the trouble to reflect that all the work that is performed in this world is done by man, and not by God. It is the thought of man, rather than the power of the Almighty, that appears to rule the universe. If man did not actually create the world, he certainly is the one who gives the details of the transaction after the

job is completed. God himself is no author, no writer, no composer, no newspaper editor or journalist. No, it is man that attends to the advertising department quite generally. Look around and tell us what one thing is known to be a specimen of God's own handiwork. He may have created the world, but there is to-day no evidence of that fact, if fact it proves to be. He is not at present in the world. He is not only absent, as they say of soldiers in the army, but even "unaccounted for." He may be taking his vacation or *siesta*. But man is here, and he is the only workman found regularly employed on the premises.

God certainly does not make the rivers run, the grass grow or the planets revolve. All these things, and many others beside, go on evidently without God's permission or intercession. God is absent, but, as intimated, man is here—as lively and as officious as ever before. Man is apparently master of the situation. He takes full charge of affairs for the present. Nothing seems to be done unless man does it, or at least orders it to be done. What a helpless being is God! If he does anything, man must be sent for to tell the story *in all cases,* or we may be assured it *never would be told.*

Is it not a strange thing that there is nothing self-supporting, self-asserting, or self-acting in the whole make-up of God? All that we know or ever expect to know of him is simply what man records or reports. And yet he is called omnipotent! Again, we ask, what can he do, *what has he ever done?* Man occasionally kills a sheep in God's remembrance, but he always takes pains to see that the choice pieces are placed on his own table. All that God gets, usually, is the savor;

the priests and the devotee get the rest. About the truth of the statements that have just been made, there need be no question. A very interesting book might be written in the form of a biography of God, if the work were found to be properly executed when it is finally completed.

It must be some satisfaction for God to know, if he knows everything, that man with all his power and presumption has his troubles and tribulations like other creatures. Man wants happiness, among other things, but it is something that he has never yet secured. He spends a life-time in gaining riches, and when the coveted prize is won, he either gives it away or he has it deposited in his coffin when he dies. He cannot create the simplest thing. He cannot make a spear of grass grow. By his individual effort, he cannot add an inch to his height, or to the height of any other person. Indeed, there is a host of things that man cannot do. He cannot add one minute to the allotted length of his life. He can combine things, he can arrange and rearrange them, as the child does with its playthings, and that is as far as he can go. He cannot make anything, or do anything, that is in any sense new. All he does is to repeat, repeat, repeat, as the composer or the player does with notes in music, and as the mathematician does with his characters in algebra. How could any man ever get out of himself, or away from himself? He knows only man, and he talks only to man, about man always. If a picture is made or a book printed, it is only by man, for man. If a hill of corn is grown, or a tree is cut down in the forest, it is by man, for man always.

And still man is only an atom, a shadow, a mere item, in creation! Man's art, as we have already seen, consists in combining and arranging parts or elements already well known, a fact that is best illustrated in the making of gods by the ancients. A new god was presented from time to time by them, but in every instance made out of old elements, as in the case of Centaur and Pegasus.

Were the gods of Greece and Rome real? Certainly they were real, if we view them as combinations and developments. They were images and conceptions, it is true; no one pretends that they were living gods in any other sense. The ancients talked about such things, we know, but they were never serious about the matter. We are no better off to-day than were the ancients. We have thoughts and images now, and we treat them always as if they were *actual, living things.* It will be remembered that we never see and know things themselves, as we shall have occasion to observe in the course of this work over and over again. *Our whole dealing is through the medium of thoughts, images and phantasms, as it was with the Greeks and Romans in their day.*

It should not be forgotten for a moment that religious thought and religious belief is not essentially different in any respect from our common everyday belief in social and business matters. Our thoughts in the domain of religion are always dreams, and our thoughts in everyday life are nothing more. No fact is established more clearly than that writers allow their fancies and imagination to run without restraint in all departments of literature—not alone in history and

fiction, but in poetry, in science, in art, in philosophy. Romance is by no means so limited in its domain as most people suppose. It is not exceptional; it is rather the prevailing feature in literature. This we shall see constantly as we proceed.

Dr. Meumann's sentiments are in the same direction, as we see in his excellent work on *Intelligenz und Wille*, from which we quote as follows: "For Schelling and Hegel it was wholly a subordinate question whether their fantastic nature-philosophy, from the standpoints of empiric nature-inquiry out, did or did not appear as pure nonsense, and vague, useless play with analogies. What interested them was the construction of possibilities which might be of importance for their fanciful comprehension of the world."—143.

"Even with Schopenhauer and Fechner this feature returns. Although Fechner busied himself with showing that he had proven that plants had souls, in no case is his proof anything else than a play with wholly remote analogies between certain life utterances of plants and the psychic (soul) expression of men and animals." —143.

"For Fichte it is characteristic that in his dialectic method, the ideas gain a flowing, liquid character, the logical differences and contrasts disappear, and the purely symbolical and metaphorical comprehension of ideas plays a greater part than any logical distinction." —288

GRIECHENTUM ZUM CHRISTENTUM

Dr. Adolf Bauer, University of Gratz, 1910

This is a work of uncommon merit, well written and carefully considered, and it must be conceded that

the author has handled this difficult theme in a masterly manner. It has been well understood all along that the civilization of Greece has exercised a powerful influence upon the thought, belief and philosophy of the whole of Europe, together with much of northern Africa and Asia Minor. But those who take the pains to read carefully the interesting work of Dr. Bauer will find that this influence is more extended, and it penetrates deeper, than the literary world has generally suspected. It is becoming evident that our religious creed has been shaped and colored by Greek thought quite as well as our political and philosophical notions have been.

We have, at this time, the space to spare for merely a cursory notice of the important teachings of the work before us, but we shall be able to bring out a few thoughts that we have in view. It has long been known among thinking and inquiring men that our lessons in law-making, and in the administration of the affairs of a conquered people, must be learned from Rome. But when it comes to the management of affairs at home, and the development of the state, we must turn to Greece. In Greece we find the first and most important models of the state—the city-state, to use the term applied by the Germans, with Athens and Sparta taken as examples.

We know to-day that the centuries after Alexander's death constituted an unusually important period of history generally, and of Greek history in particular; and it was at this time that Greek culture worked most directly and effectually upon Roman culture and civilization, and therewith, also, upon our own at last. This Hellenistic influence cannot be overestimated. —11.

In the Grecian state is not only the rule of law for the first time realized, but the Greek city-states have performed the imperishable service, in opposition to the simple subject-obedience for oriental despots, of

having created the personal and political rights of the citizen. The identity of state and ruler, which prevailed in the East as the fundamental law, was given up. For the Grecian constitution, the state is identical with the people as a body—*22*.

Mankind must thank the Greeks as well for science generally as also for the science of the state, for politics; they were the first who made the state an object of scientific inquiry.—*25*.

Political science reached in Plato and Aristotle their high point at a time when the Greek city-state signified nothing more than a living political power. Both philosophers held, in theory generally, that no other form of state was possible than the city-state. For these thinkers also, the science of the state, politics, is the realization and completion of ethics—*26*.

The spiritual achievements of the Greek statesmen and thinkers worked long after, and they work yet today among us, in both the political and the religious domain.—*27*. The kingdom of which Plato and Aristotle preached was not of this world.

Not prophets and priests, but poets and philosophers, in old Greek-land, and in the Hellenistic world, demanded the moral perfection of man. The best Greeks, all before Plato and Aristotle, treated not the church, but their city-state as the institution which should serve this high purpose.—*27*.

The immediate consequence of the victory of Macedonia was the national union of Greece—Sparta alone standing aside—*29*.

Alexander was the first prince who treated the advancement of learning, or science, as a matter for the king to care for—*46*

Out of Alexander's kingdom there arose a number of independent states, in all of which Greek culture prevailed Egypt, Syria, Macedonia, Pergamos.—*33*. In Egypt, the Ptolemies, Greek rulers, followed Alexander.

In reality, history repeats itself so little as life. It remains as the proper problem for history, to recognize historical facts in their individual form, their separateness. This applies as well in case of apparent as of real analogies.—53.

Only in Egypt do we find the king, since the remotest time, becoming the highest god in the flesh in the whole land. After the idea of the Egyptians, the bearer of unlimited power could not be a mere man.—54.

Dr. Bauer has the belief that the idea of elevating Alexander to the rank of a god was not borrowed either from Persia or Egypt. It came from Greece, where the people were accustomed to raise men to heroes, and heroes to gods.

The gods of the Greeks are morally colorless, but in power they are almighty. As everything good, so does everything bad comes from the Almighty. The near relations between gods and men developed the idea that not only the Greek kings of early time, but all the nobles of historic ages, so far as is generally known, trace back their origin to heroes or gods. The hero was one who was originally a man, to whom after death godly honors were conceded.—60.

We come now to the leading thought of the author —the close relations that we might expect to find between "Griechentum" and "Christentum." We have long known that the Greeks for centuries had an intercourse more or less friendly with the Asiatics who resided on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, or who like the Chaldeans and Persians, being not far inland, could be reached very readily for the purposes of trade or commerce.

The first thing to be borne in mind in this connection is that creeds or doctrines are never the property or possession of any race of people, or of any country. Christ, no doubt, was a Jew; and many or most of his

followers, at first, may have been Jews also. But it does not follow for that reason that our religion is Jewish or Israelitish. Paul, who was more the founder of Christianity than Christ ever was, can hardly be denominated a Jew. He was Greek in thought, sentiment and expression; and he hailed from Tarsus, a famous Greek city in Asiatic Turkey. According to the feeble light that we get in regard to his history and his wanderings, to say nothing of his death, most of his ministry was passed among the Greeks and Romans —certainly not among the Jews, a people from whom he could hardly expect a very friendly reception.

It should be remembered that the Christian religion was not made in a day, a year, nor a century. Nor was it made in any one place. Indeed, it is by no means done making yet. It is being made to-day, and it will go on making, and unmaking, forever and forever. So it is with all the agencies in the world. It is not only with religion, it is so with everything. It goes on making and changing forever! That is nature's method. Finally, we people are all apt to be careless in the claims and representations that we put forth. We pretend, or we demand too much, and often we do so with very little thought or consideration on our part.

Dr. Bauer has made a very strong case in what he says, in his book, on the Hellenizing of Christianity. It was a very strong case of itself to begin with, without the aid of argument or peroration. All that was necessary was to prepare and array the facts—that was all.

Every important fact or event in Christ's history bore the Greek imprint in some way. It was a very common thing, in both Greece and Rome, for men to trace their origin to gods, especially after these men had risen to fame. According to the Greek way of thinking, it was one of the most natural things in the world, that Christ, who claimed to be a god, should

have a God for a father! That Christ should rise again after being dead for three days, is a piece of tragedy that had often been enacted before. Such things have frequently happened, if we may believe all we hear and read. The cross, too, is much older than Christ. In fact, we never get anything really new in any new religion.

In the last centuries, before the beginning of our era, the belief was spread abroad very generally, in both Grecian and Roman circles, that in order that any man should be good and powerful, he must be a godlike being.—87.

To be a savior in ancient times, was no uncommon phenomenon by any means. Many men came to be called "saviors," a few centuries or a thousand years ago. Ptolemy, of Egypt, was a "savior," a Greek "savior."

Dr. Bauer is quite right, in his position on page 93, that advances in the morals of an age are never effected in any way through religion.

The Dr. has given us many important pages, in his book, that are devoted to the character and history of the gospels. We regret that we could not find room for much that is said in this connection. The author remarks: In later times the deceiving appearance comes forward as if these gospel writings were really something different from ordinary literature—being sacred writings!

There has been too much *canonizing,* as the author very properly suggests. Canonizing puts a stamp on a doctrine or a claim, but it *fails to improve its character* in the least. The Dr. is plainly not partial to book-religion, and we do not at all wonder at that. Independent thinkers are rarely so inclined.

In concluding this article on Religious Belief, we propose to introduce a few brief paragraphs from the pages of two of the popular works of Dr. R. Eucken, of the University of Jena. We did not have it in mind, at the outset, to dwell at any length on this theme at this time. The question is not now a live one, as it is in the case of Education, in which the movement is just beginning, and it has not even yet taken form. The subject of religion seems to be one in which the people, at present, have no great interest, at least in America. Men have convictions or opinions on this, as on other questions, and they doubtless think that more cannot properly be demanded of them.

We have planned to give a small amount of space to this topic in the work before us, not by way of discussion or criticism but for the publishing of certain sentiments which might be taken as signs or indications of the opinions or feelings of learned and conservative men on the important question of Christianity.

In this case we do not appeal to authority, because we do not consider it a matter in which authority is competent to decide. It is a question mainly of sentiment or opinion from among those whose judgment on literary matters are usually highly regarded; and when we get through, we shall not pretend for one moment that we have established any truth. As an indication of the trend of modern thought, to which this work is devoted, these excerpts will certainly be found valuable. We have thought that no works would serve our purpose better at this time than those of Dr. Rudolph Eucken. He does not seem to have taken up

the subject of religion specially at any time, but he has for many years been a persevering and ambitious student of Philosophy, and it is impossible for any one to write at length on that subject without giving more or less attention to the subject of religion. The two subjects are at all times inseparable. When we know how a man stands on philosophy, we also know by inference how he stands on religion.

Dr. Eucken is a professor in the University of Jena and he is the author of many popular works. In 1908 he was honored with the Nobel prize in Literature. He is at all times a pleasing writer, a candid as well as an industrious inquirer, and no author is more careful than Dr. E. about the correctness and soundness of everything that he sends to press. He is greatly interested, not only in all the leading questions that come under the head of Metaphysics, but on questions of Ethics and Religion as well. His criticisms on religion are from one of its most earnest supporters, but when he is called upon to speak, he never likes to stop short of the plain truth.

In every instance we make the quotations as short as practicable, because we have but a limited amount of space to spare for such a purpose. In a few cases, we give the sentiment in our own words, for the sake of brevity. But in all cases we have been careful to see that the author is neither misquoted nor misunderstood.

Our first quotations are from the well known work entitled *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart.* Dr. R.

Eucken, Leipsig, 1909. (Mental, or Spirit-currents of the Present). As follows:

What sweeps by us, is finally nothing less than the idea of a new man and a new culture.

So these doubts remain uncontradicted, and likewise the question remains open, whether culture is a blessing or curse for mankind.—237.

For man's comfort, culture appears more damaging than useful. It begets unlimited desires, and it costs untold pains and labor.—240.

Insupportable, finally, becomes all that ornamental "shine"-culture, as it goes out especially from our million-cities; ever farther extends the distance between what is announced as the aim and what is secured at last by striving; ever greater becomes therewith the *untruthfulness of life*. This must be resisted; the growing discontent shows clearly enough that such a movement is already in course.—243.

After all the labor of a thousand years, it stands herewith ever grievously enough. In spite of all advancements how little, how insignificant, is ever yet that which falls to the lot of the overwhelming majority, from the treasures of civilization, how thin is the stratum, or portion, which participates in the movement to a higher culture! A thousand years and over, Christianity has come to a fast inner possession, to a deep penetrating conviction.—318.

Our time contains many signs of age and decrepitude.—318.

So a heavy crisis is coming, and it is not to be ignored. It must be decided whether or not to-day's culture and society possesses the power to perfect our inner composing and the spiritual elevating of life, and therewith to resist the coming dissolution.—321.

From whatever side we look at morals, it presents a demand for a renewed world; there lies in it a re-

versal of the nearest look of things, and therewith metaphysics. We will not let metaphysics go, even if we turn ourself to morals.—326.

There was a time at first when the Deity was near to our existence: then the inspiring power was bound to man very closely, but finally God disappeared wholly, or retreated to a distance that made him inaccessible. So has religion, for modern man, sunk from an all-ruling power to a mere secondary power, yes, to a mere illusion.—393.

Never has the denying of religion so penetrated the masses, never has so great an antipathy prevailed against it as is the case to-day.—394.

Sorrowful complications appear by every attempt at an upbuilding of life without all religion.—396.

A tottering religion at present is not to be denied, and it should not be concealed.—402.

Where a religion draws with itself so much that is foreign and aged, where the debris of a thousand years or more covers and conceals the eternal truth, there it cannot develop its full power with certainty of success.—402.

SINN UND WERT. By the Same Author.

Finally, for this course of thought, the whole religion becomes a product of man's phantasy, its kingdom a mere web of illusions, an empty realm of shadows—12.

With such a convulsion and in the midst of such doubt, it is impossible that religion should take fast hold upon man; it cannot rule his life, it cannot determine his sense and worth—13.

The effect of religion becomes weakened to-day through its connection with an older form, which no more corresponds with the world-historical condition of spirit-life. The place of religion has wholly changed—150.

It no more has its lead as formerly, and it does not impress its stamp as it formerly did, but inside of that whole, it must found and justify itself—151.

Our personality, and our spirituality is, that we see the things around us only through our spiritual organization—152.

KNOWLEDGE

How shall we acquire Knowledge? How shall we recognize Knowledge after it is acquired? These are complicated and serious questions, and they are, necessarily, extremely difficult to answer. There is, however, hardly any room for doubt on this one fundamental point, namely, that practically all our knowledge is simply a development of self. We can never go out of or beyond ourself; we cannot commune with others. We cannot even interpret the language of other people or other creatures; we have no means of ascertaining the true thoughts and conceptions of those whom we meet, or those with whom we attempt to converse. It is simply impossible to get anything beyond an approximation in any of such cases. The language that others use is simply an expression of their feelings, but all the ideas that we ever get from any such source must always be merely the work of our imagination—pure thought and guess-work at last.

It should be borne in mind constantly that all our thinking, and our whole daily converse, is with ourself. When we talk, it is really to ourself and with ourself—in all such cases, it is purely a soliloquy. And so it is when we think, and when we sing or pray. Strictly speaking, we are not conscious of the presence

of any other being but ourself at any time. When we undertake to converse with our fellow men, we do not really talk *to* them. We are merely making an effort, more or less successful, to indicate to them our feelings, and those with whom we are conversing are doubtless striving to do the same thing. Everybody is anxious at all times to tell how he feels and what he thinks. But we never gain much reliable knowledge from such an origin as that. We get ideas second-hand in that way, and nothing more. All the ideas that we get from outside sources, from poets, authors, troubadours and story-tellers, are uniformly second-hand, and they should be so rated. They are mere images, conceptions that we have formed in our mind, as a result of what we have heard or read. They are simply the skeletons of thoughts, mere dry bones they are, as a general thing. What ideas do people gain by reading books of travel, or descriptions of any kind? They are always false and imperfect—always second-hand. We get amusement in that way, but rarely do we get any great amount of reliable information.

There is no teaching equal to that in which the lessons given are derived from experience. In this direction, travel affords the greatest advantages. Of course the information that we get through that medium comes mainly through the senses, and these are not always reliable, but it is the best medium that we have for gaining valuable knowledge. In fact it affords the only means of learning just how the world presents itself to the ordinary observer. Travel not only gives us light and knowledge, it gives us health; it gives us

confidence in ourself; it gives us business notions and makes us acquainted with men and affairs. We are inclined to agree with Sterne, in "Tristram Shandy," that "an ounce of a man's own wit is worth a ton of that of other people." It is what a man knows and has felt, and not simply what he has heard, that possesses real value. People are apt to place too high an estimate on books, and many there are who read too much and inquire and reflect too little. Some books are valuable, and some are not. Authors as a rule have too slight an acquaintance with the world, and therefore they frequently write much more than they know. They draw too heavily at all times upon the imagination. Some people have formed the opinion that it is a difficult thing to write books. It is not difficult at all to write books—we mean some books. Many authors have a facile pen, but it would be better for the world if they wrote with less facility.

How shall we ever know the truth about any person or anything? We do not know, and we cannot know. We only think we know, we imagine, and finally we believe we know. That is as far as we can possibly go in our journey towards a knowledge of the external world. What do we know to-day, that is worth mentioning, of Caesar, Napoleon, Jupiter, Diogenes, or Sindbad the Sailor? What we read, what we hear, is not knowledge in any proper sense, though it may afford us at times more or less diversion. It should also be remembered that we can never form an idea of a body that is constantly in motion, constantly changing its place and position. For us to see and understand things, they must be fixed at some point. But

nothing in this world, not even the sun, moon and stars, has any fixed position even for one moment. Everything moves, and changes constantly, and strangely, too, it is constantly at rest. Nothing can be thought of as existing without being coupled with its opposite, as heat and cold, darkness and light, vice and virtue, wickedness and goodness. Such things always come in pairs.

While it is undoubtedly the fact that we can learn only by our own efforts, and the germ of knowledge is wholly ours, it is also true that without contact with others, without suggestion and incitement from outside sources, we shall never make any progress in the way of intellectual advancement.

It is not lack of wisdom so much that bothers the people of this country. No doubt wisdom is rather a scarce article, and people ought to be excused if they do not happen to have it by them at all times. But common sense, ordinary intellect and general information—these are common, everyday matters, and nobody is excusable for not having these things in his possession, ready for use on any occasion or for any emergency. We need not feel ashamed of what we do not know about the economy and the domestic arrangements that are supposed to prevail in the sun or moon. They are rather remote worlds, and hardly any one is able to give us authentic and detailed information on matters pertaining to these heavenly bodies.

But the case is different entirely in our relation to the people and creatures of this planet. We ought to know a great deal about men and things here below, and we ought to stand an examination on such simple

points almost any day, except Sundays. Why not? It is not the hidden, doubtful and distant things that we are concerned about just now. We will pass them by, or reserve them for a later date. Let us think, talk and inquire about plain home matters in everyday life. Why have we not a right to ask questions in this direction, and why should we not have intelligent answers in most cases, if not all? We venture to say, almost everybody has some leisure time in the course of the day. Why should he not use a portion at least of that leisure in garnering up facts, figures and information, to be used for himself in after life, as occasion may require or as opportunity may offer?

Simply for illustration, we call attention to a few interesting questions coming up in common life: How many of our readers know how the letters VI are placed on the face of an ordinary watch? The fact is, as any one will find with a little attention, the letters are not given at all—the circle of the second hand covering the space.

Do all elephants have tusks? Most people think they do, and even few books state the facts as they really are. Fully developed tusks are found only in case of males. Females sometimes have them, but they are short, small and unimportant. And so it is with all animals that have horns or bones provided for defence. Wild boars have tusks that prove to be a dangerous weapon, but the females are furnished only with teeth. So in the case of sheep, the male has powerful horns while the female has none at all, or those only that are small and feeble. With deer it is the

same, and so it is with horned animals generally. Antlers are usually found only among males.

How many and what teeth have cows, and cattle generally, in the upper jaw? In front, the cow has none—nothing but a bony gum which takes the place of incisors. In all ruminating animals, there is an absence of canine teeth and incisors, in the upper jaw, while the lower has six incisors and two canines. And there are six molars on each side of each jaw.

How many people understand the operation of "chewing cud" as witnessed at any time among our ruminating animals? What does a cow do, or how, when chewing her cud? When a cow eats, grass, for instance, she does not masticate her food to any extent; she merely packs it away into one of her stomachs, as we would into a basket, to be kept for future use. The chewing process comes later on, when the cow is at rest. The food is finally brought up into the mouth, by a muscular effort, in small quantities, in the form of balls, and then masticated, before it is sent back to another stomach, and finally to a fourth, from which it passes on and becomes sustenance for the animal.

It may be noted, in animals, that everything in the way of horns and teeth is in the nature of warts, humps or excrescences, growing out from the surface of bodies, and not a permanent or original part of the bony framework of the creature. We know that teeth drop out or are removed; so the antlers of deer drop off at one season and are renewed at another. Even the horn of the rhinoceros grows out, as a bundle of bristles, from the top of the mouth or muzzle. Horn is in theory a growth of the epidermis, and is to be

classed with nails, claws, bristles, feathers, scales, quills and hairs. Stag horns are properly bones and not horn. Ordinary horns, as of oxen, are fastened on a core of bone.

The general criticism that we make on the works of those who presume to write treatises on subjects, is that they do not generally give us the whole truth, and much of what is given is not accurate. We have plenty of unimportant facts, while it too often happens that the *really important and practical truths are overlooked, ignored, or suppressed.*

It should be observed that we know many things that we fail to take home to ourselves. We do not fully consider them; we do not really remember them. But what possible benefit can a truth be to us, if we do not consider it, or we do not remember it? So it is generally known that nothing lasts, but the fact is realized only by a very few. Everywhere it is understood that all men die, and yet there are but few that appreciate the truth that everything perishes finally. The most superficial observation will enable us to perceive that nothing endures beyond a certain limited period, that we have continued ebb and flow in this world, constant rise and fall, growth and decay. What is here to-day will be somewhere else to-morrow. The character and qualities of things do not change, but their form, their relations, their conditions do change. That which was once the bottom of a lake or an ocean becomes eventually the top of a mountain, or perhaps the barrier of some elevated continent. Nature's processes are gradual and imperceptible, but they are none the less certain. There may be a spasm occasionally,

an earthquake or a flood, but the great results that come from nature's operations are uniformly the work of ages.

There are those who imagine that truth and knowledge are exceptions to this rule, that these things at least are not only lasting but everlasting. This belief arises from an imperfect knowledge of the aspect and character of truth. These inquirers have not observed the usual career of truth as carefully as they might. Truth is really the most ephemeral, the most uncertain and unreliable of all things. It presses forward with the utmost presumption to-day, but it will be impotent enough to-morrow. Visit the public libraries, pass through their spacious halls and ample alcoves, and observe the "buried treasures" that are piled up there! Visit the home, if you may, of the bibliophile and notice more treasures of the same character filling the shelves of his superb library—superb we mean, from the fine furniture, the splendid gilding and the polished covers of the volumes that are collected there. Finally, if permitted, visit the cellars, the garrets, the storehouses of the publishers, and see for yourself the heaps of rubbish that have accumulated in those places —rubbish now, but valuable books of knowledge they were not a great while since. So it is with literature generally—popular enough one day, but counted as the merest trash not long after.

And so it is with truth in all cases; but nothing goes out of fashion so speedily, and remains forgotten and neglected so long, as literature! A discarded truth may occasionally return and be accepted after many years, but this is something that happens rarely. No

one can tell in advance what will be the fate at last of truth in any particular instance. Even publishers, with all their astuteness and their experience, frequently make sad mistakes in the book that they decide to accept or decline. Books depend wholly upon the caprice or humor of the public. But what could be more uncertain than the fancies of men?

It is well to bear in mind at all times, what we have said in the past over and over again, that statements found in books, no matter what the subject may be, are always *the opinion merely of some author.* Whether the claims presented by him are or are not accepted as truth, depends entirely upon the feelings of the reader in regard to the subject in question. The author himself is entirely powerless in the matter. There is no patent or preservative of any kind to protect the rights of truth; it cannot be supported, metamorphosed, or even strengthened by any power on earth. Truth is never the property or possession of any one man, and no one can do with it at any time as he chooses. It is impossible in any way to get a title to anything of the kind. It is really a product of nature, a development of the world, of the universe. It comes with the seasons, and it goes with the times. Its habits are those of the fleeting shadow; it is liable to appear or disappear at any moment.

Men are accustomed to take great pains to secure reliable information in regard to ordinary matters, sometimes important and sometimes trivial in character. Why should they not put forth equal efforts to obtain the facts in regard to the nature and possibilities of truth? We understand very well in other de-

partments, that mistakes in facts are liable to lead to serious consequences. Why should we not have some apprehensions when we come to errors in the domain of truth? Even so slight a mistake as taking medicine from the wrong bottle often leads, we know, to disastrous consequences.

What the world wants to-day is truth, the living truth, especially the truth in regard to all questions that arise daily in practical life.

IMAGINATION

The subject of imagination deserves some attention at this time even though the notice that it receives may be unimportant. There is more of this matter than people usually are wont to believe. Even children and savages make liberal use of the imagination, and all over the East people are accustomed to embellish their discourses with highly colored pictures, and with striking metaphors and high sounding phrases.

It is known that we see only what we think we see, and we supply with great aptness what seems to be needed to complete the pictures in accordance with our own notions of propriety. Such sketches when finished are treated as wholly our work, our production. But it must be remembered that our fancies never create; these images merely come to us from time to time as the developments of our nature and education. Thus, we see an object at a distance, just enough to give us the outlines and a few prominent features. It is presented to us, as all things are, in the lump. The

details of the picture are wholly our work, and these we complete finally from the combined operations of memory and imagination. We always fill up the vacant spots in just this way whenever objects are presented to our attention in any case.

All writers make use of imagination more or less freely. They set their mental apparatus in operation and then they go on forming their thoughts quite automatically indeed. This proposition is as true of philosophy and the sciences as it is of poetry, allegory and fiction. It is absolutely impossible to draw the line of demarkation between what is pure imagination and fancy, and what we may verify readily when proof happens to be demanded. However, we must not forget that nothing is really capable of demonstration in any department of knowledge.

The imagination has no power to create new objects, but it can develop new forms, new designs, indefinitely; thus, it can present new images or pictures, new conceptions or combinations. People are never actually instructed by any information that imagination furnishes; perhaps they are never even benefited in any way by its power, but they certainly are often amused or diverted. The imagination is the Mercury, the apt and ready messenger of fiction, and rarely is it anything more. It may sometimes serve as an anaesthetic, but it never really heals, never restores the patient to a sound and healthy condition.

It might be observed that it is much easier and more pleasant to follow the imagination in writing than it is to keep confined to simple facts. So it is easier always to tell lies than to speak the truth. Indeed,

what harm can there be in a little innocent fabrication occasionally? There is always some truth in all statements. Truth and lies sound exactly alike, and we do not wonder at all that lies come to be accepted as truth so generally as they do.

The imagination is of great service in all the arts, and especially in painting and sculpture. Artists, we know, do not paint what they see, but what they remember or imagine. Dr. Meumann calls attention to the possibility of having too much imagination. People often come to regard the product of their fancy as absolute reality, instead of being, as it is, something that is merely possible.

FACTS AND FICTION

What is the difference between mind and matter? Where shall we place the line of demarkation between the two? This is but an idle inquiry. The question is often asked, but it has never yet been answered—never at least to the satisfaction of the disinterested and intelligent inquirer. To be able to answer properly a question like this, we must know something of the form and nature of the things themselves. But in this case, as a matter of fact, we know nothing of either. It is conceded that the mind has no form, no limits, no attributes; really, we know nothing of it in any way. It is intangible and indescribable. And of matter we know quite as little as we do of the mind or soul. It is as ethereal in character as the mind or spirit is itself. But when we know nothing of things, what shall we say of them? The best way in such a case would be

to say nothing. But that is a sort of self-denial that could hardly be expected of any individual. The more ignorant people are, on any subject, the more ready they are to give their opinion.

So it is especially in the case of truth. Very few know what the truth is in the first place, and yet we shall find them perpetually talking on the subject and insisting upon having it served up to them for discussion both in and out of season. Books are published daily and hourly ostensibly to give the truth. It is assumed that readers demand something new and modern and that what has already been written on any subject must be antiquated, or at least incorrect and incomplete! What the last author writes on the matter in question is supposed to be alone the genuine article. This explains why we have so many new editions of works that have been published before.

It is admitted that very much of our "current literature" at the present day is simply fiction. Fiction, we know, is not the truth; it is merely suggestive of the truth. It does not tell what has happened, but what might happen, in almost any place, at almost any time. According to the conception of the writer himself, it is "true to nature," which is about as true as things are usually. We should remember that all we hear and see and read does nothing more for us than to bring back old recollections and remind us continually of the material world. From the material world all our pictures are drawn. Indeed, they could not be taken from any other source. The immaterial world furnishes no pictures.

As to fiction, we shall find on careful and critical

inquiry that it embraces a much larger field than is generally supposed. Fiction is mainly, if not wholly, a work of the imagination. But what more or less could be said truthfully of history, of science, of philosophy, of religion? All writing is mere thinking, and all thinking is simply imagination. Men write differently on the same subject, merely because they think and feel differently. All that we ever get, in any book, on any occasion, is merely some man's opinion. This undoubted fact should never be forgotten. When Fichte, Hegel, Schelling and Schopenhauer took it upon themselves to comment on what Kant had taught in philosophy, many years ago, they gave merely their views on the question, their thoughts, their sentiments and feelings. That is quite as much as any writer or speaker ever gives on any subject. When people presume to teach what they know on their own account, they certainly make a mistake. There is nothing that people *know* on their own account. It should be noted again that nowhere do we ever get truth and fact. All that we ever get in our investigations is the belief and impressions of men. We never get real proof in any case, much as the subject may be dwelt upon at all times. When we get what we accept as proof, we secure merely the impressions, feelings and opinions of this or that man or woman. And it is not evidence or demonstrations that convinces or impresses people. People believe or disbelieve usually according to their likes and dislikes, their prejudices, their preferences and their fancies. How often do we hate people who have done us absolutely no harm! It is rather our own feelings, our fancies, our tempera-

ment that inclines us either one way or the other. It is a very common occurrence that we love those who have done, and can do, us no good, and in many cases we love those who are quite unworthy of our affections.

Logic has very little to do with our convictions, resolutions or impressions. *What men should believe is one thing, and what they do believe is another.* It is our will, our character, our inclinations, our feelings that ordinarily decide the question. So many histories as there are, of Napoleon, of Nero, of Alexander, so many and so various are the opinions of men. The subjects themselves do not change—it is the world that changes. There is, and there was, but one Napoleon, but he has many histories. Such is nature, such is man. Ideas and forms change continually, but men themselves never.

To a very large extent, men see as they are inclined to see, and as they wish to see. No man ever sees another man as he is, and we can never know which or what is the true view. So we are left to give any view or impression that pleases us, but we should in all cases give them simply as our impressions and stop there. This is the position that every historian, every writer should take. Every man should do as he likes, but he should have a reason for what he attempts and be honest in all his statements.

It will be remembered that the writers of the Bible never confined their statements to things that they could prove. They never said a word about proof. Evidently they had none to give, and, naturally enough, they avoided that subject. They claimed that the Bible was authentic, was true, and so of course the

contents of the book must be true. The Bible writers, like other writers, merely stated what they felt, imagined, believed, and for them at least the question of truth did not arise. This is substantially the case with writers in other departments of literature. People do not usually write what they know and can prove, but what they think, feel and believe, leaving the reader to accept or reject the evidence as he chooses.

It should be borne in mind that man's chief mission in this world is to interpret nature. But how shall he interpret it? Man must do here, as he does in other cases, interpret nature as he wills to interpret it, and when he is done, he should make no greater pretensions than the facts of the case warrant. At best, no matter how great or how grand a man is, he is able to give merely his opinion—and nothing more. No man can go beyond himself in any case. In history, as in poetry, allegory and fiction generally, the author paints all his figures after his own conception. He does not color from nature, but *from his own mind,* his own fancy, his own character, his memory. Whatever a man writes at all times is *from himself,* because of himself, not because of the world at large. Every writer is his own builder, his own artist; he designs, combines, constructs and establishes on his own account. Men write clearly only when they have mastered their subject, and when they think and see clearly.

What is there to be seen in any picture, any poem, any work or structure, any writing? Merely and simply what some man has put there. If it is a chair, a face, a finger, a vase, that we notice in the painting,

we may be sure some one put it there. And if some of these things are not there, as they ought to be, this, like all delinquencies, must be charged up to some man, some agent. *All that we see in this world, all that any one sees, is the thought of man.* Man alone interprets nature; man alone perceives and appreciates what is to be seen and appreciated. All around us is the evidence of thought—the design and conception of man. Were it not for man, and his thoughts, there would be no world—nothing!

Nothing is more real than things that are usually denominated "spiritual." Even material things are spiritual and elusive in their nature. And it should not be forgotten for a moment that we never actually deal with material things. They are in fact intangible, and quite beyond our reach. We are concerned merely about *ideas of things*, about images, remembrances, and these we must reflect upon, examine, combine and assimilate before we can accept them and make them a part of ourselves. Again, it is never the whole thing that we are concerned about in any case. We know nothing of the whole of things; we notice, in practice, only parts of things, signs of things, and always only one side at a time. When we notice a horse, for instance, or a tree, it is only some part of the object that attracts our attention. It is the head of the horse, perhaps, or the hoof; or it is the branch of the tree, or the leaf, or the bark.

We do not perceive the leaves of a tree when we observe it at a little distance. We see only some color, a certain space that is occupied. We may see a leaf, but never two or more leaves at a time. It is the leaf-

effect merely that we get when we look at a tree as a whole. The leaves are rarely individualized by the painters of scenery. *The effect may in all cases be taken as the real thing.* Do we see all that is before our eyes? No, we see only that to which we attend, things only that we notice and remember.

We may add that matter, being destitute of thought or intelligence, is in itself absolutely powerless. Matter alone does nothing; intelligence, coupled with will, does everything. In other words, in all the realms of nature, it is found that matter taken alone and independent of thought, *does not count.* Without will, without the impulse and direction of thought, no body can move. To control will, there must always be some one who thinks. Will never acts without intelligence. Matter alone never feels any impression, it never thinks; it is the mind alone, the soul, that feels, thinks, perceives. The mind is influenced by thought, suggestion, example, association, as is abundantly illustrated in psychological experience. Mere physical force not directed by intelligence, is powerless. Taken absolutely alone the body is no better than a ton of coal or a load of wood. A ton of coal under certain conditions has great capabilities, but alone it counts for nothing. What is done in this world is always either directly or indirectly the work of the mind or the spirit.

We never really see persons or things, we see only reminders of them—the body, the head, the nose, the face. Of course we know that the body is not ourself. After death it is only the corpse, the remains; it is by no means the deceased. We may not see a horse at all, but only something that brings a horse to mind, and

hence we see it. We often see bears and ships and heads in clouds, where none really exist. All these things we have said before, but the earnest student will thank us for reminding him of them here.

RECKLESS STATEMENTS

Nothing is more deserving of serious attention on our part than the reckless and slovenly habit that prevails in this country in cases where statements made are supposed to be actual occurrences. Many are ready to assert as true at any time what in the end may prove to be nothing but fiction; but it is well to observe that the example we are setting in such cases is dangerous in its tendencies and corrupting in its influences. We take no pains to be accurate even in matters where we know that accuracy is of the highest importance. In such statements, we are ready at all times to accept the part of a thing for the whole, and especially so where this part happens to be the leading unit, or the majority of the whole. We are prompt to declare that a certain opinion is unanimous, when really it is only a portion of the people that have been heard on the question. We are often inclined to declare that what is claimed or affirmed by a few is really the voice of the whole country. We are constantly talking of public opinion, and at all times we are ready to pass off the sentiments of a party for the convictions of the great mass of people. It is proper to add here that as a matter of fact public opinion is a very uncertain quantity under all circumstances. Indeed, it is quite impracticable for us to ascertain what

the real opinion of the people is at any time on any important question. Too often it occurs that the public actually has no opinion on the matter at issue. It is simply waiting to find an opinion.

We have not only contracted the habit of counting the part for the whole, but also, in many cases, counting the same thing twice, and sometimes doing it repeatedly. If we hear that a few people endorse a doctrine, we do not hesitate to affirm that the whole body politic is arrayed on the same side of the question.

It is a very common thing, again, for partisans to assert that because everybody does not say so, therefore nobody says so. The real facts of the case are usually ignored, and finally they come to be forgotten. Because a few buildings are red, we are apt to declare that the whole town is red; and because some of its people are tall, we are ready to affirm that all are tall. We know as a matter of fact that some people are bad, and hence we are prompt to declare that the whole world is wicked.

It is a vicious habit that we have acquired of bundling together many dissimilar things, marking them with one and the same tag, and finally dumping them all into one box, as if they all actually belonged to one class. This is not fair, it is not just, it is not business-like. It should be observed that nature has no classes, no species, no categories of any kind. These are all exclusively the work of man. Certain it is, there is no clearly defined line by which to distinguish these classes. There is no safe means by which to distinguish a horse from what is not a horse, what is actually a wolf from what is not a wolf, or what we know to be

a rat from what we know is not a rat. It is no doubt convenient to classify, but in no case can classification be placed on a sound and substantial basis. Classify as we like, we shall always group together things that do not belong together. Nature has given to each and every individual its own particular characteristics. Even the tail of one dog is never an exact duplicate of the tail of another dog. There may be points of likeness, but there are also points of dissimilarity in all cases.

We speak of the Americans as Christians, as if they were really all Christians, when it is well known that only a few Americans, comparatively, subscribe to one and the same doctrine. So we call the French Catholics, as if the whole of that people were Catholics. The same illustration applies at elections. We say the people of the United States elected Andrew Jackson president, when in fact only a portion of the people, his own party, voted for him. The opposite party voted for some other candidate, while the women, and the men under twenty-one, did not vote at all. We say the people make the laws, when we know that it is only an influential few that have anything to do with that business. And so it goes on indefinitely in all the departments of life.

The innocent often suffer for the guilty, because they happen to belong to a class that has become offensive to the public. Anarchists are considered bad; therefore all Anarchists, and those who happen to be called so, must be bad. Some people know, and therefore everybody knows; some people of a country are rich and happy, therefore everybody in that country is

rich and happy. The Germans have many highly educated men, and therefore the Germans as a race must be highly educated. However, we know very well that none of these consequences follow naturally or necessarily. In fact, consequences never follow in any case, in the sense commonly understood. The truth of one proposition has *absolutely nothing* to do with the truth of some other proposition, and inferences are always unjust and unreliable.

The Egyptians, in their system of hieroglyphics, regularly used the part of an object as standing for the whole, and we to-day in thousands of ways are doing the same thing—we are using a part as the representative for the whole. We may illustrate our principle still farther. We say of one who travels that he reached England, when the fact is that it is Liverpool that he reached, or Portsmouth perhaps. Of course neither Liverpool nor Portsmouth is England. They are merely on the outer edge of that country. A man touches a horse's ear, or his nose, and we say he touches the horse, as if the horse, and his ear or nose, were one and the same thing. We speak of a herd of cattle, a flock of sheep, a multitude of men, when we know that in every instance there is only one individual of a kind in the body. If there be only one, how can there be a herd of them? If it is really a herd, it is a herd of something that is quite imaginary. There can be no mistake on this matter, if we take the question into careful consideration. Individuals may be perceived, but groups, crowds, companies exist only in the minds of men. The individuals may disappear, one or more at a time, but the flock will remain, show-

ing clearly that the individual and the flock are not identical. Nature takes cognizance of things, but never of groups of things.

We speak of the climate of India, of Mexico, of America, as if these countries had but one climate and one set of animals and productions. Even a single state like New York varies greatly in its climate and temperature, especially in winter. We speak of Florida as if it were all one spot, instead of its being as it is a long strip of land extending several hundred miles, with one climate at the north and another quite different at the extreme south. Latitude makes a difference in temperature, but altitude, as we notice in Mexico, and indeed in all countries, exerts a still greater influence. Large bodies of water have a great influence upon the temperature of the land lying contiguous.

A name is never any evidence or indication of character. We are accustomed to call all people Germans who reside in Germany, and all who reside in Turkey Turks. But people live or reside in Germany who are not Germans—they were not born there, and in no sense are they true Germans. This state of things is particularly noticeable in Turkey, a country that has to-day, as is well known, more Greeks than native Turks.

It is said that if one horse sells for $100, ten horses must sell for ten times as much! But is that really so, either in theory or practice? Is there no difference in horses, or in prices? Is it true that if we take three from ten, it leaves seven? Is seven really the difference, in practice, between three and ten? As

a matter of fact, we do not, and we cannot take three from ten.

Let us add that none of the operations of Arithmetic, or Algebra, or Geometry, have their counterparts anywhere in nature. They are merely operations or conceptions of the *mind*. Nature *never adds nor subtracts;* nature has no squares, circles, triangles, or *regular figures of any kind.*

At a meeting of historical societies held in New York in December, 1909, the leading subjects of discussion were the prevailing inaccuracies in historical statements, incompleteness and untruthfulness of statistics, and the exaggeration and recklessness noticed in reports generally. Prof. Hart, of Harvard, was most outspoken in his criticisms. He said, "the pressing danger of the republic may be found in want of accuracy in statements." Prof. Lowell, also of Harvard, deplored the inexact terminology of political science, and the unfamiliarity of many students with practical affairs.

IDENTITY AND THE SOUL

It would seem that the time had arrived when men and women of intelligence should turn their attention to the question of identity or reality, and make an effort toward getting rational views on this and kindred subjects. Of course there are many questions in this connection that never have been, and never will be answered; but on the other hand many things are agreed upon among thinking and intelligent men which

have never yet attracted the notice of the reading public in this country.

It is quite commonly understood among scholars, even those who have made but small advancement in metaphysics, that the bodies of men and animals which we see around us, together with nature's inanimate forms which we notice in our walks, are not the realities that they are usually presumed to be. What we call men are not men in fact; they are merely the forms, the images, the symbols, the representatives of men. For the purpose of illustration, we might refer to the gods of Greece and Rome, as they were found in the temples of those countries. They were called gods, and yet the ordinary masses very well understood that they were not gods in any true sense. They were simply the images or symbols of gods. So we, during life, forgetting the teachings and traditions that we have received, usually speak of the body as the man himself. But the slightest reflection on the question enables us to see that this presumed identity is entirely imaginary. However, the moment death occurs, we cease to have any doubts on the subject. No one for a moment speaks of the corpse as the person himself. What we see before us in all such cases is only the remains of the one who was known to us in life.

It is common for us to say, after the death of our beloved ones, that the spirit, the real individual, has taken its departure. This is an idea that has come to us through the teachings of the past, and we are at liberty to accept it or reject it as we like. But there is no evidence of a spirit, and certainly none of its flight. It is much better to tell the truth and concede that we

have absolutely no light at all on this subject. There seems to be no room or occasion for doubt that the living body never was anything more than an image or symbol. What we have in connection with this body, is merely impressions that have come to our mind through the senses. Of the real person, the spirit, we know absolutely nothing, because we have no means of communicating with a world that is outside of ourself and quite beyond the realms of our consciousness or intelligence. We do not consider it well to accept the notion, that for every individual there are two separate and independent existences—one physical and the other spiritual. As we have before intimated, the physical form is no being at all, any more than any piece of wood or stone would be.

People love to talk about the spirit world and rehearse stories that they have received from those who are supposed to reside in that distant land, but it would seem to be the proper thing first to establish the fact that there really is such a spirit world as people tell about. Thus far we have never been favored with a particle of evidence bearing on that question. All that has appeared has come through and from the mind of man exclusively, and naturally enough, all the images and phantasms that we get from that source are uniformly terrestrial in character, rather than spiritual or immaterial.

We deem it not amiss to repeat here what we have said before that man does everything, says everything, and he pretends to a knowledge that takes in the universe! But one thing is certain, he never creates anything new, never contrives or constructs anything

really original. He has never yet, by any acrobatic feat of his, or by any trick or contrivance, been able to get out of himself for one moment. If he builds a house, he merely puts certain parts together; there is not a piece or part of the whole structure, either nail, board or post, that is in any sense new. The design itself of the house has been in the world, and has been modified from time to time, no doubt, for hundreds of years. And, remember, the building itself is not the house, it is only the shell, or representative of the house. If found anywhere, the house is in the design, in the plan, in the mind of the architect. So the tune of the composer existed before he gave utterance to it, and long, no doubt, before he was born; and the book always exists before the author writes it, or before he sends it out for publication. Everything is done in this world after some sort of *pattern*, that has been in the world from the beginning.

People should get out of their heads, at the earliest day possible, the belief that they shall ever find or see anything that is properly new. Things may be new to you, and yet not new to the world. New thoughts, new fashions, new forms are always old things that are revived and reproduced in some way, with certain changes or modifications more or less important.

If we had never seen a tree, we could never paint a tree, or even conceive a tree. We must in all cases learn before we know, and creep before we walk. Our learning comes from our senses always, and if we had no senses, we should *know nothing*. For us there would be no world, no idea of a world. As said before, man originates nothing; he is himself merely the prod-

uct of a thought. Beyond a thought, he cannot proceed a single step. If a man had never seen a house, he could never imagine a house, much less construct or reproduce a house.

All around us we see patterns and models, and never anything beyond these. Even a man's ideas are never shaped by himself. *They come to him ready formed.* Of the soul he knows nothing save what he has learned from his own thoughts, his own feelings. Every instrument or implement, every machine that is made, every plow, every gun, every car or carriage, every engine of every kind, is simply a modification, an improvement so called, *on something that preceded.* Everything, no matter how far back we may go, must have a beginning, something from which it may *start and grow.* Every plant must have its seed or its scion. Moreover, *everything comes from something quite different from itself.* The child and the parent are as different and distinct as any two beings that can be found in the world. What could be more different and distinct at all times than cause and effect, the producer and produced? There is not even so much as a semblance between the compound and the elements of which it is formed. From gases we get liquids, and from liquid gases again—melt ice, and you get water, heat water and you get steam. Add two and four, and you get six, a different number from either. And so in mixing or adding two colors.

It is practically impossible to define or describe the soul, because we have no means of knowing its features or ascertaining its character. However, ignor-

ance does not prevent any one from talking freely on the subject.

Reason teaches us that what we call the soul must in itself be separate, single and independent; it can have neither form, extent nor attributes. In one sense it must be a mere point; and in another sense, it must be unlimited in extent and outlines. It is commonly understood that the spirit resides in the body. Perhaps it might be said with greater truth that the body resides in the spirit. One statement is evidently as true as the other.

It is admitted that our soul as an individual is one and indivisible. It has no parts of any kind. How then could it reside in the head, the heart, the stomach and the hands all at one time? It is well known that when death comes, the whole body does not die at one and the same moment. But when the spirit takes its departure, it must in the nature of things be true that the flight takes place not by installments but all at once. The successive steps of death and decay are best illustrated in the case of the tree, in which the leaves all die in one season and are replaced by other leaves the following season. So branches of the tree, and even the bark and the heart, may die while the tree continues to live. Indeed, the fact is well known to students that for any individual plant or animal, dying is a process that is going on constantly, and the same is true of birth, repair, and reproduction. It has been ascertained by scientists that it is impossible to decide when death begins and where it ends; they cannot even determine whether it ever does begin or ever

does end. More than that, they are always in doubt what death really is.

It is well known even by those who have but little knowledge of science and its developments, that there are no single individualities in nature, no true compounds existing, no aggregates or wholes. All our conceptions in this direction are pure illusions. We simply see things as wholes. We consider them as such, and nothing more. It will be noticed that in all cases we are not interested in what things are, for that is something that can never be determined. We are ourselves the ones who produce the images and form the combinations in all cases. Thus, we are practically the real creators of the world as it appears to us each succeeding day. It is never God's work, nor is it that of any other supramundane agency.

Everything is simply as we look at it, and as we conceive and present it. Take for illustration a bunch of golden rod, the flower, the stalk, as it is called. We speak of it as an individual thing, and so it appears, if we give it merely a glance. But take it in your hands, and bring it close to your eyes and examine it carefully. Give it your whole attention, your concentrated thought, and notice to your great surprise what a wonderful production, what a remarkable combination is a bunch of golden rod, which may be found in any locality in the late summer season! Observe the shapes and figures, the beauty of design, and the modest but becoming colors that unite in making the striking display. What an interesting discovery is to be found in a bunch of common golden rod, when examined for the first time by the inquiring student! Are these

beauties actually in the flower? No, they are in the eye, in the mind of the observer, and he never realizes what is before him until he gives the flower his undivided attention.

Who makes the flowers, who makes the world as we find it or perceive it? It is man, the child even, who sees and admires the beauties of nature. He it is who really makes the world as we see it. Without man's persevering effort, and his amazing power of development and combination, we should have no world worthy of attention. We notice the golden rod and speak of this bunch of yellow flower, set in becoming green, as if it were a simple, single thing. But those who have eyes can readily see that it is not simple. It is made up of a thousand, perhaps ten thousand, shapes, and forms, and combinations. There seems to be hardly any limit to the number of little parts and parcels, in this as in similar cases. There are none of them great in size, but in design they are remarkably curious and interesting!

CONTINUITY OF THINGS

Nothing begins. If we examine an object carefully and philosophically, we shall find always that it never begins and never ends; it never changes its character and never gives place to something different from itself. This is as true of thoughts and belief as it is of objects in any other direction. As we have intimated more than once, if we stood alone, and always remained alone, we should not move. Certainly we would not and could not make any progress. It is a

thought, a suggestion always in some form that impels us and finally starts us off in some particular direction. While others do not teach us, properly speaking, it is true that we should never learn in any way if we did not come in contact, and perhaps in conflict, with other men.

Even religion is but a continuation, a modification or development, of some antecedent religion. Hence, no religion, no thought, no philosophy can ever be essentially new. So, too, no civilization is really new. If we did not have some religion to begin with, we never should have any religion later in life. All our science, all our philosophy, all our beliefs are grafted on, or built up on, what we have possessed, or what possesses us, long before any change of belief takes place. The Christian religion was founded on Greek thought, Greek philosophy, and it was transformed, or transubstantiated, later on, through Pagan influence. Of course there were other elements, other influences that entered into the problem, either first or last, as the Persian influence, the Babylonian influence, the Egyptian influence; but the Greek and Roman influences were the predominating factors in this case. Not for one moment did Christianity come forward as a really new doctrine, a new development, something before unheard of and entirely disconnected from all preceding thought. It never did begin, we know; it never will cease to be. It will fail, it will decline, and it will finally disappear, but even that fact would not prove that it has vanished forever. The Roman empire could not readily be found now by any amount of search or inquiry, but it would not necessarily follow from that

fact that its influence is gone and that it will be heard of no more.

So it is with civilization. There is nothing to-day that ever did, or ever will stand out apart and alone, but even for all that, its continued existence could not be safely denied at any time. Like everything else in nature, civilization is something that has to be learned —always learned or derived from some source and in some manner. Greece learned its lessons in science, in philosophy, in religion, from the peoples with which it came in contact—from the Persians, from the Arabs or Mahometans, and from the Egyptians. The Romans learned from all sources, from the races that they conquered and from those by whom they were defeated. But it is well known that an unusually large share of their philosophy, their religion, their literature and learning, their civilization, was borrowed or taken directly from Greece.

In trying to draw the line which shall separate Italy from Greece, and leave to each its own proper allotment, the historian would find that he had taken upon himself a very difficult task. The Romans were taught by Greeks, just as a child is taught by its instructors. For centuries the Romans had no literature and no art of their own. The Roman student was compelled to learn Greek, as well as his own language, in order to meet the demands of his station in life. It should be remembered that southern Italy was always more Greek than Roman. Of course, it should also be remembered that in southern Europe, the Moslem influence was for centuries a very important factor.

When creatures or things are lost, or when they

finally decay and disappear, they are lost to sight only. Their individuality merely is gone; but still they exist as factors in the world, although to our feeble vision they are perceptible no more. As a part of the great whole, the universe, thy will go on and on forever. That is true of life and death under all conditions. What is in the world to-day is no more nor less than what has been in the world from the first days of creation.

THINGS AND THEIR ASPECTS

What is truth? What is the true and correct view of anything in nature? As a matter of fact, there can be no real or established truth, for nothing is at rest, nothing is stable, nothing is unchangeable. To be true, a thing should be true to-day, to-morrow and forever. But there is no such thing to be found. Change, movement, development, decay, prevails everywhere in all departments of life.

Instead of actual truth, we have merely impressions that have been formed upon our mind—ideas of things, our conceptions, mere phases of truth. It must not be forgotten in this world, that our concern is not about things, for apart from and independent of ourself, we find them entirely without force, interest or value. What is gold to us, so long as it is left in the mine? To give it value, we must delve for it, and when found, it must be purified and appropriated. So it is with treasures of all kinds. It is man, and the works of man, that brings things forward and gives to them their standing and value. The ideas of men change, and

with this change, things themselves, to a certain extent must also change.

The sole problem for man is what others think of him and how he is appreciated by the world in general. Indeed, no other creature has thoughts, in the proper sense of the term; certainly, no other creature has means of communicating its thoughts and feelings to man, and without some such medium of expression as that, thoughts are valueless. Thus, it is idle to talk about what things are in themselves. *The sole problem for us, is what we think of things and what estimate we place upon them.* What may be thought of the matter by other men, or other beings, never has any concern for us. Indeed, we never can know what they think, or whether they think at all. On this question we should start at the beginning, and in this case that will be found to lie in *what men think*. There is the beginning, and there we shall find the end at last.

What is the true view or phase of any object? It is merely the way in which we happen to look at it. Its character and appearance has some importance in this connection, but the result depends still more upon the limits and power of our vision. Some people have no vision, and hence they see nothing; others have defective vision, and they see very little and that more or less imperfectly. Certainly, in this case, the character and outlines of the object have little or nothing to do with the general results.

It would seem that to get a true view of an object, we must see it when it is standing alone and apart from all connections and relations. But really there are no such objects. We never find things standing out dis-

connected and removed from the influence of other objects. There must always be some things lying contiguous to them; they always have more or less light and more or less shadow, and it is light and shadow that give to things their *color and expression.* It is for this reason that we never get a picture that is entirely satisfactory. It never looks natural, because it never is natural, since it stands out apart from its ordinary surroundings.

Again, what is the correct, the true aspect of any individual—a tree, for instance? Is it the spring time when the buds appear, or in the autumn after the leaves have wholly fallen? (When is water in its true form, when it is ice, when it is liquid, or when it assumes the form of steam or vapor?) Do we get the true view of a tree when it is a mile distant, or when we are examining its leaves under the microscope? Surely, *one is as true and proper as the others,* but they differ greatly. There are thousands of views of any object, depending entirely upon particular conditions and surroundings. Beyond all question, any one of these views is as correct as the others.

Our own health-condition, our temperament, our enlightenment, or the want of it, has everything to do with the way in which things appear to us. We project our own nature, our own conceptions, our ignorance often, into all the pictures and presentations that come from our mind. If we paint with a brush, we use different colors and we present the figure in a different light from that noticed in the production of some other artist. And so when a scene is presented in language by different authors, we find different

words employed, because the objects appear different to each author. Besides, we use the words themselves with a different application or interpretation from that found in other writings. So, when we write science, we give what we consider to be the truth, but it is merely our view, our opinion, our belief at last. *That is all that any man is able to give at any time.* The world has never had any science *beyond the views of ordinary mortals,* and doubtless we shall never have any thoughts of a quality more refined than those which we have at present. When common men cease to write history and science, we shall doubtless find something radically different in these departments. Whether it is to be better or not than what we have, remains to be seen.

It is well known that illusions are very common things among men. Indeed, it is very often asked: Do we have any idea in the way of thought that is anything but an illusion? It is certainly very difficult to draw the line between what is to be called an illusion, and what is the real thing. A drama as it appears on the stage is as real as any drama that was ever enacted by man. Are not the feats of the fakir something real, and do we not see with our eyes as we do in the ordinary affairs of life? If we are deceived, it is only because we deceive ourselves by drawing false conclusions. It is a mistake in the first place on our part to believe all that is claimed, or to accept as genuine all that is presented as truth. The error lies chiefly in our defective interpretation. It is not the fault of the fakir that we happen to form erroneous conclusions, in this or in any other case.

It must be observed that illusions in ordinary life are more common than is generally supposed. In other words, things are not always what they seem; in fact, they are not so generally. We call it hypocrisy to pretend one thing, while the fact is something different. But hypocrisy, we all know, is a very common deception, and instead of its being condemned in high life, it is too frequently encouraged or applauded. It often occurs, too, that we are impressed with the dress that people wear, the paint that we notice, the powders and the shams of all kinds. The real individual seldom comes to the front, and so we rarely see him as he is presented by nature. Doubtless it is just as well. The case is the same with lying, a vice that is not generally approved, though it is generally practised.

It is necessary to remind the reader again that truth properly so called is a rare discovery, and when we imagine that we have found the article, it often turns out that we have found something else. People generally are apt to embellish their stories, and they have a decided aversion to telling things as they are. They have a fondness for hyperbole. Some people fail to see things as they should, and others do not want the truth known. It is in high life where the greatest amount of lying is usually found. When people gush freely and tell how they love you, it is always well to bear in mind that they are merely following the customary form of salutation. They frequently tell you to come again, but they do not expect you to take the request literally. Of course, people feel that they must say something; everybody wishes to appear polite, and this is particularly true in the East.

Our imagination is an instrumentality that is uniformly kept busy. We never see things as they are; we merely imagine, and finally we present the picture as suits our fancy, or according to our taste and judgment. We do not pretend to reproduce things—we merely read and interpret on our own account. That is our sole business in life. We are constantly comparing, contriving, combining. We notice the paper on the wall and the figures in the carpet. As we study them and make new combinations, we develop new forms, new designs. For all practical purposes, man is himself the creator of the world; the ideas are his, the designs are his, the earth itself is his. It may be added that the objects about us do not produce ideas in our mind. The ideas are impressions of ours which are occasioned by the view that we take of the object in question. Men generate their own ideas, their own thoughts of things.

It may be added here that every imitation, every picture, every piece of art, is illusory in character. In its manner of presentation, we shall always find there is an artifice or trick. What we call a vase or mug, perhaps, is not the real thing, it is perhaps an ornament or substitute. Counterfeits, of course, are real in their way—they are real counterfeits. They may be metal, like plated ware, but not the right kind of metal. Imitations are not what they are supposed to be; they are deceptions, and that was the original intention. A chromo is a real picture, but it is not an oil painting.

Some important points in philosophical inquiry cannot be repeated too often. The more frequently we

are reminded of things, the longer we remember them, and the more firmly we are impressed in regard to them. To remember and apply, is more important than it is to know, as what we fail to remember, we might as well not know. For example, we cannot think too frequently nor bear in mind too well, that we ourselves give to everything its *quality,* its *character,* and finally its *appearance*—and this we do by the way that we look at it, view it, conceive it, think of it, and by the form that it finally assumes in our mind. We do all this, humble beings as we are, and that is our business, our sole business in this world. Things seem to be put here chiefly for man's interpretation, or man's appreciation. Certain it is, he puts his tag, his rating, his imprint on all with which he comes in contact. It is man's view that counts always; other views never count.

Under the head of "Religion", we dwelt briefly upon man's relations to God; and now to enable the reader to gain a clear insight into the manner and extent to which man carries his sovereignty over the earth, and over all that it contains, we will dwell on the treatment which man accords to his fellow man as we find it exemplified in the unjust and despotic methods which he pursues in the affairs of both society and the state:

It will be noticed that no man or woman has any right or privilege except so far as this is conceded to him by those who are presumed to be in authority, either through election or through arrogance and assumption. It will be observed first of all that no citizen of any community has any character, any rank, or

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any authority or privilege, except such as is conceded by that august, but rather indefinite body, known as the "public." The public settles absolutely every question pertaining to the position, progress and welfare of citizens, in total disregard of the rights, interests and feelings of any one, or of any number of individuals. The community can, and does, place any man or woman, in any class, category or company that meets its pleasure. It can call a man by any name, or apply to him any epithet that may be decided to be desirable or proper; and the citizen has no relief or remedy whatever, until the odium is removed in some way, either by accident or compromise. A man may be pronounced a thief, a scoundrel or a loafer, by the community in which he lives, and the victim must be patient under the reproach and simply await results. Through and of himself, he has no source of relief whatever. If by some luck or chance he escapes jail or the penitentiary, he may consider himself extremely fortunate.

The state is all powerful in its treatment of the helpless citizen, and it is within its province to punish or torture the poor victim in any manner that it may deem proper. States, as well as communities, are omnipotent, and at the same time they are not responsible for any damage done, in the regular state way, to any one coming under their jurisdiction. In fact, it would seem that the chief business of the state is to do injury to one class of citizens, while it is protecting or patronizing another class.

States sometimes assume to render proof, when cases are brought to court, but that is a formality that

is really quite unimportant. A state, or a community, that is all-powerful need not go to the trouble of securing proof in any contingency. That is clearly a work of supererogation in this instance.

Now, considering the helplessness of ordinary citizens in their dealings and relations with other men, as we have just indicated in our discussion on the power of communities, should we wonder at the impotence of the brute, to say nothing of things inanimate, when it comes to the treatment they receive and the rights that are withheld from them, when man determines the question of rights and duties for the lower orders of creation? As things are ordered now, and as they have been all along, since the days when history gave us its first accounts, the brute has absolutely no rights that man feels bound to respect. In dealing with the lower orders, to say nothing of inanimate things, *man has thus far taken charge of the whole business.*

The brute cannot talk, and so naturally he has no rights. He has no character to maintain of his own, and hence he takes such a rating and such a position in life as man chooses to assign to him. Even his name is given to him by man and the place or class to which he is assigned is determined by the same supreme authority. His case is like that of the ordinary man who is rated as either black or white, bad or good, according to the decision of the man, or the body of men, that happen to be in authority when the verdict is rendered.

Is there any question about the absolute rule of man on earth? If everything is not already as man

wants it, what is to hinder him from having his wishes gratified at the earliest moment practicable? Surely, we ought to have no further discussion on this question as to when man does or does not have things precisely as he wants them. Everything now is framed and shaped under his direction, and why should it not be, practically, a complete duplication or reflection of man himself? That is what it proves to be, when the facts are fully considered and the conditions are properly appreciated.

It should not be forgotten that there is not a name given to any creature or object that was not assigned originally by man. The same authority decides every question concerning these creatures of earth. If there is any scientific question to be settled, it is disposed of always under orders from man. We have no science or art save that which man has established. Again, we ask, what is to hinder man from having his own way on all questions of metaphysics? The lower orders of creation have never anything to say, because there is nothing that they are supposed to know; and they have no way to express their thoughts if they had them. Man knows it all, and man has all to say. That much is beyond all question. Strange that no other creature is supposed to know anything!

Unquestionably, everything that we find in this world is simply as it is conceived by man, and as he paints it and fashions it. Not a quality is assigned to a single thing except upon authority from man. *All history is written by man, for man;* all science, all law, is from man, for man. If there is any question to be settled at any time, man renders his decision, and that

ends the business. The deeds of man are recorded, but not the deeds of any creature lower than man. Religion, Philosophy, Morals, Law, even Intelligence and Culture—all these are for man, and for man alone. As man changes, these and other things change. Even truth and right are for man alone. The highest of the brutes never stop to consider, much less to discuss, such questions. There are no rights for slaves, none for brutes, and none for children. Right and wrong applies in cases only where there is complete freedom of action. Children, servants, slaves have no history, no record. Such things belong to the master alone. To have history, men must first have freedom. They must have will and be allowed full liberty to act as they please. Men have no dealings with slaves, or brutes, or children. Men deal with the master exclusively; he alone has rights. Laws and duties are made for slaves only; rights and privileges are for free men alone.

Man has usurped everything! It will be noticed that objects change their qualities *when men change their notions.* The world is round only so long as man says it is round, thinks it is round. If man says it is flat, it is flat, and so it remains till he changes his opinions. So it is with all things. We begin to see why things are so and so. It is because *men say they are so and so. Yet man himself is only a thing.* His acknowledged superiority comes entirely from the fact that he can think and read and reason. He has all the cards in his hands, and of course he can deal just as he likes.

It has been generally supposed, or at least assumed, that as things are, so we shall always see them, and that so they are finally pictured in our mind. But this is not properly the case—at least it is not generally, or certainly it is not always the case. We have a powerful imagination which is always at work. With this instrument or power, we are conjuring up some new form, some new design, every day, every hour. The object that we observe is often only a form, or a few dark or bright spots which suggest some new make-up. These simple elements of design we ourselves combine in a manner to suit our fancies or wishes, and from these we derive some new development, frightful or delightful as the case may prove. There can be no question that the images in our mind are largely of our own manufacture, or at least our own combination. We see always what *we* see, not what others see; so we feel what we feel, not what others feel. In delirium, our imagination is always actively at work, but even in our saner moods the constructive or inventive principle operates as it does at times less normal.

It is clear enough that the external world is entirely passive so far as concerns its relations to man, and it seems to assume no responsibility for any of the impressions which it is supposed to leave upon the mind of man. What has the sun or the moon to do with the earth, or with residents of this planet? It is a mistake to suppose that these bodies shine for the earth, or on the earth, or that one revolves around the other in any proper sense of the term. There is no connection or relation between any of the heavenly bodies. Every

individual, every single body, exists for and of itself alone.

Here we may remark that it is just as natural for man to think wrong as to think right, as it is just as natural for him to be sick as to be well, and in neither case has he any power of his own to set himself right again. A man may imbibe a wrong notion or harbor an unfounded thought and carry it with him for a lifetime. He may even die without ever realizing that he was mistaken. A man's ideas or notions are always a mere impression, and beyond such an operation as this, his mental efforts never extend. He talks continually about proof, but proof at last, evidence of all kinds, turns out to be *merely a diversion or a delusion.* Anything in the nature or form of a demonstration is entirely out of the question for man. Evidence itself never leads to anything but an impression or an opinion. A man is convinced only because he wishes to be convinced—conviction against one's will is something quite unknown. *There is no such thing as compelling man to believe,* or compelling him to accept another man's testimony. A man may yield. He may, from motives of policy, at least cease resisting, but even that fact is no evidence of final conversion on his part.

It may be well to remind the reader that the best established theory has only an indefinite period of time for its usual duration. Theories that are universally popular at one time are absolutely discredited by the same people at another time. Again, things that are quite acceptable to one section or one class of people are rejected with great distaste by another class. It is idle to talk about everlasting or universal truth—there

never was such a thing, and there can be none. Truths at best are only what seem to us; those which merely seem to others we have nothing at all to do with. Every man must use his own brain and cultivate his own thoughts. People when they travel usually like company, but when it comes to the matter of thinking, every man must have the whole road to himself. If out of pure kindness of heart we start out to help others think, we shall find after a few futile efforts that we have undertaken an *impossible task*, and finally we shall observe that we have neither aided nor obligated anybody. Confidence is for ourself alone. But when we find, as we do, the same truth returning from so many directions, why should we not feel confidence?

THE LIMITS AND LIKENESSES OF THINGS

People do not generally understand the fact, or if they do, they fail to appreciate the fact, that no object in nature can have any limits, or in other words, no object can have any character of its own. Certainly, no object can be described or defined, unless it is at the same time immovable and unchangeable. But there are no such objects in all this world. Inanimate matter is subject to the laws of constant decay and decomposition; and living objects, being affected by the usual processes of growth, are never really at rest for a single moment. The grandest mountains rear their heads very proudly, at times in the history of the world, but they are certain to be carried down as dust to the valleys and the sea, a few centuries later on.

The mightiest rivers have their constant rise and fall, and even the great ocean itself continually invades the land at one point and is itself encroached upon, by alluvium, in other directions. Where shall we find the shores of any lake or sea, or of the ocean, that may be considered established permanently?

In view of the facts, and this state of things, can we with any sort of propriety describe or define any object in nature? Can we find anywhere objects that are really at rest, or that possess boundaries or barriers that are fixed or immovable? It is evident enough that nature does not fix limits to things anywhere in creation, and the limits that man establishes are particularly uncertain and unstable. Man is accustomed to fix geographical limits, but they are in no case lasting. The limits of Germany to-day are by no means the limits of Germany one hundred or two hundred years ago, and the same remark will apply to every other country in Europe. It will apply to the world at large.

Do we imagine for a moment that our earth has always had the form and limits that it has now? Countries, we know, rise slowly, and slowly, steadily, they decay and disappear. Who shall say just when Rome began to rise, and when it began to decline? Who shall describe Rome at any time in its history, and say here Rome was, and here it was not? What are the bounds of our earth? Is it the land? Is it the water? No. Is it the air, the clouds, the sky? No. Probably even these are not the utmost limits of our globe. Perhaps the earth has no limits; perhaps nothing has limits. Perhaps nothing in all this world stands out apart by itself, even for a single moment. Everything

that is on the earth, or in the earth, is a part of the earth, and so it has no separate existence of its own. What is born comes from the earth; what dies and decays returns to the earth again. Nothing new is ever added, and nothing is lost.

Where and what was Constantinople? Its people were Turks and Tartars, and Greeks and Romans—somewhat of one race, and somewhat of the other races, but with no great preponderance for any one of them at any time. How shall we paint such a mixed and motley gathering and say this was Constantinople, in any one age or generation? Such a thing could not be done. Why talk about things, why attempt to picture things which really never existed—save in the air or in the minds of men? We cannot paint, faithfully, what we have never seen, or things of which we have no clear conception.

It is evident enough that we have nothing but ideas of things—that much is certain—and so the ideas of every individual are different from those of every other individual. Men have made, and always will make, the world largely in their own image, and after their own ideas of nature and its works. It must be remembered that nature has no maps and it neither names nor describes any countries, mountains or streams. This is all the work of man.

We see the forms and shapes of things, but never the things themselves. Our perishable body is not ourself. Did we ever see Italy or Egypt? We may have seen some parts of these countries, but we could never have seen these countries as a whole. We can never see the whole of any one thing. Italy, for ex-

ample, is composed of many parts and sections, and we can never grasp them all at one time. There is northern Italy, central Italy, southern Italy and they are each very different in their various characteristics. It is impossible that the mind of man should comprehend them all as a complete whole.

Who is the artist who feels himself competent to paint a creature that appears in the world at first as a helpless infant and finally attains the form and power of a full grown man? In which of these extremes of life do we find the proper representative of man? Not in both, most certainly. The limits of things, as of countries, are in the minds, the wishes and the will of man. Really, to define and describe an object, is to cut it loose from the world and destroy it. Where are the limits of the air, the sky, of water, of sound, of electricity, of thought, of feeling, of motion, of color? Who can tell? The forms and arrangements of things are the conceptions of men, and they have nothing to do with the things themselves. Can things have two forms or more? Can one thing be two things or more? Which is the true, the original, the permanent form of water? Is it the solid, rocky form known as ice? Is it the fluid form known as water? Is it the vapory, invisible form known as air or steam?

Clearly enough our impressions of objects never correspond to any extent with the objects themselves. It is with these impressions as it is with pictures, they are only approximations, mere reminders of the objects under consideration. No picture is a faithful representation, much less is an impression a true copy, of any object in nature. The character of the impression,

as we find in the case of the picture, does not depend wholly, nor even mainly, upon the object presented. The impression depends largely upon the avenue through which it comes, as every picture depends upon the medium and the manner of its taking. *Objects can never be reproduced in any manner, to any extent, in any form.* Impressions, like pictures, are wholly the affair of the one who receives or introduces them. They never affect the object itself in any manner, and the object and subject never have any relations to each other whatever.

After all, a man's picture, even a caricature or sketch of any kind, no matter how imperfect as a likeness, has a great deal to do with the idea which the people form of his looks. As no man has any established character, the ideas that are formed of him by the public are constantly changing. What the world thinks of a man determines at last how he appears to people. He is either good or bad, pleasant or ill looking, just according to the impressions formed by those who imagine that they know him. We all know very well that the great man becomes celebrated not by what he has done, but by what the people think or say that he has done. Greatness is a matter rather of advertising than of achievement.

Quite unjustly, we speak of *resemblance* as if there were some correspondence or connection, some intimate relation, to be found between two separate bodies. As a matter of fact, we know there is none in any case, except so far as it is developed in the mind of man. *There is a likeness, in any case, if we think so, and otherwise there is none.* It must be remembered that things

are very unlike, even with many points of supposed resemblance. Two bodies of the same class, two circles, two squares, two trees or houses, two letters A or figures 2, do not properly resemble each other, though very much alike in many respects. If anything, they are one and identical—but that is hardly possible.

How shall we say a picture resembles an object, or an object a picture? All things resemble each other, in some respects, and yet there are no ties or connection between them. Shall we say one man is the picture of another man merely because they look alike? One shadow may look like another shadow, and still no connection may exist between them. Just so it is in the case of two sounds, or two bodies of water.

That all thoughts, ideas and impressions are human, or in other words are man-made, may be exemplified in the case of the ideas that we have formed of men and things that we have heard of or read of, but have never seen. Our notions are always formed in advance, and when we happen to see the object for the first time, we are uniformly disappointed, because we find that these ideas gratuitously formed as they were, as usual in such cases, do not correspond with the object that we had pictured in our mind. Why should they correspond, when the ideas are developed in the first place without any reference to the object under consideration?

It is a mistake to suppose that men uniformly form their ideas only from what they have seen. Few of their ideas, as a matter of fact, come from that source. They are formed, generally, of things that they have not seen, and of course they are never true representa-

tions in any sense. Even where the object has been seen, the ideas are based, finally, on memory and reflection, and not on direct inspection. Naturally, no two men think alike on the same subject, no two have the same picture impressed on the mind.

MATTERS OF OPINION

We speak frequently and freely of the opinions of men, simply because we deem our position on that subject one of the utmost importance to our readers. As we have intimated before, people are always ready to render their opinion on any subject, whether they know or do not know what they are talking about. They do not appear to realize that when they give their opinion on any subject, they must necessarily pass judgment, directly or indirectly, upon the worth, character, ability and rectitude of their fellow men. They seldom seem to consider the question whether they are or are not really competent to act the part of the wise and just judge and are fully qualified to decide the matter fairly upon its merits. As a rule, very few persons are fitted and prepared, even to a moderate degree, to sit in judgment upon the character and motives of other men. Do they understand the evidence in the case, and have they the means, the time and disposition to give it all the consideration that it deserves? People are apt, as we all know, to assume too much, even in matters where they know very little. They will talk about a horse as if they knew all the points of the animal—his age, his habits, his value. But when brought to the test, we shall find that they

really know no more about the many points of a horse than they do about a camel or a hippopotamus. They know these animals when they see them, but that is usually about as far as their knowledge extends. So people will talk about other things with an air of supreme confidence—about mines, about science, about art, about the moon, the weather, the crops and finance! But when it comes down to the facts, what do they actually know about any of these things? There is no harm in a man's not knowing as much as he might. The harm comes from his pretending to know what he does not know. People will not only give you their opinions, but they will tell you what to do, and that makes things all the worse. As long as people are content to talk to themselves as it were, it does not matter so much what they say or what subject they discuss, but when they come to forcing their opinions upon others and seek to make their view of the case the rule of action for everybody else, then matters get to be serious.

How shall this and other similar questions ever be settled? They never have been settled, they never will be settled. Suppose it is a question which is the largest, the best, or the prettiest of several different things, or which one is superior or which is the most desirable? How shall we ever decide such a question fairly? If done at all, it must be solely upon opinions. It is a matter of opinion in the first place, and by opinions finally it must be settled, if it ever is settled. So it goes in the world constantly. Questions are raised, but they are *never answered*—never at least to the satisfaction of more than a few persons. They can-

not be answered; nature seems to have decided that they never should be answered. And still we go on, and on, groping in darkness to the end. Unquestionably that is the fate of man. When it comes to real knowledge, those deemed most wise are often found to know as little in fact as those do who make no pretensions. We may inquire, we may investigate, if it pleases us, but when it comes to the matter of compensation for our efforts, we should never expect anything in the end beyond pure diversion. As a simple business proposition, it is perhaps better to write fiction, for that usually brings better returns.

THE MYSTERY OF EFFECTS

There is, unquestionably, a certain mystery of effect that the world thus far has failed to penetrate. We do not, in practice, see things; we rather experience effects, and the manner of producing these effects it is often difficult to explain. Thus, in painting a house, it is not the colors alone, nor even the combination of colors, that produces the striking effect. There is much in contrast, much in the location and play of colors, that determines the effect which impresses the observer. A similar principle applies in music and other fields. Indeed, as a matter of effect, there is everything in contrasts and combinations, in discord and harmony.

In producing results, it is evident that many things combine, and even remote agencies contribute toward the result that comes under consideration. It is well

known that objects reflect their hues from the colors of various things around them. Even the frame, which is no part of the picture, has a remarkable influence upon the effect that is finally rendered. A frame may be too large or too small; in fact it may be the wrong frame entirely for this one particular place. People who wish to have things right and who would secure the best results possible in all cases, must exercise taste, judgment, and even a little skill, under all circumstances. It is not things so much that tell in life as the effect of things. So it is even in what a man says, as well as in what he does. He may say the wrong thing, at the wrong time, in the wrong manner, and in such a case, of course, the result produced will not be gratifying.

The fact should be constantly kept in view that it is no one cause in any instance that produces any certain result. A host of causes contribute—we should find a hundred, a thousand, or even more, if we could see and understand the whole operation as it is. A result achieved in one case would be sure to fail in other cases. A speech, certain evidence, or a phenomenon, has a striking influence in one case, while it would have an entirely different effect in another case. When it comes to the matter of impression, that depends as much upon the subject as upon the object, upon the one who sees and thinks as upon the thing perceived. It is a well known fact, though not always appreciated, that things appear entirely different to different people, and hence the effect varies. No doubt, at no distant day, we shall have some new idea to replace our notion of effects. If a cause were really the

cause of a certain effect, it would always be the cause of the same effect. But such is not our experience.

It should not be forgotten that appearances have as much to do with producing results, as the real facts have, or the phenomena. In fact, it is appearances that we are busy with most of the time. How things appear, is usually the whole question. We observe appearances at all times; it is the things themselves that usually evade us or leave us in doubt. A little thing often goes a great way in leaving an impression; and *impressions* are the things that usually count at last. There is nothing like keeping up appearances and holding on to our *impressions*. A very small thing often produces a great effect; in fact, causes are not to be estimated by their size. Thus, in the picture of a piece of jewelry, we notice that it appears to be raised above the surface on which it is supposed to be resting, a pleasing and novel effect that arises entirely from a delicate bit of shading that we notice under the article exhibited.

The outside of things is generally the most important part of this world. Men see the outside—they rarely see the inside, and when they do see it, they fail usually to understand its meaning. In the army, where rank is everything, it is determined not by the character and worth of the man but by the clothes he wears. Even a major general appears to be made up wholly for effect, for outside show. He may or he may not be a good officer, but anyway he is expected to wear good regulation clothes. He wears two rows of buttons on his coat in front, while lower officers have only one row. The major general's nine buttons

are arranged in threes, while a brigadier has groups of two buttons. That is the difference in the men. Both generals have buff sashes, while lower officers must be content with a crimson sash.

It will be noticed that the higher an officer stands, the greater must be the attention that he is to pay to his outfit. Even a captain is known, not by his size or personal worth, but by the bars on his shoulder. If a man has no bars, he is simply a second lieutenant. That is the main difference between company officers. Sometimes the latter gets promoted, and then he may wear one or two bars, or possibly an eagle or a star. Besides, his pay is raised. Rank, we notice, has a great effect in a variety of ways.

How things are, seems to be of little concern to us; we are more interested in how things appear and how they affect us. Things that do not affect us, seldom concern us. That is simply natural, and it might be expected. We say the sun sets because it seems to set, though we know very well that it does not set. So a car on the track appears to be moving westward, when we know that it actually stands still and our car is the one that is moving. And in all cases of deception or delusion, it takes two people at least to complete the trick and perpetrate the fraud. If we do not deal with people, they will not cheat us. There is a great deal in that. Some people will not allow themselves to be deceived, and they will not give rascals the opportunity they are seeking for. How far the prestigiator is to be held responsible for the erroneous conclusions that we draw from his apparent performances is certainly a question. It was an old principle

of law that people shall not take advantage of their own wrong; and it is a question how far they may take advantage of their own stupidity or ignorance.

COLOR AND ITS USES

There is no field to-day, in the domain either of science or art, that offers stronger inducements for cultivation, to the zealous and conscientious inquirer, than the field which embraces the study of colors and includes the theories of light, shade and reflection. Compared with other studies, this one now under consideration may be said to have been almost wholly neglected for fifty years or more; and those who have ventured to write upon the subject seem to have taken no great interest in the matter, and hence they appear to have but little of importance to offer the public in this connection. The consequence is, that in this country at least, we know little indeed of the true nature, uses and possibilities of color and even little comparatively of the character and influence of light.

Speaking generally, in a case like this in which exact measurements are more or less impracticable, we should say that more ignorance prevails among the masses on this question of color than upon any other to which scientific men have been latterly giving their attention. To begin with, it is commonly understood by the public that color is something that resides in bodies, or that it is inseparably connected with them as one of their properties. As a matter of fact, however, it is generally agreed among thoughtful and ob-

serving men who have given their attention to this question that color is merely an incident in nature, something which comes and goes, and is never constant or unchangeable for a single moment.

Color comes from that part of nature by which things are surrounded. The construction of the eye is a leading factor in determining the color and appearance of objects, but it is by no means the sole factor. The object itself has a great influence in producing the result witnessed, but without light and the co-operation of the eye no color could ever become perceptible. As Schopenhauer says, "the colors themselves, their relations to each other, and the laws that they follow, all this lies in the eye itself." They depend on the activity of the retina.

It is the common impression that prevails among ordinary observers, that the color of objects is something that is permanent, when in fact nothing is more vacillating or more uncertain. If color properly belonged to objects, of course they would always have the same color. But we know, or we may know, if we observe, that color is something that is constantly changing. It fades in the sunlight when it is applied as a paint or paste, but even among living things, as the growing plants or flowers, a constant change of hue goes on from day to day. The leaves of trees are pale green in the spring, dark green in the summer, and finally they turn yellow, or red, or spotted, as the autumn season advances. Again, reflection from the sky, as well as from objects that are near, have a constant and quite perceptible influence upon the color of everything that it happens to strike. The atmosphere,

which is all-pervading, has a very notable effect upon the hues and appearance of all things.

The reader should be reminded that what we have said of the action and properties of color is by no means exceptional or anomalous, so far as the operations of nature are concerned. Very generally, a rule or an observation that will apply to one object will apply also, in principle, to many, if not to all others. Thus, we find that color is not a permanent possession of any object in nature; it changes with everything that affects or influences that object even in a slight degree. But it should be noted that no objects have any character or quality that can be properly called their own. This is something that is given to objects or is produced for them, by the combined influence and action of that part of nature with which they come in contact. In other words, as we have repeatedly said, no object in nature can be truly said to have any character that may be called permanent.

Whatever affects the condition of an object, necessarily affects the color of that object. So, iron ore melted in a furnace takes on a red or ruddy hue, but when it is cold, it is a dull gray. A lobster, we know, when boiled turns red or vermilion. But it is well to notice that no object has any color except so far as there is an eye in suitable condition to perceive or appreciate that color. It is well known that many men are color-blind, and they cannot distinguish certain colors even when the object is placed plainly before them. They simply have eyes that do not meet the conditions of the case.

We will give some additional points by way of information on this interesting question: There is much to be learned from the study of colors, and we should understand their properties better than we do. It is highly important that we should have fixed in our mind, quite early in our investigation, that every color is merely an effect produced by certain influences, and in return it reacts and has its effects upon other bodies. For instance, while the sky and the clouds shed their hues and cast their shadows upon the earth, these again are reflected back upon the sky. This phenomenon is in evidence most strikingly in all cases where bodies of water, as lakes, are exposed to the bright sunlight.

Color is by no means a simple matter of imagination, nor is it in any sense the work of fancy. All peoples, the savage and the cultivated alike, are fond of colors, as they are delighted also with music. The Arab chief is proud of his gold lace, and the American Indian places a very high estimate on his paint and feathers. The Chinese are charmed with strong colors; so are the people of India and so were the old Athenians. It requires no effort or pressure to induce even children to take an interest in either music or colors.

In many respects color and music are very much alike in their office and character. Neither of them affords sustenance for the body, but they both have a wonderful effect upon the soul. They both appeal to the emotions, the feelings, in a most forceful and mysterious manner. Color does its work in a quiet, undemonstrative way, but none the less does it have a powerful influence, in certain cases and under certain con-

ditions. Strong colors, under favorable circumstances, are just as intoxicating, or perhaps as elevating or exhilarating, as strains of music or sparkling wine. How inspiring, how wonderfully impressive, are the stained-glass windows of European cathedrals in all their glory! How soothing, how comforting and, finally, how lasting is the effect that is left upon the feelings of man by the delightful landscape!

Every piece of colored work, it will be observed, is a combination, an exhibition of mosaic, like a fine composition in music, or like an artistic production on canvas. The problem in all these cases is to combine the parts skillfully, successfully and efficaciously. So the effort ought always to be in our homes, our dress, our rooms, our lawns. Colors are never out of place, if they are of the right kind and are artfully combined. It should be remembered that dress is simply plumage or foliage; especially as it is worn in civilized life, by people of all ages, of all ranks, and of all stations in life. Very few people wear dress either to keep warm or to keep cool. Everybody wants to make a display and leave an impression in some manner. This same passion is to be noticed everywhere. Travelers who visit St. Petersburg and Moscow will be struck with the gilded domes of the former and the deep-hued roofs of the latter, long before they are prepared to enter the gates of those magnificent capitals.

The reader should never lose sight of the fact, undoubted as it is, that in all places where there is light, and something is to be seen, there color will uniformly be found. There is not one object in sight that does not have some color, some hue or tint, and we may add,

also some shadow. Shadow is itself a color resulting from lack of light, and its depth varies. Black is color, white is a color, drab, and gray, and brown are all colors. Trees have color, the trunks as well as the branches, and so have the stones and rocks that give strength and tone to the landscape. It would not answer to have landscapes presenting to the eye nothing but flowers. Such a picture would be, to say the least, fearfully monotonous. There must be some contrast, some background. Without this we can have no picture in the proper sense of the word. We find this feature illustrated in and about Jerusalem in the spring season. As is well known, the country is strikingly barren and rocky, but its very rocks serve to give additional beauty to the anemonies, poppies and tulips that cover the ground in great profusion, at certain times in the year.

Every color has a meaning, or an expression, that is practically its own; it means at least a little more or a little less light. Yellow color has more light than red, and far more than blue, or even violet. The number of different shades or hues is infinite, and we develop them as we mix paints—a little more black or blue, or green, to make the color darker, just as we use white or yellow or cream, to make the tint lighter. The addition of a very little of any one pigment changes the tone of the whole mixture. In some such way as this nature mixes her colors every day—the great paint-shop, the original source of all our color, being the sun. So, all the shades of red come from combining yellow and orange with prismatic red, each in its due proportion, to produce the desired hue. All

the shades of yellow may be produced by red, yellow and orange.

It should be remembered that all light, all color, is compound, being in theory at least made of elements, which are themselves probably compounds. But as much as this may be said, and is said, of music, and indeed of everything else in nature. All is compound; and in a certain other sense, all is single or elementary.

The conditions implied in certain colors, in special cases, are often curious and apparently anomalous. For example, yellow flowers show somewhat of green and somewhat of orange color. When light is reflected from a gold surface, it is yellow; when transmitted through thin gold leaves, it is green. Light coming through blue glass shows much blue, but also green, indigo and yellow.

If we look at any color continuously, red for instance, this color loses its vividness, but its complementary color becomes bright and pure. When several colors are shown to a customer on any occasion, he is sure to get the hues mixed and to find himself at last quite unable to give to any one its true value and character. The same is the experience in eating or drinking, or when we try two or more instruments of music, or two or more chords, at the same time. It seems difficult for the mind to separate two impressions received together, or to eliminate either one or the other.

The effect of one color upon another with which it happens to be brought into comparison in any way, is often very surprising, to say the least. So it is with instruments of music, as two violins, of different power and tone, sounded together. To a certain extent, the

strong instrument will negative the sound of the weaker one.

It is understood that dark colors in goods, especially black, diminish the size of the wearer, but white or light goods increase the size. Horizontal stripes in dress shorten the figure of a person, while vertical narrow stripes increase the apparent height of the wearer. Colors often affect the complexion of ladies quite noticeably, in some cases. The figures in wall paper have their effect on the seeming height of a room. These few facts gathered hurriedly will serve to give an idea of some of the effects that may be looked for in connection with colors. But many important features remain to be noticed.

In order to give a little better notion of the power and peculiarities of light and color, a few words may be added here, on complementary colors and color-blindness: According to theories that are usually accepted in optics, colors are considered as belonging in pairs, and they are to be taken together to obtain a complete color. Thus, red and bluish green are said to be complementary, and so are orange and blue, violet and yellowish-green. United or mixed together as powders, they are supposed to produce white. These complementary colors harmonize, or contrast favorably with each other, not for any reason that we can give, but in accordance with a principle that we have learned from experience.

It has long been known not only that colors change or vary from day to day, but vision itself varies as between any two people, no two seeing exactly alike in any one case. We say one man sees normal and an-

other does not, but this is quite an arbitrary decision. However, it is a fact that some people cannot distinguish green from blue, or red, or brown, or perhaps red from black. Some people can only distinguish or name two colors, blue and yellow. It is evident enough that color is chiefly in our eye, as taste is on the tongue and hearing in the ear. It is said that at least one man in every twenty fails to see colors normally. Just so it is in the case of ordinary blindness, no two men seeing alike, and every man being a little more blind, or a little less blind, than some one else. It will be noticed that everything is *relative*.

We might sum up our remarks on this subject by observing that nothing which nature brings to the attention of man, is so pleasing, so impressive, so thrilling, and finally so brilliant in the effects which it may produce, as color! Color is the dress that nature wears on all occasions, and it does not conceal the form as ordinary garments do. It adorns the person, improves it, renders it presentable and brings it into the lime light so that it may be seen and admired by the world. Without some dress, nothing can be seen or understood. And by the way, why should nature dress the humming bird and the butterfly so gorgeously, so splendidly as it does, if color amounts to nothing, counts for nothing?

It will be noticed that it is not garments alone that people wear. In distant lands, especially in warm climates, and among uncultivated races, the main dress consists of colors and hues, of paints put on and oils and ointments applied to the body. Dressing, we must remember, is a very general term. We dress a line on

parade, we dress stone with a chisel, we dress poultry for market, we dress cloth, we dress leather, we dress lumber with a plane, we dress everything! There is no doubt, especially in mild climates, that oils and cosmetics answer their purpose exceedingly well. They may not cover up the form and conceal it as might be demanded by our Christian notions of propriety, but they certainly keep insects at a safe distance and render the body cool and comfortable on a hot day. We speak of a coat of oil, as we do of a coat of paint, showing that we regard it as a covering or dress.

Tattooing deserves honorable mention just at this time and in this place. This is a style of dress that is very common all over the world, at least in spots. It is looked upon as highly ornamental, and it answers its purpose remarkably well. It is by no means confined to savage races. Tattooing, and coloring the eyes and eyebrows with black, is a very common and very popular practice in Egypt, and all over the East.

And in this connection, we must be sure not to overlook the hair. That is a prime article of dress, for both sexes. It is simply indispensable. Ladies would rather lose their hats than their hair at any time—and many of them discard their hats and give their whole attention to the hair. Among savages, so-called, the potent chief devotes hours to his toilet, and to the hair particularly.

There are all sorts of ways of using oils and of applying grease to the person, among different peoples. The Esquimaux, and other races, eat fat, while we, the enlightened people of the earth, apply it freely to the skin in the form of soap and ointments. We shall find,

on inquiry, that the customs among peoples are not so variant as we had been led to suppose before we came to view the matter in a fair light. We were wont to believe that the use of oils was confined to the peoples of the East, but that is clearly a mistake. The Asiatics consume more oil and butter, while we consume more ham and bacon.

It is well known that anointing has always been a religious custom in the East, based, as most religious ceremonies are, on pure sanitary reasons. It is a curious fact that to-day our physicians are beginning to concede that there is an important benefit to be derived by patients from the practice of anointing.

There is, doubtless, no obstacle to the progress of true knowledge that is more serious than the impression so common among men, that people uniformly see alike and feel alike on all questions; or at least that as they see things, so everybody else must necessarily see them. We know as an undoubted truth that no two people ever do see things alike; they see under different conditions, with different hopes, interests and education, and so it is impossible that the results, the images, the ideas, should ever be alike in the two cases. It cannot be repeated too often that ideas or images are never transmitted, for there is absolutely no means of transmitting them, if indeed there were anything to transmit.

How things seem to others, we never can know. The best that we can do in any case, is to approximate. How near to exactness we may come, *we never can ascertain*. We get the absurd notion that as we see pictures, so everybody sees them, even savages and chil-

dren. This error is too evident and too common to discuss, even for one moment. The fact is that no two people can be brought into comparison, with any kind of fairness, at any time. Many savage races cannot distinguish or interpret pictures, and others can do so only imperfectly, a fact that is well known to travelers.

All over the East, the people affect strong colors, especially in dress and equipage, and this is especially true of the Arabs. They are not so fond of those single colors which stand apart from others, as they are of colors in combination, in the form of broad stripes and bands—gold, yellow, brown, red, blue. This was the prevailing fashion in Europe until recently, particularly among the peasantry. It was noticeable among the Highland Scotch, in their plaids, and in their costumes generally; so it was in Scandinavia, especially in Sweden. Striking effects were seen among the Magyars, and throughout Servia, Roumania, and all along the Danube, as late as 1888 and 1895, when this author visited those countries. In France, Italy and Spain, he noticed similar costumes. But to-day they are a rare phenomenon. Everybody now wants to be in fashion, and so everybody adopts the Parisian style, not only in dress and manners, but in the arrangement of the streets and in the architecture of the homes and public buildings. Everything in Europe to-day is uniform, as if all the peoples belonged originally to one family. The old costumes which were so picturesque have taken their departure, and they have now become simply things of the past.

To illustrate the change that has been going on in Europe during the last fifty years, in the appearance of

things, we refer to Bucharest, the capital of Roumania. A half century ago, this city wore a Tartar look. At the present time everything, in make-up and general appearance, is "French." A similar remark will apply to Russia, where "French" is quite popular—more so than it was a hundred years ago, when Napoleon was invading that country. The Russians seem to have a passion for white in dress, the men more so than the women. It will be remembered that white for dress prevails all over the East. Perhaps Russia gets its taste for white through Greece and Turkey, with which people originally they were quite closely connected. It will be remembered that the religion of Russia is that of the Greek church.

It should be noted that in England, a century or two ago, men had a fancy for extreme colors in dress, such as with us would be regarded as "stunning" at the present time. They had green coats, scarlet coats and buff coats; they had blue and scarlet vests with embroidery in great profusion. They had generally an abundance of gold lace, of which they seem to have been passionately fond. Wherever they went they carried a sword —no doubt to keep up a fashion that prevailed among their savage ancestors many years earlier. Things are different now, and so are the customs and ways of the people. The fashions did not change then, as fashions change now, with every new phase of the moon.

It may be observed, finally, in this connection, that our European dress of the present day is simply a development and modification of eastern dress. The fundamental article of apparel was originally a tunic or shirt of light goods worn next to the body, with a

girdle or sash, as we still have in the army, and as they still have in Greece and Turkey, and more or less over the East. This served as a pocket, among other things.

Over the head and shoulders is thrown a piece of cloth two to five yards long. A modified form of this garment is found in the Roman toga. Its counterpart is found in our shawl, cloak and overcoat, and in the blanket of the American Indian. For many centuries, the Romans, and all of the East, went bareheaded, barefooted and bare limbed, very much as savages do everywhere.

So far as effect is concerned, all that we perceive, and all that we really are impressed with, when we look about us and observe, is *color!* All that we do see at best is color and form, but as we have before intimated, if it were not for shading, we should perceive no shape or form; and of course if we had no color, or if we had but one color, we could not possibly determine or define the shade in any way. But when we come to discuss this subject of color in its fullness, and when we begin to perceive how much there is to be known, and how very little we actually do know, on this important problem before us, we feel as if we were merely infants! Color at any time, we know, is capable of accomplishing wonders, when it is manipulated under favorable circumstances by a skillful artist.

What surprising effects can be brought out in painting an ordinary house in any town, the whole work being done with a common brush and some colors! An artist can make a house look longer or shorter, lower or higher, and especially he can make a column appear longer or shorter, according to the

manner in which he combines or applies his colors. It is not the architect or the builder that gives to the house its final tone and appearance when it is all done. That is the work of the painter, the artist. How would a person look without any clothes? He would look odd—anybody would say that. So does a house look odd when it is not painted. It simply lacks dress, and appears naked.

If we look at the mouldings in a cornice, or in a porch, we get an impression of color, and this effect is produced wholly by light and shadow—light in some prominent spot, like the nose on our face, and shadow in some depression, like the mouth and eyes. And does the reader realize that *all* there is of a face at any time is simply light and shadow? If a man comes into a door, with his back against the sky, and his face reflecting no light from the front, he looks black, and for the time being he is black. A painted face looks very much like a natural face, though it is a flat surface and there are no prominences. And why does it look so? Solely because of the color that the artist applies. Just so in painting a house, very much of the ornamental effect can be brought out with a brush, some color, and the help of an artist of course. What the artist does is no trick of his—it is merely because he knows how. In a certain sense, he is really a philosopher. He knows what he knows.

We will close this article on color by a brief reference to the Moorish art of decoration as developed by the Moors in Spain. What strikes the observer most forcibly, at the Alhambra and at Seville, is the softness and repose which is to be seen and felt on all sides;

the easy flow and quiet blending of delicate colors; the striking simplicity and wonderful diversity, which, strangely enough, we find united together, harmoniously, all in one—with no sign of antagonism perceptible at any point. The novelty of what the observer perceives wherever the eye chances to rest, is something that, to say the least, is quite remarkable. The perfect nicety and unequaled skillfulness with which the artist seems to have performed his delicate task, undismayed by the difficulties that beset him, is a phenomenon that forcibly impresses the art critic when he comes to examine the developments of Moorish decorative art for the first time.

Richness and grace, elegance and splendor, will be found among the surprises of Moorish decoration. The means seem trifling, and yet the results, or the effects, upon the observer, are simply astonishing! The colors are not flashing or startling, they are rather modest and simple—such as white, light blue, pink or red, yellow or orange. For the lower part of the room, the colors are green, blue, white, black, yellow. The groundwork of the walls is red, the border deep blue, while the letters that are inserted appear in living gold.

It must be added, finally, that there is no place where color is exhibited at so great an advantage as it is in the different branches of ceramics, where the bright and brilliant enamel, or glazing, serves as an effective background for the defining and developing of delicate tints and colors. This effect is seen in Spain in the enameled dado that extends around the bottom of the room, in Moorish palaces.

MUSIC

This is not the time, nor is it the place, we know, to introduce a dissertation on Music; and yet the subject is one of sufficient importance to justify the use of a moderate amount of space, at this time, in presenting the claims of the art and encouraging its introduction in schools and families.

Music is, in a certain sense, a tonic for the soul, and its influence is at all times healthful and comforting. Music certainly inspires the heart, and its effect upon the human character is decidedly salutary. It soothes, tranquilizes the feelings, and its tendencies are uniformly in the direction of good, rather than of evil. That the Greeks, as well as the peoples of other civilized lands, had a very high appreciation of the power and influence of this wonderful art, is a fact very well known.

Unfortunately, the idea prevails very generally among the masses that it is impossible for the ordinary student to learn music. Of course, no one pretends that everybody must, or that everybody will, excel in this art. As a fact, it is well known that very few people excel in any branch of science or in any art, and yet the world goes on fairly well, and nearly all succeed in making some advancement and having at command, finally, some acquirement. It is simply a question of greater or less success, and so it always has been. To learn classical music, is something, no doubt, reserved for the few. But beside and above all this, there is popular music, which is worth a great deal

more to the race than music of a higher order. There are more, far more, common, plain people in the world, than there are of the other kind. They all like plain music, because they are better acquainted with that article. This form of music, with its melodies and beauties, is quite within the reach of every man and woman, those who are advanced in years as well as those who are young. The study is one that can be taken up by any one, not always in the same way, of course, nor to the same extent, but with a fair prospect of success in every instance. The investment is not one of that kind, so highly recommended, in which the individual must wait till after death before he can realize on his venture. In taking up the study of music, if done in right good earnest, the pupil is sure of his compensation as he goes along daily.

The three things wanted, not only in learning music, but in any ordinary undertaking, is time, work and will. Without these three factors, no one need hope to make any important achievement. Talent is a very good thing, but it has had far less to do with success in life than many people suppose. We usually call men great because we do not know them, and we are apt to consider things wonderful merely because we neither understand their origin nor comprehend the methods by which they are performed.

The writer proposes to give a chapter of his own experience in this connection, not that he has anything remarkable to report, but to show what one man has done, with limited advantages at command, and what any other man may do with a similar amount of effort, provided he has the time and the inclination. Nothing,

we venture to say, was ever done well, if the work was carried through with precipitation. All of nature's work is done leisurely and entirely free from all nervousness and irritation.

When the writer was a young man, the idea occurred to him that he would buy a violin. He had heard the instrument played repeatedly, and he was charmed by its strains. He did not have the slightest doubt that he could play, like other folks, if he only had a good instrument. So he bought the violin, a good one, of another young man who had secured it with similar purposes in view, and who was now willing to sell at a discount. He, too, had gotten the notion that he could play—if he only had the opportunity. But the undertaking implies more than that, as he found by experience.

So the writer had a violin of his own, and he felt for a time as if he were really beginning life anew. However, he began to have a revelation, and some of it was not of a pleasant character. No one ventured to say to him that he played well; to tell the truth, he did not play well. The family at home, in their agony, declared that the noise was excruciating, and they begged the artist to desist. He had formed the notion in some way that the music was in the violin, and all that the player had to do was to extract it in some easy, simple way. It took him a long time before he was able to see his error, but he saw it at last. He had bought what he did not want, and what, with his methods, he could not use. The music is not in the violin; if it is anywhere, it is in the player himself.

Again, many people believe they can readily learn music, if they only have a good teacher. But that is another common mistake. A good teacher, like a good instrument, has very little to do with the pupil's success in learning any art. It wants *work, will, time.* These things, first, last and always. Genius does very well, after a while, if the pupil happens to have the article, but straight work, patiently and hopefully continued, is very much better, we venture to say. By the way, a fair amount of intelligence is quite an important matter, in such an undertaking.

Teachers will not make a good player, neither will the instrument, no matter how good they each and all may be. Finally, the violin in this case was abandoned by the writer, and it remained in a state of complete quiescence for many long years. Later on, his son took up the instrument in earnest and being favored with excellent natural gifts in music, he had from the beginning very gratifying success. But after the son had grown to manhood, he died, and the violin was laid aside again for an indefinite period.

At the age of seventy-five, the writer sold the newspaper which he had owned and edited for forty years, and retired from business for all time. But then came up this question, what would he do? His life had always been one of unusual activity, and what would or could he do now that might be considered sensible for one of his years? As for study and traveling, he had had enough of these things already. In fact, he never could read books simply for diversion. He read books for what they contained, just as he talked with people to ascertain what could be learned from them.

When he found he could learn nothing, he soon dropped the conversation, and turned his attention in some other direction.

He happened at last to think of the abandoned violin. But what could he do with that instrument? He had tried music, he thought, to his entire satisfaction, years ago. He had no natural talent in that direction, and he had never heard even his best friends say that he could either sing, play, or whistle. However, he decided to have the violin professor come and make him a call, just as the people usually send for the doctor or the minister when they are in trouble.

The professor who came prescribed for the pupil in due and ancient fashion. But what could really be done for one to whom even the rudiments of music were unknown? His experience in this instance, he must say, was not very encouraging, and he would never advise any one to undertake to master the notes in music at the very mature age of seventy-five. It is very dry and discouraging business at best. Everything about the study is arbitrary, like the notes themselves. There is not a single rational point to be found connected with the whole subject—the keys, the beats, the octaves, the chords, the harmonics. Everything is arbitrary and mechanical. There is no reason why anything, in any case, should be so or not so, in preference to some other way. So, to make the story short, the pupil discharged the teacher, after paying him his reckoning, and he started out in business on his own account—a step that he was never sorry for one moment to have taken.

And here let it be remarked once for all, that there is no law nor reason to compel a man to follow the notes precisely as the composer has placed them in all cases. It is merely his conception of propriety, and nothing more. But any man, any genius, any player, may render the piece on his own account, in his own style. He may introduce notes, intersperse notes, or suppress notes, as he pleases. Why not? Whose special prerogative shall it be to render a piece in his own peculiar style, adding or omitting notes according to his particular fancy? The writer does not believe in the power or prerogatives of law-makers at any time, on any subject. It should not be forgotten for a moment that many men play tunes sweetly without knowing notes or paying any attention to them, just as a man may learn to speak a language fluently and correctly and still not know a single rule or principle in grammar. What is there to hinder any man from being his own composer, his own law-maker? Why may he not render his own tunes, adding, suppressing, and interpreting as he likes?

Why must any man have a coat that does not fit him, or does not meet his fancy, merely because it is expected that he will follow the rules and the fashion? It must be remembered that rules, and laws and fashions are opposed to all freedom, all elasticity, all *true development*. Nothing comes forward that is new and true without being directly opposed to laws and fashions. This is the material fact that should always be *borne well in mind*. There is no one style in which any tune must always be rendered. It may be played, as any work may be done, in a hundred, or in a thou-

sand different ways—and any one of them may be as *correct* as any one or all of the others. There must be such a thing in this world as individuality and independence, or such a thing as originality and genius, if these terms are preferred. No one can deny that a tune can be played, well, exceedingly well, and yet the player may not follow the notes without some variation. In fact, no two people ever play a tune exactly alike—they never do, they never could. There is such a thing as interpretation—but those who always play like *some one else*, of course *never interpret*.

The writer, it will be conceded, had a few advantages over some other men, when he started to play the violin on his own account. He had what is called an appreciative ear for music and he took a lively interest in the whole subject. His was not a cultivated or correct ear as rules go, but he knew a sweet and pleasing tune when he heard it. It always inspired him, and its effects sank deep into his soul. His taste in music was never false in any respect, and he uniformly found himself in accord with good judges of melody. The writer, it is agreed, had a fine sense of time, and time goes to the bottom of all music. Without time and rhythm, we can have no tune. Tunes are made up of successive tones, rests, measures, repeated over and over again, and still there is no feeling of monotony! That is the most remarkable fact in connection with the history of the art. In music, there are congruities and incongruities, but it is hard to decide what is congruous, or harmonious, and what is not. Even certain notes that are several intervals apart may be sounded together with a pleasing result.

We have consonance, often, where dissonance might be expected.

The only particular gift that the writer was favored with, in connection with music, was a rather abnormal remembrance of tunes. He has always taken note of new and popular tunes and songs from his youth down to the present moment. The first series to be photographed upon his mind was the lively Scotch and Irish reels, waltzes, polkas and jigs, heard at dances and entertainments when he was still a boy. Of these, not one does he seem to have forgotten. Then came the plantation songs, or negro melodies, heard at circuses and concerts.

These continued to be popular with the masses for a long time—such as Lucy Long, Susannah, Dandy Jim, Dan Tucker, etc. Later on, came the patriotic songs of the Civil War: such as Tramp, Tramp, Marching Thro' Georgia, Rally 'Round the Flag, Just Before the Battle, etc. In connection with these were Dixie, Star Spangled Banner, Red, White and Blue of an earlier date. Later on, we had a host of fine pieces developed by composers, such as Wabash, Summer Time in Dixie, Hiawatha, Sousa's Liberty Bell, Washington Post, Red Wing, etc.

Here, omitting the few names that we have already mentioned incidentally, we append the names of many tunes which have been impressed on the writer's mind for a long series of years, and which he never tires of trying to render: Jordan, a hard road to Travel, Down in Dixie, Girl I left behind me, Pop goes the Weasel, Captain Jinks, Nellie Gray, Swallows, Hail to the Chief, Bonnie Doon, Arkansas Traveler, Lannigan's

Ball, Home Sweet Home, Lily Dale, Old Oaken Bucket, Mocking Bird, Annie Laurie, Beautiful Bells, Blue Bells of Scotland, Wearing of the Green, Last Rose of Summer, Comin' thro' the Rye, Dearest Spot on Earth, Old Kentucky Home, Massa's in the Cold Ground, Come, O Come with Me, Long, Long Ago, Suwanee River, Janet's Choice, Maryland, Wait for the Wagon, Shamus O'Brien, Little German Band, Champagne Charley, Dublin Bay, On the Beach of Brighton, Pretty Little Sarah, Guards Waltz, Jenny Lind Polka, Buy a Broom, Abraham's Daughter, Waiting at the Church, Stupid Little Cupid, Sweet By and By, Chimes of Normandy, Rory O'Moore, Monnie Musk, Virginia Reel, O Happy Day, Joe Bowers, Falling Waters, Robin Adair, Irish Washerwoman, Walking in the Zoo, Walk in the Parlor, Life on the Ocean Wave, Roll on Silver Moon, Bully for You, Devil's Dream, Irishman's Shanty, Zip Coon, Free and Easy, Up in a Balloon, Johnnie Come Marching Home, Bonaparte's March, Rosin, the Beau, Up in a Balloon, Veritas March.

A few of these names may not be correctly given, but there can be no mistake as to identity.

These are all striking pieces, and many of them are characterized by great beauty and sweetness. As melodies and compositions, some of them have never been surpassed. Of course their age or simplicity has nothing at all to do with their merits as choice specimens of music. The negro melodies, especially as they are heard in the South, are wonderfully thrilling and impressive. Then there is the Welsh, Scotch and Irish music, which constitutes a class by itself. Nothing is

so characteristic of a race as its music. There is the Arab music for instance.

The writer himself, in his usual practice, has never given any special attention to any other instrument than the violin. It is small, but it has great capabilities. The organ and the piano are larger and more powerful, but do they have more real merit; and do they produce an effect that is finer or more lasting? That is a question. The piano has great compass, but does it appeal to the heart as the violin does, plain and simple as that instrument may appear? The piano is built on the basis of the harp, but it lacks the beauty of tone and the feeling that characterize the harp. In the latter instrument, the strings are picked, or fingered, while in the piano they are thumped or pounded. The piano serves well in a concert, or as an accompaniment. That is about the extent of its usefulness.

The guitar is also a small and cheap instrument generally neglected, but it is capable of effects much finer than those of either the piano or the organ. As an accompaniment for the voice, it is charming always. There is quite too much machinery about the piano. What the soul craves is melody, and that is never successfully produced in connection with machinery. As a rule, the greater the noise, the less the music. There is a great deal of noise in a brass band, but when it comes down to a matter of pure music, there is no room for discussion. The brass band is a later discovery; it sounds well in the street, at a celebration, but that seems to be its limitation. If music took rank according to its power and effect, thunder would have a place in the first class. It might properly rank as

classical. Finally, there is *too much difficult music* and *not enough of the plain sort.*

To return to the case of the writer and his experience with the violin. He began with a repertory of two or three hundred tunes, mostly of the popular class that we have already noticed. These were generally complete tunes or songs, but sometimes only important parts were mastered. It costs no more labor or skill to play a fine tune, and one of merit, than to render a tune that has no merit or beauty. It is well known that some pieces appeal to us strongly, and are thrilling and impressive. What sense is there in wasting time on commonplace tunes having no strong points, when there are so many of a higher order that are accessible and actually cost no more? Of the finer tunes, the writer never tires, and he loves to repeat them indefinitely. For him, they never lose their freshness or their delicious flavor. It is the beauty of the tune itself, rather than the playing, that the artist usually feasts on. Some of the most interesting pieces that ever were written are in themselves simple little productions. What has more true merit than Nellie Gray, Mocking Bird, Walking in the Zoo, Dublin Bay, Hiawatha, Liberty Bell, Summer Time in Dixie, Marching Thro' Georgia, Suwanee River, Shamus O'Brien, Wabash, Red Wing, and finally Dixie, and the Girl I Left Behind Me?

As the writer could not read the notes, he could not learn new tunes in the usual way. Many tunes he learned readily after hearing them rendered once or twice, at concerts or elsewhere. Others he could learn only after hearing them played repeatedly on the

piano. Some tunes gave him much more trouble than others. For instance, it took him four years, hearing the piece repeated from time to time, before he could master Sousa's popular, but difficult, Liberty Bell. After the tune was fixed in his mind, and he could sing it, it was his for all time, and he never experienced any trouble again in rendering the piece quickly and correctly on the violin. It was as easy to play such tunes as it was to breathe. The fingers and the wrist seemed to do their work automatically, without any help or direction from the mind.

According to the impressions that the writer has formed on the subject, the inconvenience of resorting to notes in playing is incomparably greater than any benefits that might be derived from being able to read music at sight. Those who depend upon notes are constantly hampered by the want of them when they are not at hand. By the writer's method, when the tune is once fully mastered, it becomes his property. However, it is his idea that ordinarily those who wish to learn to play the violin should go on with their practice, *leaving the notes to be learned later,* after the pupil has made considerable progress on the instrument. Let him practice, and thus get command of the instrument, whether the tunes that he plays are strictly correct or not.

It is certain that the notes serve to embarrass the learner in his progress, rather than to lighten the burden, and especially so at the start. It is true, the notes aid in learning to play a tune correctly, but they are by no means indispensable. We have seen that the work can be done without notes, by first having the

tune fixed in mind. While the pupil keeps his eye constantly on the *correctness* of his *playing*, when he uses notes, he loses all that feeling and sentiment which he otherwise might have. How can music be mastered in that way? It will be observed that *correctness* at all times, is *following copy strictly and nothing more.*

Of course, one violin is sufficient for any one pupil who is learning to play. But there is some benefit in a variety of instruments, especially in the early stages of playing. The writer kept buying different instruments as he happened to come across those that he fancied, until he finally had six, all different, and all with their own points of excellence. It was quite a relief to take up one instrument after tiring of another. Later on in the process of learning, there would be no object in keeping more than one instrument in tune. That of course should be the best one.

The writer does not attach a very high value to the services that might be rendered by any teacher, either in violin playing, or in any other art. He would at all times have been glad to get some information or suggestion from those whom he knew. But those that he met who knew much about a violin were very few indeed, and these few, generally, were not inclined to render any substantial assistance in this direction. Valuable hints were obtained from the music books of the day, but they were usually very incomplete and unsatisfactory. If the learner has reached mature years, and has a good violin book, or several of them, he would need no teacher. What he would need, chiefly, would be *practice*. The work of learning must at last be done by the pupil himself, and it is just the one job

that *no one can have done by hired help.* Nobody can aid the pupil, to any extent; and to secure a substitute for him is impossible. *Practice, and practice alone, does the business.*

What such a case wants is long-continued effort properly applied. It would take an ordinary learner four to six years to learn to play fairly on a violin. But when he has got that far, how great is his achievement! In the writer's case, he places a much higher estimate on what he has, unaided, been able to accomplish with the violin than upon any other work that he has ever undertaken in his whole life-career. He would not, especially at this time of life, take many thousand of dollars in exchange for this possession.

It is a great rest, a source of continued consolation and satisfaction, to be able to render tunes nicely on the violin. Of reading, for the sake of reading, the writer soon tires, and so he does of other diversions which are mere diversions. But on a violin he could play for hours at a time, and never experience any fatigue. The music is also a source of pleasure to the family and the neighbors. Even in learning to play, he never felt for a moment that he had a task before him. Every day since he first began, and quite down to the present moment, he has had the satisfaction of perceiving that he was constantly making progress, and that he was playing a little better one day than he played the day before. Improvement always encourages the learner.

If a man wanted to be an artist, and keep up with the times, he would need to take a different course. He would need a teacher and travel abroad. He would

need also a great deal of money and time, to say nothing of the labor implied. And even at last, he might miss the mark—*as a great many do.* The writer never felt that he needed to go to all that trouble. What he was after, was music exclusively for home consumption, and that can usually be secured in a very simple manner, with a trifling expenditure, by one who is willing to do his own work—provided only that he has the requisite amount of time, energy and perseverance. In music, as in medicine, people often send for the doctor, when no doctor could do any good. It wants work usually in all such cases, rather than prescriptions.

As we have said before, everybody cannot expect to excel. No, that much is not expected, or demanded, of anyone. All that is expected, and all that the world demands, is that each one *shall do as well as he can.* On that basis, we shall surely have some musicians in every family. We should compare ourself with ourself at all times—we have no personal concern about what others can do. What can *we* do, is the proper question uniformly.

Of course everybody is not obliged to take up the violin. The flute, a cheap, plain instrument, renders very pleasing music, and requires no very great skill; so does the accordeon, and even the mouth-organ and jews-harp, give quite passable music. Music is very cheap, and very accessible at all times—if you only stop to give it a little attention every day, every week, every year. How much better would music be for the world than to waste time, as it is wasted now, in a hundred weak or wicked ways! In other words, how

much better our world would be *with music* than our world as it is *without music!* Those that cannot play might at least sing. It is a very desirable accomplishment to sing well, as it is to dance well.

There is nothing that is really new in any tune, even though it may be considered new, and it really may be new, for some people. Every piece of musical composition is a medley, as a patched quilt, or a sample of mosaic is a medley. In the case of music, the strains and the peculiar features that belong to tunes, are picked up, one here and another there, and finally they are deftly pieced together like any other medley, often very unconsciously. No tune ever had a note or strain that was never known or heard of before. They are always old notes, just as our thoughts are always old thoughts that have emerged and disappeared again, in the history of the world, no doubt a thousand times before. Just so when an author composes a chapter or writes a paragraph, he uses words and expressions, and even thoughts, that have been used by other men, or other authors, hundreds and thousands of times before. And yet the author gets the whole thing copyrighted, and finally he offers it to the world as his book! In fact there is not a word of it that is really his! All that any artist ever does is to use old elements and thus form simply a new arrangement, or a new combination. It may be noted that, in music, we often have a feeling that parts of one tune are very similar to certain parts of another tune. This need not be considered strange at all. Parts of different tunes are often not only similar, they are in fact often identical. It is only a repetition, to say that nothing is ever

found in this world that proves to be something really new. The pieces of the quilt were, not long since, parts of some dress, and the stones of a cathedral were, at one time, constituent parts of some distant quarry.

The violin, it may be noted finally, as an instrument of music, has some very remarkable qualities. The more music you take from it, by use and practice, *the more music remains,* and the better is its quality. Age and practice improve the violin to a wonderful extent. It would seem that the instrument, with proper care and treatment, is the better every way for the tunes that it has helped to render. So we notice that practice improves the violin quite as much, and quite as certainly, as it does the player. It is easy to do what we have learned to do, and what we have become accustomed to do; and it seems, curiously enough, to be a principle that applies as well to inanimate matter as to living beings!

Let the Heaven-born art of Music spread; let it bless the homes and hearths of the people; let the children sing, and sing together; let the concertina, the violin, or the flute be found in every cottage; let not the only fiddle in the place be hung up in the beer-shop, the only choruses in the village be heard in the choir and at the public house. And, while music refines pleasure, *let it stimulate work* Let part-songs and sweet melody rise in all our crowded factories above the whirl of wheels and clanking of machinery; thus let the factory-girl forget her toil, and the artisan his grievance, and music, the *civilizer*, the *recreator*, the *soother* and *purifier of emotions*, shall become the music of the future!—Rev Haweis, *Good Words*.

In concluding our remarks on Music we have deemed it not amiss to dwell briefly on the modern aspect of the subject, and to notice a few of the leading points in the progress and development of this wonderful art—not as it is known among men generally, but as it is understood among artists and amateurs. Really, men do not generally devote any time to the study of music under any of its forms and conditions, and hence it is that they know very little of its history, its real nature or its true use and application.

The first thing to bear in mind, in taking up the study of music, is its representative character and the symbolical office which it is known to perform. In fact, music never represents itself; it has no character or mission of its own. In that respect, it is, like all art and all science, a mere instrument in the hands of man. Its direction is determined and its features are delineated by man alone. What man concludes that music is, that it is, and that it must continue to be until succeeding generations decide to give it a new character and a new mission; and so it is with every object, and every class of objects in nature.

All the terms used in music, or in treating of that subject, originate in the mind of man, and they indicate not so much the nature and operations of music as they do the conceptions that man has formed in regard to this art. Musical terms are all metaphors, and so the terms are in art generally, as well as in metaphysics and mathematics. Music, it will be observed, gives very little information to students ordinarily—indeed, none at all directly. It merely suggests, reminds. As we have intimated before, it is symbolical.

It acts upon the emotions, rather than upon the mind or the intellect.

Music, especially written music, is not only made up wholly of signs and symbols, it is practically an art devoted to expression, precisely as we find in the case of language. The original music known to man was vocal music, the use of instruments being introduced much later than vocal music, and appearing more rarely. In its primitive form, music was mere chanting or the intoning of words. That was the leading characteristic of Greek music, which was simply declamation or recitation, and nothing more.

Among the Greeks, music and the drama were closely allied. Both were alike in their office; both were used to teach and impress people, rather than to furnish them with either knowledge or diversion. It will be noticed by those who are familiar with history that the ancients were much less devoted to ornament and amusement than we are at the present day. They valued things for their uses mainly, and if it was found that they could not be used, they were soon discarded. We should notice also that we are always dealing, not with things, but with the mind, in short, with *our* mind —alike in music, in science, in art of all kinds, and in government. It is always the mind, thought, belief, that comes to the fore and demands our attention.

Here it may be observed that music is an invention, as we find in other arts. Nature is not inventive; in fact, it has nothing to do with invention. Indeed, nature does not even think. Thinking is exclusively a human affair, that is, thinking in its later form and more approved aspect. Animals have invention to some ex-

tent, but it can hardly be said that they study, and reflect, and compare, in any true sense. Music comes from the mind, and it is directed by intelligence and will. Where there is no mind, no thought, no design, there can be no music. Sounds without will, without plan or purpose, are mere groans, cries, screams, shouts or noises. They are not music properly so named. Music implies a composer, a designer or inventor, as we find implied also in poetry and painting. The world has had designers in music for thousands of years, and so it has had in other arts.

Music, like every other art, has a growth and a history. Two thousand years ago, and more, men had, in both civilized and uncivilized countries, music in abundance, but not such music as we find at the present time. In countries like Egypt and Greece, they had rhythm and melody, but they knew little about harmony and contrast, consonance and dissonance, so far at least as concerns their innermost nature. It may be noted, too, that the people of these countries knew little about shading and perspective in drawing. Greece did much to advance music, but not along the lines that it has been advancing during the last few centuries.

In nearly all civilized lands, a few talented and devoted students have pursued the study of music with remarkable results. They have had the public and the professions against them, as the public and the professions are uniformly against what is understood to be new truth. Beethoven, Haydn, Mozart, Handel, Gluck, Bach, Wagner and others, had a sorry time of it in their musical career. They were cruelly treated at times,

solely because they had the presumption to press forward to introduce *a new idea*. But they were heroes, as men with new ideas usually are. They fought the battle, fought it to a finish—and, we rejoice to say, they finally won! That much is admitted to-day even by a cold and unfeeling world! The victory has proved complete and overwhelming. But the crowd! the crowd! what has become of that? The crowd may be seen, in the dim distance, as it comes trudging along, tired, foot-worn, and despondent, some hundreds of years behind the composers! *It is always so.* A few, a very few men, are far in the advance—while the crowd are always lagging behind, very far behind!

What is music? That is an old question, as everybody knows, and something similar we hear very often in other directions. We give names to things, we classify them, and then we start out to ascertain what they are and where they may be found. Whether we have given to them the right names or the wrong ones, we probably never shall know. What their mission is, we do not understand. And so it is particularly in music; we must all admit that on this question, there is very little that we really know. We have ideas, but ideas demonstrate absolutely nothing. At best, ideas last for only a brief time, and the purpose that they serve is unimportant.

What is music, again we ask? There is no indication of our ascertaining what it is just now, nor for some time to come. We know a few things about music, or we think we know, and that answers the purpose as long as we have nothing better to offer in its place. It is said to be a language, but a very peculiar

language it is, judging by what we have observed thus far. Curiously enough, it appears to be used mainly for amusement purposes.

Unless we get stronger light or better evidence than we have now to lead us in some other direction, we must conclude that some men see more in a piece of music than others do, and we are reminded of the fact which we have often observed, that the beauties that we see and the value that we assign to them depends largely upon what we are, what we have learned and what we believe. In all these cases *we* are the most prominent factor, rather than the object under consideration.

Another fact seems to be this: That no sound, no note in music, stands out alone and independent. We have noticed something like this all along in our investigations connected with this work. *Everything gets its character, finally, from that with which it is associated.* This is particularly evident in music, an art in which chords and harmonics play a very important part. There we notice that one note, or one string on a violin, sounded alone, produces a plain and uninteresting effect, while if we sound it in connection with a note that is a fifth or an octave higher, we get a result that is not only pleasing but actually brilliant! In this domain of chords and harmonics, may be found chiefly, the source of the amazing power of the violin, with its astonishing richness and sweetness. In colors, we find the effects, in harmonies and contrasts, that are evidently identical in character with those of music.

An exceedingly interesting and important work that reached us while this was in press is *Musical Culture*

and Education (Bildung und Erziehung). Dr. Arnold Schiering, Leipsig, 1911.

The subject is ably handled by one who has a clear conception and a thorough understanding of the matter on which he discourses. It is a profound and readable book, giving the public light in a department where light, until recently, has certainly not been abundant. The views of the writer are uniformly well founded, and many of them will be found to be new, even by the intelligent reader. The musical analyses of the book deserve a careful perusal by every lover of the art.

A highly valuable treatise which reached us a little later than the above, is Musikwissenschaft (Science of Music), Dr. Hugo Riemann, Leipsig, 1908.

This volume abounds in leading and interesting thoughts, and the author in his investigations has gone to the foundations of the subject. The book is fully up with the times—indeed, in some of the positions taken, it may be said to be in advance of the times.

LANGUAGE AND SIGNS

In order to thoroughly understand our thoughts and ideas, we must inquire more closely into the true character of language. It is well known that thoughts and language are intimately related, and that without the introduction of language as a part of everyday life, thought would never have made any appreciable advancement among men.

The first step that should be taken on entering upon this inquiry is to get a true conception of the nature

and office of language. It is generally understood that by the use of words we communicate thoughts to others, and that in some mysterious manner which has never yet been explained, we are able to transmit ideas. But we think that a careful examination of all the facts of the case must lead to the conclusion that ideas are not, and cannot be, transmitted from one point to another point, or from one person to another person by any contrivance known to man.

There are some points of resemblance between language and pictures, but there are also great differences. Pictures are employed to revive the memory and to bring forward old thoughts and impressions that have been lost in some way, or that have been affected, perhaps, by the corrosive power of age. But it must be remembered that pictures are in no sense duplicates or reproductions in any form. At best there is, as there always will be, many points of difference between the picture and the thing signified. There are really but few points in common between them. Many points of resemblance are brought out in the picture; but many features, also, are suppressed or overlooked, in still other cases, great modifications are noticed, and the illustration or portrait when presented, as a whole, instead of being a copy or imitation, simply gives the artist's own peculiar view or conception of the subject that has been engaging his attention. Instead of showing how men and things really look, to this or that person, or to mankind in general, the painting shows only how objects appear on canvas under the treatment of this or that artist. It must be remembered that the painting as a work never affects the subject

treated in the slightest degree, and it has absolutely no connection with it in any way whatever. Whether the picture presented is a poor likeness or a good one, the man or woman supposed to be represented goes on in his or her career precisely as if nothing had happened.

Strange as it may seem to some, the real office of pictures is substantially the same as that of words. It may be stated that pictures were used before words, and in place of words, as language. Pictures are in no sense copies of men and things; neither are words copies. Likenesses are mere reminders of men, of men and women. The office of both words and pictures is to keep things in memory, to arrange them properly, and to bring them to mind—and in doing this work, some conventional sign or mark is employed which by custom or agreement is the one to be used in each individual instance.

Of course we should never lose sight of the fact that there is no meaning in any picture, in any sign, in any object. How should any object mean something that is different from itself? We have seen over and over again, in our past investigations, that words in themselves have no meaning, no expression; neither have pictures or objects of any kind a meaning. No two things in all this world have any connection or relation in any way to each other. Things are known only by some characteristic sign or symbol. The connection or relation in any case lies wholly in the imagination of the reader or observer, and resemblance is always confined to a very few features. If a sculptor chisels a head and face, he can call it, when it is done, either

Caesar, Napoleon, or Cicero, or by any other name that he prefers. Even if he meant it for Caesar, his intentions by no means settle the matter. How should we ever know what a man means? At best we can only know conjecturally. So in applying words to things, there is *no natural or necessary connection in any case.*

We can call a horse an ox, a castle a house, or a sea a lake, and so on indefinitely. We can call a note in music *si, do* or *la,* as we please, though if we followed rule or fashion we could not use these names indiscriminately. As a matter of fact, the Germans apply the name *thier* to animals generally, while we apply the same word, *deer,* to only a small class of animals. Lat. *fera,* Greek *ther,* Eng. *bear,* meaning a wild animal, is the same word. The Germans say *hut,* while we say *hat;* we apply the German *hut,* in the form of *hood,* to a sort of cap or bonnet for women; the Germans again use *gross* for *great,* while we use gross in a different sense. The Germans also use *fall* for *case* or event. It is well to note that our *case* is allied to the Latin *cado,* to fall. The German *schiff,* our *ship,* is the same as our skiff, a small boat.

We see and feel only what is in our mind; we have no concern about what may be in the mind of some other party. When we look at a picture, or something that is meant to recall some particular object or event, we see only our own images or conceptions, those which arise in our mind and bear our imprint in some form. If we observe a figure in the clouds, or in the fog or smoke, the outlines are those which are the product of our own brain, and they are really the work of our imagination. So in painting, the artist puts on his oil and color freely and roughly, and always leaves

numerous gaps for the observer to fill out, according to his own judgment, fancy or acquirements. Indeed, the construction, or reconstruction, finally, of every picture or painting is placed wholly in the hands of the observer who reads or interprets the picture, and how the work appears to him, depends entirely on what he himself is, and what he has seen and learned in the past.

The work of all artists is subjected to public opinion, or to that of critics, just the same as in other departments of life. Nobody can ever see at any time what he has never learned, and therefore what he does not know. We do not see things some distance away from us, but only those things which we have present in our minds. No one can see what others see, nor where they see it. Berkeley is entirely right. "What we see at any time is only that which in some way is a part of ourself."

Words or signs bring up no thoughts or ideas for us, unless they are our words, our signs. We know nothing about the signs that are known to other people and not to ourselves. We must have the language *with us, in us, of us.* Ideas may be called up by signs, as in music or mathematics, by agreement, without regard to form, and even without form. In sound and feeling there is no form. Words themselves are properly sounds and have no form. Yet they call forth ideas, in accordance with either custom or previous arrangement. Words stand for classes of things, for ideas—never for individual things. The word *tree* applies to all trees, and never to any one tree in particular. This or that tree is not really a tree; it is only the form of a

tree and by no means a complete tree; it lacks very much that other trees possess.

It should be borne well in mind that our language, consisting as it does of words, either written or spoken, is only one form of language among a great many forms. They all employ signs in some form and under certain conditions; they all serve as reminders that will preserve and help record certain thoughts or ideas. In all forms of language, gestures as signs play a conspicuous part; the facial expression is also of great service in giving evidence of thought and feeling.

Among the different sign-languages of this country, none is more interesting and instructive than the sign language of the American Indians. Simple and uncultivated as this is, it is very generally used in certain cases of need, and with its use, even remote tribes can converse with each other with surprising success. No words are used. Certain signs, gestures and movements have come to be understood as having a certain significance, and thus conversation is rendered possible, even for those who have devoted but little time to the study of the language.

It may not be amiss to dwell briefly in this place on what may be considered to be the true character of language when we converse. What do we really do when we talk to people? It may be as well to announce here in the beginning as elsewhere that we do not do what we assume to do, nor what people usually imagine that we do in such cases. When we think that we talk to people, as we say, we really do nothing of the kind. We simply talk to hear ourself talk, precisely as we do when we offer up prayer to Heaven or

to God. God never hears a word that we say nor does he grant a single request that we make. Just so when we talk to men. We go on talking, and talking, merely because we love to hear the pleasing sound of our voice, and precisely as we do when we read aloud or when we have a soliloquy. It is just so again when we sing. We need not necessarily sing to people. Do we think to people? No, we think to ourselves, and so it is when we talk, or sing, or pray, either when we are asleep or when we are awake. What difference does it make to us what others say, or whether they do or do not say anything at all? We repeat—we never talk to a man, we merely talk just as we merely sing, or read, or pray. This is especially evident when we address an assemblage.

Before we proceed farther on this subject, we should remind the reader that language in its inception was not the elaborate and intricate affair that it is now. Man did not begin his life career with long speeches; his rhetoric was simple enough, and he did not bother with metaphors, hyperboles, or apostrophes. He knew very well there were very few about him who could appreciate such stuff. Man in the beginning said little, because he had very little to say. Why should he run to big words when small words were handier and just as effective? The first words of man were monosyllables. Instead of there being several parts of speech, there was, as there is now among savages, only one part of speech. Adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and expletives generally, were unknown. Even the sentence, the soul of language as we conceive it now, could not be recognized. People perhaps then as

now had sentiments, but they were slow to declare them. In fact they lacked the means of such expression, as the natives of wild countries usually do. They had feelings and wishes, and to a certain extent they had emotions, but unless we are greatly mistaken, their psychology was confined mostly to such simple lines as we have just indicated.

Bishop Berkeley understood the force and office of words, as well as their limitations, much better than most scholars did who lived and wrote at a later date. He seems to have fully appreciated the fact that words may have many applications, or they may be taken to mean many things. He considered it false to say that words in any case have but one meaning. Even beyond this, he granted that it was a mistake to claim that words are used exclusively, or even chiefly, to signify ideas. In many cases they are expletives, or perhaps mere counters.

The true office and nature of words can be understood most readily by considering the uses and purposes of numbers as illustrated in the operations of arithmetic and algebra. Numbers certainly are not things; they do not even stand for things, for nowhere do we find any individual things that correspond to numbers. At best, they denote notions or conceptions that have, in the course of time, developed into thoughts among men. We think of two things, of five things, all of a certain kind, but this is merely a notion that we have formed. There are no instances in nature of two things being exactly alike, and therefore we need not expect to find things of one and the same kind. If they were really so, as many people imagine,

they would be one and the same thing. So we call this object a tree, and that object a tree, as if they were one and the same thing. But on reflection we begin to see that there are *no two things alike* in all this world, and hence they should never be grouped together as such, either in numbers or as classes of any kind.

Language and numerals, or figures, were a contrivance used originally by men to lighten labor and to ensure correctness in the results of their calculations. They went on still farther, and devised, as in China, a calculating machine. In all these cases, it was simply cutting across, abbreviating, instead of following the stupid method of going around the square, when there was a shorter route at hand.

In language, uniformly, people are constantly striving to soften unpleasant sounds. They shorten words, or drop them entirely, wherever it is practicable. Just think of the great number of abbreviations and arbitrary signs that are in use, in medicine, in law, in music, in weights and measures, in astronomy, in chemistry—all introduced with the design of shortening work and perhaps rendering results more certain or more agreeable.

Some of these signs are natural or imitative, but often, as in music, they are entirely arbitrary. The sign of the moon is a rude picture—a man's face. For the sun a circle is used with a point at the center. Man is always abbreviating wherever it is possible. And this custom ought to be carried much farther than it is, and extended far into other fields. Why should we write *Monsieur* when *Mr.* or *M.* would answer the purpose? Why take the trouble to write *William* when *W.*

or *Wm.* would do as well? Why write a letter and seal it, when a postal card is so much handier? Our pronouns might well be dropped very generally, and likewise our articles, prepositions, conjunctions and expletives of all kinds. We should thus have shorter sentences and fewer of them. Why follow fashion, when fashion is so burdensome? In fact, fashion is almost always in the wrong. It is very rare that fashion meets the real wants of mankind or does things in the shortest and best manner possible.

We can get a somewhat better insight into the uses and character of language by learning the history and the relationships of certain words that are employed in our various talks at particular times and under special conditions. Thus, *count* and *account* refers to numbers and calculations, but we have the same word *recount* which means to tell or relate; French *conter,* to tell. Our *compute,* Lat. *computare,* referring to numbers, is really a form of Latin *puto,* which means to think, believe, suppose. We also *reckon,* figure, calculate, referring, of course, to numbers and their operations. But *reckon* with us also means to think, to believe. Our word *tell,* to speak, a tale, is same as German *zahl,* number. It is also used in connection with paying, counting. It means to count, and it is allied to our *tally.* The employee in a bank who tells or pays customers is called a *teller* or counter. It is well to remember that numbers were used at a date earlier than letters, and so counting is earlier than thinking, reflecting, relating. It may be noted that among the Greeks and others, letters were used for figures or numbers.

Additional words for telling, relating are: suggest, based on the Latin *gero*, to carry, bear—also infer, refer, prefer, suffer, defer; *report*, Lat. *porto*, to bring; *propose*, based on Lat. *pono*, to place; *refer*, reference, on Lat. *fero*, to bear, bring; *relate*, on Lat. *fero*, to bear, bring. Thus we have many other words that are purely mental in their conception and application, like the words already referred to, as *refer*, *prefer*, *suffer*, which are all forms of one word, Lat. *fero*, to bring, carry.

It is not necessary to observe that much is to be learned of the history and uses of words generally by comparing them with certain related words in our own and other languages. Indeed, if we wish to really understand anything, we must know its history. But strangely enough, *Comparative Philology*, a science well and favorably known half a century ago, in both America and Europe, is now, supposedly, nearly extinct. The Bopps and Grimms, Potts, Humboldts, and a host of others, are with us no more. There seems to be no place for them, no use for them just now. This interesting science—at least interesting at one time—is now generally ignored or disregarded. Even the lexicographers repel it. No doubt it will rise again in some form, at some future day. Evidently the investigations in reference to this subject, in the early half of the nineteenth century did not command the approval, for some reason, of the thinking public. Too much was certainly assumed and believed, and too little was actually accomplished. The inquiry began wrong, ran on wrong, and finally closed wrong. The book-buying public are just now running after other gods, and it is very hard indeed to divert their attention to some new, or rather

old, subject at present. And still it is just as true now as it ever has been, that if we wish to know more about thought, we must know more, a great deal more, than we know now, about language. And, by the way, if there be any subject on which the general public is amazingly ignorant, it is the subject of thought and the subject of language. On these matters at least, children seem to know as much as grown people, if not more.

There seems to be little room to doubt that language in its early history did not have the deep and intricate metaphysical problems that it presents at this time. Men originally knew very little of mind or reason, but more of the body and nature. Then words were formed on the basis of operations that came to the notice of men in everyday life. They had few doubts, and little curiosity, about anything. Our ancestors must have been very much like ourselves—they had few questions to ask, and so, necessarily, they saw but little opportunity to advance in learning. They took the world as they found it, and said nothing. And perhaps that is a very good way after all. When people start out to look for problems and doubts, they are always sure to find something of that kind before they return.

And here we may remark generally in connection with this topic, that students as a rule start out bravely enough on most subjects of inquiry, but too often they faint and fall by the wayside, and their works finally produce no valuable results. They accomplish very little, and even in cases where their views come to appear in print, it too often occurs that they merely find

amusement for themselves, and possibly for a few other people. In fact, in glancing back over the past, what shall we say that men have learned, what do they know to-day that men did not know a hundred, or a thousand, or perhaps ten thousand years ago, on the true nature of things? We have acquired, or rather developed, much in arts and inventions, but what have we learned, what have we grasped and what do we now retain, as a lasting achievement anywhere in science?

We have observed many things, we have believed many things, we have asserted and instituted many things, but what do we *know* that was not known in the world before our time—in science, in philosophy, in religion, in morals? It will be conceded that at this moment there is nothing in these directions that we can speak of as being established with certainty. In cases where there is the least doubt, and where most is known, we can only say *we think, we feel, we believe.* That is absolutely the extent of man's knowledge at all times. The wisest man in the world is not able to define or describe truth. He can talk about truth, we admit, but if he be candid as an inquirer, the best he can do is to say, finally, *he does not know.* If men knew more about truth, they would disagree less. Demonstration is something that may be talked about, but its results are never attained.

We have too many doctors—in law, in philosophy, in religion, in medicine, in literature. Is it possible that we can do nothing better at any time than simply to unlearn what we have been learning amiss? That does indeed seem to be man's chief occupation.

In this connection a small amount of space may be devoted to sign language properly so called. There are indeed more sign languages than many people suppose. There is the Indian sign language in this country, already mentioned, which has long been known to those acquainted with the Aborigines of America. There is also the sign language of deaf mutes, the telegraphic codes, the nautical signals, as well as the signs of various kinds that are used by children, by birds and by beasts generally.

Language is a matter of agreement, either expressed or implied, between two or more people. One man cannot make an agreement alone; one man can neither establish a meaning nor can he fix the application of a word. The hearer or reader must himself accept the meaning and agree to what is attempted or proposed by the one who takes the initiative. All language, it must be observed, has to be taught in the first place. No man can learn the use of words or signs without help from some outside source. There must be an agreement or an understanding of some kind as to the word used and its sound or form.

There is no limit to the number of new languages that may arise from the adoption of new codes like those of the cable or marine service. These, like sign codes usually, are in themselves arbitrary and meaningless. They are found acceptable in practice simply because of the important service that is rendered, in a business way, by devices of the kind. The Indians of this country make use of fire and smoke as signs in telegraphing, as they do very effectively, from one elevated point to another at a distance. On the sea, flags

are used, but now wireless is rapidly taking their place to a considerable extent.

Among the sign languages, none are more common or more important than gesture language, which is in use so generally in both civilized and uncivilized countries. The Indian sign language is made up largely of gesture, and that of deaf mutes among us is characteristically gesture language. When any sign language once becomes understood, as that of the Indian tribes referred to, it becomes wonderfully serviceable, even simple as it seems to be.

A small amount of space may be used at this time for the purpose of illustrating the changes to which words are subject, and to show the unexpected relationships which are often discovered, when different languages are compared, or different words in the same language. Almost any group of words would answer our purpose fairly well, but the following we have selected for this occasion: *rule, law, right, straight, extend, strain, tell, read, thing, think*. Some other words will come up incidentally in connection with these just named, and these will be noticed at the same time. That the words thus introduced are related to each other, either more or less closely, there can be no doubt.

In the past, when changes were fewer and much simpler than they are now, this relationship here claimed was far more evident than it is at the present time. But those who are familiar with the laws of

philology never need to have any question about such relationships, except in very rare cases. Of course, there is nothing that is absolutely certain in the development of Comparative Philology, but in this respect we are confident that it will compare favorably with any other branch of science. Indeed,when people decide to abandon the study of language and its history, they might as well drop philosophy at the same time. And what shall we say of Logic and Rhetoric? As matters stand at the present time, they seem to have outlived their usefulness, and they belong to ages that are long since past. They are simply arts that receive comparatively little attention as studies at the present time.

We begin with the Latin *rex,* a king, rule, Ger. *regel,* rule, Lat. *regula.* What the original word may be of any group, if there be such a word, we are not able to decide; but we know that *rex* is closely related to the Latin *rego,* to rule, to govern, Ger. *regeln,* to regulate, Sans. *raj, raga,* a king, Ger. *reich,* Lat. *regnum,* Eng. *region,* rule, Lat. *regina* (queen), Lat. *regius,* royal, Span. *real,* Eng. *rich* (powerful), Germ. *richter* (judge), Eng. *rector,* Eng. *rick* (heap up).

We now turn to another group, somewhat different in signification, but exhibiting identity in form, as follows: Lat. *reor,* to think, judge, believe, Lat. *res,* a thing, a cause, reason, affair, principle (judicial matter), government, republic (*res publica*). Connected with this is the participle *ratus,* from *reor,* Gk. *retos,* said, spoken, meaning what is thought. In the German languages, we find this *rath, rat, red* quite prevalent, in forms that vary but slightly. Thus, in Old Fries it is *red,* Ang. Sax.

raed, a public council or assembly—the basic-meaning being to suggest, to advise, to counsel, to assist.

Beyond doubt, our *ratio*, *reason*, *rate*, *ration*, involving as they do the idea of number or quantity, belong to this family; and so also Eng. *read*, speak, Germ. *reden* to speak, to talk, Eng. *riddle*, Germ. *räthsel*, is also at home in the same class with Germ. *rath* or *rat*, Lat. *reor* to think, to guess.

We come now to new forms of the same word *rex*, *reor*, *res*, but the words appear in a somewhat peculiar dress. We refer to the German *lesen*, to read (l for r), Eng. *lesson*, Lat. *lego*, *lectio*, to read, to speak, to count, to talk, to collect, to select, to count—Sans. *lagh*, to speak, to cry. In this group, the prevailing thought is to *read*, to *speak*, to *relate*, to *recount*, the original conception being a collecting and combining which is found in the work of the one who interprets what is written. These words generally imply number in some way, and hence power. It will be remembered that thinking and reading is, in mental effect, the same as counting and calculation. When we read or speak, it is well known that we have to do a deal of calculating, constructing and combining. It is work that will not in any case do itself.

In all such words as right, Germ. *recht*, Lat. *rectus*, Eng. *e-rect*, *di-rect*, Fr. *droit*, Eng. *straight*, Germ. *gerade*—the thought back of the whole group will be found in such words as *string*, *strain*, *stretch*, *reach*, *ex-tend*. Such words are the bases of government, rule, law and justice. They always indicate an effort, with power to accomplish what is undertaken. They imply a binding and an obligation. The same is true of law, lay, lie,

slay, Lat. *lectus,* a bed, Gk. and Lat. *lego,* to speak, read, ply, flog, inflict, afflict, plight, Lat. *ob-ligo,* Ger. *pflicht,* duty, obligation, Old Germ. *plegan,* Eng. pledge. It will be remembered that Lat. *lex,* law, Ital. *legge,* and *rex,* ruler, king, are all one word, *l* taking the place of *r,* as often occurs. It is well known that Lat. *lego,* to read, say and *rego,* to rule, are the same in origin. We might note that the German for law is *recht,* our right (a legal claim), Lat. *lego* and *rego.*

With a few more words in this connection, we will close this special inquiry: There is no room for doubt that the Lat. *res,* a thing, anything, Lat. *reor,* to think, suppose, judge, and its participle *ratus,* meaning supposed, fixed, ratify, Germ. *rath,* counsel, advise, assembly for counsel, Germ. *reden,* speak, Eng. read, Lat. *rhetor,* Eng. reader and o-rator, Gk. *retor,* Gr. part *retos,* said (Lat. *ratus*) Gr. *reo,* to say, to run, Eng. *rate, ration, reason, ratio,* Lat. *res* and *cause,* Fr. *chose, a thing,* Eng. berate, low rate or value, scold, Germ. *be-reden,* Eng. rate, are all closely related.

Our thing, Germ. *ding,* like Lat. *res,* has a long list of words with which it is closely connected, among them being *think, estimate, deem, doom,* Ger. *denken* and *dingen,* meaning to do business, *dünken,* to seem. *Think,* like *thing, go, run, flow, move,* is a general term that is extensively related to other words. Almost everything is a thing, as all mental work is a kind of thinking.

The fact should not be overlooked that new names, to an indefinite extent, can be given to objects, according as we think of some trait, mark or feature which has attracted our attention. Things are known usually

by some one name, from some particular feature, though any one of a hundred, or a thousand other names might have been given with equal propriety. Thus, we speak of a strip of land, from its narrowness, a stretch of territory, from its extent—or a section, a cut, a piece, a bit, or a bite. These words have nothing to do with land really, as we may notice, though they came to stand for land at last. *Just so words and names multiply.* One boy is called John, another Henry, another Peter, because these are the names fancied by the parents, and for that reason they were given. But there is no peculiar or proper name for any one object. Words, as so often said, have the meaning that men give them, and *no other.*

An interesting illustration of the different applications that the same word may have, in forms more or less modified, we may find in the group of which our word *mind* may be taken as the type or original. In Latin we find *mens*, or *ment*,—Eng. *mental*, *mention*, *memory* (keep in mind), Eng. *mean*, *meaning*, *ween* (Lat. *o-pinor*), Ger. *wahnen*, to fancy, to think, suppose (put in mind), Lat. *memini* (remember), Eng. to mind, remind. More remote is Fr. *mentir*, Lat. *mentior*, to lie—related to our *mind*, mendacious, but more remotely. *Mania*, madness, belongs in the same group. Also Greek *menos*, vigor, thought, rage, Gk. *meno*, to desire, to think.

We might note that in German *wahn* and *wahnsinnig* indicates madness, but *wahn* is our *fancy*, phantom. *All fancy is madness, a kind of thinking.* We cannot draw the line between soundness and insanity any more than between what is true and what is false. They are very much alike and often gradate into each

other. *Dementia,* folly, Lat. *a-mentia,* is a form of *mens,* mind, mental. Indeed, there is no chapter in science more interesting than that on the curious, or mysterious, relationship of words. We do not always perceive the connection, but it exists none the less. It is impossible to separate language from thought; when we are considering the one, we are necessarily studying the other.

EDUCATION

It had not been our intention, until recently, to refer even briefly, in this work, to the subject of education. We had dwelt upon that topic in all our late works, in each differently and from different standpoints, and we did not feel that it would be necessary to add anything on that subject at this time. But we are glad to notice that education as a subject of interest and inquiry begins to command a great deal of attention just now among thinking and educated men in Germany and other parts of Europe, and notably among a few leading men in our own country.

What we have called education, meaning thereby school and college instruction, has been moving along slowly, and we may even say listlessly, for at least the last hundred years. Everybody knows that this question, for every intelligent man and woman, surpasses, in the importance of its results, every other life-question. It is well understood that all that comes to us in the way of instruction and development, whether in the course of a long life or a short one, reaches us, finally,

through the medium of some educational influence. Every man or child who lives among men and with men, as we do, must learn what he knows as he moves along in the daily routine of the world. Everything that crosses our path, everything that we see or encounter, whether we are at work or at rest, instructs us to some extent and in some way. Everybody must get his inspiration from some source, or he would not move. We must be educated, if we continue to reside in this world, whether we so will or not. The leading question is not whether we may or may not have an education, or whether we may or may not have enough of it, but whether we may not have too much, and whether we may not have acquired what may prove to be education coming from the wrong source and being of the wrong character.

Nobody questions, so far as we know, that America as a country has education enough, or that the bills, when they come to be paid, are sufficiently large for all practical purposes. The real question has been, and still is, about the *quality of the goods*. The quantity is ample, even far beyond all reasonable demands, but *the quality is wretched*. We must say that education as an investment, speaking of course generally, *does not pay*. It never has paid, and judging from the results thus far, if it continues on indefinitely upon the same old lines, we have no reason to believe that it ever will pay.

The first, the most noticeable and the most afflicting blunder connected with our methods of education, arises from the fact that very few people know, or care to know, what the real possibilities of education are.

They do not know what are its true aims nor what may be its real character. It is generally imagined that education is a matter for bargain and sale, that any one can purchase the article, as he would bread at the bakery, so long as he has the money, or at least the credit to buy with. But this is a mistake—it cannot be done. Education and learning, or teaching of any kind, or for any practical purpose, *can never be bought.* There is not, necessarily, any education in merely sending children to school, as there is not necessarily any knowledge in merely reading books. In the pursuit of wisdom, money may smooth the path somewhat, but it will not lighten the burden nor lessen the task in any way. No one can have learning served up to him as wine is handed on a salver. To learn is an active, not a passive process. In this case at least people will have to do their own work and it is silly to think of letting the job out to some person who acts as a substitute. We have said this many times in the past, and we would like to say it often enough to have the fact, important as we deem it to be, generally understood.

When we consider the energy expended, and the time lost or consumed, in the long years past, in the vain endeavor to "secure an education," we stand appalled at the stupendous waste! What will the scholar do when he comes into possession of his boasted acquirement? What could he possibly do with such an education as he usually obtains, in any case or in any way? Does he ordinarily make any inquiries, or does he consider what he may expect to do with his education when it is secured? No, he merely follows the fashion, or the custom, and no reasonable motive for

his action is ever asked for or given. Does he acquire by his study and effort what he knows he can use, or does he gain what he might know that he could never use, if he only stopped to consider? He studies the classics, the dead languages, with mathematics and the like accompaniments, for the discipline that is promised, and not for the wisdom he may gain, nor for any additional power that he expects to have placed in his hands. Even the sciences which he believes to be so very useful, and to which he devotes so much time and attention, are open to much criticism. Of all that the student learns in this department, he never knows how much can be relied on as fact, and how much in after life will have to be discarded as false and worthless, or perhaps as entirely impracticable.

Unquestionably, there is too much authority in our schools. The teacher is always authority, and the author of the textbook is also authority of course. But what kind of authority are they? At best, they are self-constituted, and no one pretends for a moment that they represent the Lord, or any other heavenly being. Teachers and authors are ordinary folk, just as good as common folks, and usually not any better. Let it not be forgotten for a moment that *authority proves nothing*. In no way can we prove or demonstrate any proposition. We must simply appeal to the intelligent, thinking student himself, and let him decide what he will and what he will not accept and believe. The decision lies wholly in his own conscience, his own bosom. *There will be found the evidence, and nowhere else.*

It is well understood that many authors write and print what they do not know, and what nobody ever has known or will know. In fact, they know but little of their subject usually, and it is noticed that the more they trust to imagination, the more fluently and more charmingly they seem to write. If the time should ever come when writers might contract the desirable habit of writing what they know, *and only what they know,* we should have fewer books, but there would be more in them, and their contents would have a higher value. People are fond of speculation to-day, as they were in the Middle Ages. They like to follow the mazy paths of sophistry, rather than the straight and narrow ways that lead to wholesome instruction. They are fond of philosophizing, as they term it, and they regard much talking as something that in itself is more meritorious than sound thinking, or better even than good common sense.

People imagine that they pass their lives in the pursuit of wisdom, and they find out at last, if they ever find anything, that they have been traveling on the wrong road. They never get so far even as to learn what truth and wisdom are. Many people there are who imbibe the notion that there is wisdom in much reading, or in the reading of many books. They quite forget that no one can obtain wisdom where none is to be found. Wisdom is to be secured always from those who keep it in stock. It may be well to bear in mind that there is no wisdom in assumption, though it is to be conceded that there is abundance of presumption in what is often considered to be wisdom.

And here we may remark that in Germany the pupil is trained and educated with a view to the place that he is expected to fill, the calling that he is designed to follow, or the work that he is expected to perform. However, in America there is no such concern for the welfare of either the pupil or the race. In our universities especially, the whole thought and study, on the part of the managers of these institutions, seems to be largely commercial in character. Nobody appears to appreciate more fully than they the fact, that "in numbers there is strength." In other words, bigness and greatness are considered to be identical, and the more overgrown some institutions become, the greater is their supposed magnitude and importance. But is it a fact that the more students there are in attendance at an institution, the more rapidly they will learn and the greater will be their acquirements? They may learn in some directions, but we should doubt about their gaining more real knowledge, or becoming more honest or more virtuous. In practice, our young men are sent to college, chiefly for the fun of the undertaking, and somewhat for fashion. One of our college presidents recently spoke truly, as well as pertinently, of these institutions as "a four years play ground." For the boys, it is very much like going abroad for pleasure, rather than for mental development. It is commonly supposed that boys must sow their "wild oats," and that it does not matter where nor how—if they only have the money and the inclination to carry the business through successfully.

And yet we wonder why the moral and intellectual standing of graduates, taken as they average, are no

higher than they seem to be to-day! Why should we wonder, if we know and bear in mind the facts of the case? The real wonder is, how it comes with the influences and agencies that are known to be at work constantly, that we people are able to develop as much character as we seem to possess. What is there in the training and treatment received by our young at home, or in the discipline and management in our schools and colleges, to say nothing of experiences while traveling abroad, that would be certain to render our young people either learned or upright? We will not take the responsibility of saying that education, in some cases, makes scoundrels. It takes a great many influences combined to make a scoundrel that is accomplished, and there can be no doubt that education often helps to give a nice finish to a job of that character. If some people did not know so much, they would not have so many arts at command. Even Satan himself, it will be remembered, is reputed to be quite an accomplished artist in his way. What is the example set for the rising generation by our men of wealth and renown, and by our leaders in the affairs of state and nation?

To return to our great institutions again, who is the man that is usually chosen to stand at their head, to guide, direct and develop the thousands who gather there yearly, and who are placed in his hands to be molded for life? Is he chosen for his goodness, or even for his solid attainments? No, he is chosen, ordinarily, for his talents of a "commercial" order. He should be a large man, rather than a good one. He must be known as a great organizer, a business man, a man who can secure bequests and endowments. He must be an

eloquent man, a popular man, a talented man, and if he be handsome withal, so much the better all around.

Our schools, our colleges, as well as our families, are supposed to send out men ready-made. But shall we say that always, or even generally, they are really well made, when they are made? No, Heaven knows they are not. Men are made over later in life, after they have left their home and the institutions referred to, to take their places and play their parts among men. It is well known, and said frequently, that our students, our young men and women, really begin to learn the lessons that are serviceable and useful after they have left their alma mater and have gone forth to battle with a frigid and selfish world. No, neither our homes nor our schools of any rank or degree, give to the boy or girl, or to the young man or young women, the slightest conception of what living in this world will certainly be found to be when the crisis comes. We that have been there know, and only because we have been there do we know. Those who have never been there will not learn till they themselves have been there. *Experience is the great teacher after all—not the colleges and schools, nor even the homes.*

And still perhaps it is not fair to complain of our institutions, any more than it is to complain of our books and newspapers. Both are found to be simply what our people have made them. They are both, to say the least, quite as good as the people are themselves. Everything is placed on a money basis at the present day. And why not colleges and newspapers? And while we are about it, why not also the courts and the legislatures? You pay for what you get, and some-

times you get what you pay for, and sometimes you do not. Without money, nobody moves. Even the doctor who saves your life, and the undertaker who buries you —all must have their fees. If a man saves you from drowning, or finds your lost pocketbook, he expects some suitable reward. By forgetting or ignoring these facts, you would appear small. Many years ago, in this country, when all things were crude and new, the customs and rules and practices were different. But the world moves, and with it the people.

We hope we may not be misunderstood or misapprehended. We are not objecting to education in general, not to any and to all education, but only to education in particular, as we find it developed in this country at the present time. We agree with Kant, Vol. 10, *"Man can become a man only through education. He is nothing but what education makes of him."*

The fact should not be forgotten that four years in college is, practically, four years in an atmosphere that is quite unlike anything else that the world affords. This is one of the reasons why college training has always fallen so far short of the success that might have been anticipated. When the student finishes his course and graduates, he finds himself ready to enter a world with which he is not acquainted, and which, therefore, he is but poorly qualified either to combat or to serve. He must not only begin life anew, but he must also begin his education anew. If he wishes to acquire art, and most of what he needs, we know, comes under that head, he should go at once to some place where the art is practiced. If he wants to be a banker, he must find a position in some successful

banking institution; if he wants to be a railroad engineer, or a civil engineer, or a mason or an architect, or a farmer, he should go and locate at some place where the business in question is the daily occupation. *That is the way, and the only true way, to get an education.* Education on any other basis is a false education, and it is sure to result in failure for those who try the experiment.

We urge again, what we have already intimated, that there is no real advantage in those institutions which boast of numbers. There is danger and demoralization to be found in such crowds, rather than any educational advantage. It is no uncommon thing for students to lose their lives at college, and a larger number lose their character there than is commonly supposed. Numbers add nothing to the industry or application of students. It is just the contrary. Numbers cause distraction, or introduce diversion. Is a small army of instructors needed for one student, or even for a hundred students? Too many things are taught at these institutions, and what is taught is often found to be unsound and unsatisfactory. It cannot be said that thoroughness always prevails at our higher institutions of learning. An industrious and ambitious student can get an education there, it is true, but he can acquire as much at other places, with a smaller expenditure of both time and money.

How much better it would be every way, to say nothing of the expense, for the pupil to remain a longer time under the influence of home than to be sent away early to college to mingle with the motley crowd that is generally found at such an institution!

It is well known that our students usually do not get learning or acquire virtues under any such conditions. Learning comes from study, practice and perseverance, and not from crowds of students, nor even from a multitude of professors, no matter how learned they may be themselves.

People should discard, once and for all time, the absurd and antiquated notion that we *must be taught* in order to learn; or that we must have task-masters and teachers, and must recite and repeat, if we wish to acquire knowledge! How ridiculous! It is well enough understood that knowledge never comes through any such agencies as these. This perpetual round of class work! What does it all amount to at last? It is not what the class knows that counts, nor what the class does, but what the pupil himself knows and what he accomplishes. So many years in grammar, so many in geography, arithmetic, when, it is well known, that at mature years, the whole work might be completed in a few months, and in a manner far more satisfactory.

The pupil, the younger one especially, needs some hints, some suggestions, some assistance, at certain times of doubt and despondency, but the school as we have it to-day is not the place where such assistance can be obtained to the best advantage and with the greatest certainty of reaching reliable results. Usually, all that is needed in the way of guidance and suggestion can be found, or should be found, in some well edited and well prepared school work, either in matters of science or in the arts. Instead of sending the child to school, send him to his books. Books and study are the main sources of learning at this time in

the history of the world. This is the way and the only way, by which the teachers themselves obtain their learning—*from books and study.* Indeed, we know that the lectures of professors in college are more serviceable in print than in any other form. It might be noted here that studies and tasks begin with us at too early an age, before the mind is sufficiently matured and strengthened, and they are continued too many years by far. The education which we obtain by contact and conflict with the world is found to be most useful, when taken in connection with study and well directed effort on the part of the learner.

People generally have no idea what wonderful progress the boy and girl are capable of making, and what achievements are in their power under a new and improved regime! They have plenty of latent talent, inherited and acquired, plenty of genius and energy. All they require is a fair chance to develop this talent in their own vigorous and effective manner. Talk with any bright boy that you meet, or with any little girl, and see how much they know and think that you never suspected, how much they have learned, without perhaps ever passing a day at school. They will play their part with their associates as if they were star performers. The unfortunate fact is that the children of this country, as a body, have *never yet had a fair opportunity*. What they want first of all, and what they have never yet had, is *freedom*. Give the boys and girls a chance much earlier in life. We feel certain that as a whole they will fully justify the confidence that may be reposed in them.

We can, to a large extent, dispense with teachers, but not with books. It is not practicable to carry a teacher with us wherever we go, but it is practicable to carry a book for reference at any time. When we need information or assistance, is the time when it should be at hand. The time to cross a river is when we come to it; the time to solve a problem is when we are able or when it presents itself. This world is all a school, and we are never without questions of some kind that need to be answered.

It is well enough understood, though not always admitted, that our high schools and colleges are by no means indispensable under any circumstances. But we do need, in connection with the efforts and the influences of the home, primary and elementary instruction, at some time and in some form. But all the learning that is obtained beyond that, should come chiefly from the individual efforts of the learner himself. If we desire to be learned, if we seek for attainments of any kind, they can always be secured by our own action, when we are ready and willing to meet the requirements of the case.

The fact should be kept in mind all through life that learning is not wisdom necessarily, and that even a college education does not of itself ensure success in life. Many men have become eminent without a diploma of any kind, and some of them never had so much as a common school education. High schools and colleges, in our present stage of civilization, are indeed desirable, but we must insist that they should be different institutions from those that we have at present; they should be able to render a better account of their

stewardship than we have received from them for some time past.

But with all that we have said thus far of our educational institutions, we do not fail to realize for one moment, that back of them, at all times, in every state and leading city in the land, there will be found a tremendous power. There are first of all the book-makers, booksellers and book publishers—a powerful trust of themselves; then there is the faculty, the president, the professors, with a host of influential relatives and friends. Then there are the alumni beside, and the city in which the college is located. They all have naturally a great pride in the "home institution." With all these elements of power, and others that we need not mention, there is a strong force at all times ready to defend these institutions, whether in the right or in the wrong, till "the last armed foe expires." How shall we even expect any radical change in the management of these institutions, or any great improvement in their tendencies? We know their weaknesses and their defects, their shortcomings, as every one who wishes may know. But what can be done under such circumstances and conditions as we have just noticed? Nothing in the way of a lasting improvement can be expected either now or for some time to come. Formerly it was church power that predominated. Now it is educational power that has the strongest combination either for attack or defence.

We have the spirit of the Middle Ages still with us, as we still have Roman methods and Roman law; and doubtless we shall continue to have them at least for a century or more. We shall have other things beside.

So long as money can be had by voting, and votes again can be had for money, directly or indirectly, as the case may be, why should we not have free education served up to us in high style for many years in future? Education is indeed a good thing, we are not going to deny it. It is a very good thing—for those especially who are benefited by the prodigality which the prevailing system implies.

We are glad to call attention in this connection, to the fact that there is going on just now, on this as well as on the other side of the Atlantic, a rude awakening in regard to the Rights and Privileges of Boys and Girls generally, as well as to the true status of the pupil or student in our schools. What single reason could be given why children should not have the rights, and all the rights that are granted to grown people? They are certainly human beings, as we are, and why not treat them as such, not only at home but abroad, and not only in school but out of school? It will be conceded by every honorable and honest man, that rights, the rights of human beings at least, begin with the cradle and end with the grave. We have the rights of men and the rights of women, the rights of dogs, the rights of horses, and even of birds. But not a word is said, usually, about the rights of children, or even of men and women who happen to be under the age of eighteen or twenty-one years! How absurd, how unjust, how inconsistent.

It must be noticed before we proceed farther, that no part of this denial of rights, or this disfranchising

of an important portion of the human family is to be charged either to Nature or to Nature's God. *Nature never denies any rights—neither does God.* With nature man's rights date from the day he was born. Why not? This cruel work of limitation in point of time is wholly and truly man's work. *All sins and wrongs come from man*—so does every denial of rights. No sin can be charged to God or to Nature. It is a false accusation, and one that is entirely unfounded every time. Notice how man's cruelty and injustice varies! With us a man gets to be a man, with the rights of a man, at twenty-one. A woman becomes a woman at eighteen. That merely happens so. In old Rome a man never became of age; he was always completely in the power of his father, and the wife was always in the power of her husband. In other countries, the child is of age at from twelve to sixteen years, especially in the East.

Grown people take charge of children, so-called, from twenty-one years down, for what reason, or on what ground? Why, for the same reason that we took charge of the Indians, a hundred years ago, and of the Filipinos, a long time afterward—simply because they were not of age "and they were not considered to be mentally competent to take care of themselves." In fact, they were *children*—so considered and so treated. That is what we say, and that is what the conqueror always says, but it is all presumption or assumption—in other words a barefaced and wicked lie. The savages who cannot take care of themselves are remarkably few in number, and so it is with children under twenty-one. It is astonishing how much children of five years, or even three years, know and think on

their own account. There are plenty of men running about, or possibly in the poorhouse, with all their rights and privileges preserved and conceded, and yet they are possessed of less common sense than most children manifest at the age of five or six years!

Let us go back again to the pupil in the school and observe his status there. We compel him to take a course of compulsory education. We force him to school, whether he likes it or not. Indeed, the more he dislikes it, the more we compel him to go, the more books he must study, and the longer he must remain in confinement. He does not fancy imprisonment, and possibly it injures his health. But no matter, he must stay till his sentence expires, and as much longer as the teacher thinks proper. This is one of those cases where the teacher and the truant officer have all to say, and the pupil nothing. He does not like the studies, and no doubt they are of no real benefit to him, but as this is a case of compulsory education, he must take his medicine like a little man and say nothing. It will be remembered that he is under twenty-one, and that makes all the difference. Perhaps, too, he does not behave as he should, and he is guilty of some little irregularity or indiscretion. If such be the fact, he is liable to punishment, and he may be whipped, with a stick, or a club, a strap, a piece of hose, or whatever is most agreeable—to the teacher of course, but not to the boy. This is the law, or at least the practice, inhuman as the whole affair confessedly is.

But why does not this law and practice apply as well to the grown as to the half grown? If it is sauce for the goose, it ought to be sauce for the gander. Is

there any man with his wits about him, and his mind in ordinary working order, who will rise up for one moment and say that such laws and such school practices as we have been considering are humane or proper? If things are proper merely because they have been practiced in the past, why not introduce the rack and torture in our schools? The plea of necessity, or convenience, could easily be made.

We shall never meet with any great amount of success in training and educating children in families, or in institutions of any kind, until we treat them as human beings and concede to them *every privilege that is granted to adults.* We never think of compelling any free man to do any work against his will, and so we never should think of *compelling* any free-born child under twenty-one to do anything that is *opposed to his wishes or sentiments.* Give to children the rights of *grown people,* and let them take the responsibilities of such people. A similar rule in every respect should apply to woman. It is a strict question of right, and not one of sentiment. Give to woman equal rights, and at the same time equal responsibilities. There would be some friction, we know, in trying to establish a just rule of this kind in practice at once. But the principle is what we are advocating, and no amount of friction or irritation could affect the justice and propriety of the rule.

A boy will get to be a man, and act like a man just as soon as we learn to *treat him as a man,* and not any sooner. We should have no baby talk from children of a tender age, and we really would have none, if we ourselves ceased to talk baby talk in the beginning. It

is just as easy for a child to talk straight English as to learn any dialect. As a rule, if the pupil sees what he ought to do, for his own comfort and welfare, he will do it, and do it promptly. No animal learns as readily and as cheerfully as a boy or girl that is managed judiciously, and that finally becomes interested in his or her work. If pupils are not interested, *they will not learn at all.* The work is wholly for them to do, and if they refuse or neglect to do it, *it will not be done.* There is no proxy in such cases.

A boy soon learns, or may learn, how important it is to himself to be kind and just. If he wants friends he must show himself friendly. If he wants justice, he must be just to others. If he wants the teacher to be a friend, he must treat him as such, and it is generally advisable for the teacher to pursue a similar course. The straight way is always the truest and best. It is the crooked way that leads to trouble always. As a rule, the boy, like the man, will get just such treatment as he deserves. This is one fact that the pupil learns in school sooner than anywhere else. The teacher has his responsibilities too. He cannot have his own selfish way always any more than other people. Even the Almighty himself can have his own way only part of the time. So it is with the teacher and the pupil, and indeed so it is with mankind generally. It will be remembered that conquerors are only victorious part of the time. It often happens that a man seems to be nearest the top, when in fact he is nearest the bottom. The question is not what happens to-day, but how will the account stand at the end of the campaign? We know how it was with Napoleon. Was it any bet-

ter with Alexander and Caesar when their estates came to be finally settled up? What are they to-day? Only two names that we occasionally hear mentioned. We remember them, but all sentiment in that direction is gone.

If the pupil is treated like a felon—*as many pupils are*—he will naturally be inclined to play a felon's part. It should not be forgotten that we have more to do in the shaping and the influencing of the conduct of others than we have in forming our own character. Our own conduct furnishes the key to the situation *in all our dealings with men.* We are controlled by influences, and those with whom we have relations are also subject to similar influences.

It is a well established principle, and one that applies with peculiar force and constancy in our schools and families, that the more that is done by others for children, and for young people generally, the less they are certain to do for themselves. They themselves should have something to do and they must learn to do it on their own account and in their own fashion. No proxy will answer the purpose. Work, and resistance that must be overcome, always strengthens those who put forth the effort. In schools especially, the learner must be accustomed to speak for himself, to think for himself, and finally to stand upon his own platforms and act for himself. Self-reliance and self-regulation are the points that always count in the struggles of this life. The only true way to learn to do anything, is to *do it yourself, and do it repeatedly,* to the best of your ability every time. That course alone produces strength and establishes confidence. It also develops skill and

maintains manhood. An authority in music says: "He is a poor teacher who does too much for his pupils."

Again, every boy and girl, and every man and woman, should be free to do what they choose, and as they choose—acting upon their own judgment and their own will and initiative. No one can have a character of his own unless he first has complete independence of action. The slave has no character. In the families, as things are ordered now, the parents, who are at the head, have all the character and responsibility, and the children none. So in the schools, the teacher is supposed to do all the work and to have all the knowledge; and it is too frequently the fact that the teacher obtains the development, rather than the pupil, for whom the school is supposed to be instituted.

Here, as well as elsewhere, we may notice one of the serious evils connected with school training, in this and all other countries where educational work is performed. We refer to the matter of classification. This is something that is always wrong, always unfair, always impracticable, because it groups together individuals that do not belong together, and that could not possibly thrive under any treatment that is uniform. But why classify at any time, why group together? It is done for convenience, and to save time and money, and not because it is the best thing either for the pupil or the school. Different pupils have different talents, different tastes and temperaments, and different interests and capabilities. Why should they be packed in one school room, like so many sandwiches in a box? What becomes of the pupil's individuality in such instances? That is disregarded in schools; it

is simply suppressed. There is no more individuality there than there is in a regiment or company of men in the army. Sad and fatal mistake this is! In some cases the pupils are compelled even to wear the same uniform. But teaching is not a class or uniform matter, and when we attempt to classify, the results are never satisfactory. This system keeps pupils in classes long after they are fitted for higher places.

The pupil loses his identity in schools, as the convict does in prison, or as the slave does in bondage. Without any reference to size, temperament or acquirements, he is merely No. So-and-So—or possibly Tom or Pete or Jerry. It would not answer to call him "Mr.," because he is not of age, and he has not attained his manhood. The school is merely a flock or herd, and it has all the characteristics of such a gathering. As individuals, they merely happen to be thrown into each other's company. They are so many heads, or pieces, without any individuality of their own. There is little in our ordinary school management that implies judicious action or sensible preparation. Most things are taken as they come, and they come as they may. What is strictly followed at all times is precedent and rule. All truth is supposed to be found in the Bible. But everybody ought to know that all truth cannot be found in that publication.

In closing our remarks on the subject of classification, we wish to add that we are tired of hearing about "serving the whole," the "good of the greatest number," the "good of the public" and all nonsense that comes in that category. To serve the whole, is to serve nobody, because it is serving nobody in particular. It

is like giving to a body of people, which really means to nobody. How could we give any one thing to a body of men? What could we possibly do for a body of men? No such thing is possible. We may think about such things and talk about them, but *they are not found in practical life.* As a member of a class or body, we have no wishes, no interests, no feelings, and so of course we could not be served. We are simply nobody. "Serving the whole," or for the "good of the whole" is the greatest of all shams. Service is for individuals only, and so are the good things of earth generally.

In many portions of Europe, and notably in Germany, there has been, latterly, a remarkable interest manifested in questions connected with the best methods of teaching, the proper treatment of pupils, and the true principles to be followed in the management of schools. Precedent is no more followed merely because it is a precedent, as it was formerly, but certain rules are adopted, and new practices are introduced that promise results that are in harmony with the advanced ideas of the times which are beginning to prevail all over the world, on the rights and duties of man. A nobler and more encouraging spirit now pervades the better class of schools, both in Great Britain and on the Continent. The rod, a relic of the barbaric past as it is, is now generally disused and even the milder punishments are being supplanted by methods and measures that are more modern and productive of better results than before.

In the schools of Germany, especially during recent years, there has been an interest and an advancement that has not been paralleled anywhere in this country. New subjects have been receiving attention and new and highly improved methods of instruction have been adopted, in many cases with the most gratifying success. The pupil there stands upon a higher plane than that of the past. His claims are now viewed from a more favorable standpoint, and he has been granted concessions and privileges which were unknown in connection with education a few years since. The subject is one of the highest importance, not to the pupil only but to the world, and the field before us is one in which valuable discoveries will certainly be made in the near future.

The Germans, it is well known, are a practical, serious, and sensible people, who uniformly think before they speak, and then they speak thoughtfully and understandingly. They start only when they are ready, and in the time and manner of their doing, they follow their own judgment rather than that of some other person. We consider this a good way under all circumstances. They taught France a valuable lesson, in 1870, and one that will no doubt be remembered for a long time yet. Not in war alone, but in the arts of peace as well, is Germany able to give to the inquiring student valuable instruction on all topics, and especially on those of a social, educational or political nature.

We would particularly refer to the position taken and the example set by Germany in the matter of teaching and discipline. We in America have gone on with our school instruction in the most thoughtless and in-

considerate manner, following custom, fashion and precedent, rather than the plain dictates of reason and sense. In Germany, as in old Greece and Rome, the pupil is taught and trained in such a manner, and under such methods, as are certain to produce the results most desired—and these results are kept well in view and uppermost in mind at every step in the process. There is very little ornament or display about German education. We doubt not our educational edifices cost more money than theirs. But they study all their subjects thoroughly, and simply for what they are believed to be worth. What is believed to be worthless, they seldom meddle with. What is kept in view by the German teacher at all times, is thoroughness and efficiency on the part of the pupil. The pupil is the one who must do the real work, because he is the one that reaps the harvest. The teacher is only a helper or assistant. He is not the master; there are no real masters in teaching. In that business, the problem is not what can be done for the pupil, but *what can the pupil do for himself?* This, as we understand it, is the position taken to-day by the teachers of Germany quite generally.

The effectiveness of the German system, in the different branches of instruction, is best exemplified in Metaphysics, or Psychology, to use a term that many seem to prefer. Instead of seeking to penetrate and explain the mysteries of mental science, as was done in the Middle Ages, and as is still being done by the professors of our modern universities, the Germans have taken up the subject for themselves, in that practical and sensible manner which characterizes all their efforts. Instead of trying to explain, or even to under-

stand, the mysterious phenomena of mind and soul, they have rather turned their efforts in another direction, and they have endeavored to learn the methods and powers of the mind and intellect, in order that they may make the best possible use of such agencies as are found in everyday life. And this should be the course pursued in all our studies—not to wear ourself out in efforts to explain what is not explainable, but to ascertain how to make the best use possible of those powers and instrumentalities which nature has placed in the hands of both young and old, to be applied by them whenever the opportunity is offered.

In the German schools of the present day, the developing and establishing of character receives a much larger share of attention than it has ever been known to have in our American schools. Of course, the subject is not specially or specifically named in the curriculum but it is kept constantly in view at every stage in the process. The Germans seem to appreciate thoroughly the fact, in the growth and development of the young man and young woman, that every special feature of their own natures, every individual with whom they associate, and indeed every object with which they come in contact, has its influence, either greater or less, in the shaping and forming of their own character.

We might notice again that the Germans as a people are always at work with some problem that promises to be useful, or productive in some way. Even their thoughts and discoveries seem to be garnered with care for some emergency that may possibly occur. As a nation, they keep themselves on a war footing, and they govern themselves accordingly. The char-

acter and habits of the people are indicated by the titles of the books that they print and publish. Compare these books with those bearing an American imprint. What a noticeable difference. The Americans seem to have a great partiality for something ephemeral and commonplace. They are fond of novels, and they like to let their imagination run with loose reins. They seem to have an abhorrence for profound thought, and they apparently consider it as so much time wasted. It is a long time since sound and serious thought has received much encouragement in this country, or really any serious attention. Look at the titles of our books, and see what our people send out for home consumption! The books are generally nicely bound, and that is the nicest thing about them. They look well on library shelves. Authors who understand the market, soon learn what books to write.

It is not lack of genius that we complain of, but the strange uses to which American genius is devoted. There is no lack of invention in this country—that everybody admits, and our genius mostly goes in that direction. But do inventions improve, or tend to improve, the manners, the morals, or the character of a people? No one so pretends. Suppose a tenth part of the energy and genius that is now devoted to invention were turned in the direction of social science, or mental, or even medical science, how much better it would be for the world at large! As it is, no one seems to have any active interest in any of even the most important problems of life—such as the question *how to live, what to believe,* or what may be the best course to pursue in this or that emergency. Suppose

our talented men had done as much to promote good health, or even good taste, good habits or good morals, among men and women, as our talented men have done towards making warships and airships a success, what wonderful results we should have to chronicle, in both social and political life!

Suppose the phenomenal inventive talent of America had been turned years since, in the direction of education as it presents itself in our schools and colleges, what a field they would have found for development and discovery! Our educational institutions, no doubt have learning enough now, of a certain quality. What is wanted is genius, forethought and inquiry turned in the right direction and there maintained as a constant and serviceable factor! It must be evident enough to every thoughtful man that a few changes are needed at once. At least half of the studies that are now pursued should be suppressed entirely, except those which are specialties for particular purposes. Our ordinary public schools are not adapted to special teaching of any kind. The number of studies for each pupil, and particularly those of tender years, should be divided by three or four. Our institutions should have entirely different aims from what they have at present; and with better aims, and better methods, they should do much better work. The question to be asked at all times, is not *what has been, but what should be?* The school age should begin with the tenth, rather than with the fifth year. In too many instances our primary schools are simply nurseries in which children are cared for, while the parents are spared the trouble.

There should be far more outdoor and much less of indoor work, in connection with our schools. The only rooms needed are those for recitations, and of these much fewer are needed than we have now. Our public school rooms, with most of their contents, should gradually disappear—and with them, to a large extent, our palatial school edifices. Of what earthly use are these magnificent structures, except to make a show and leave an impression? No one will deny that they are, to say the least, *evidences of wasteful expenditure*. They are built, as our laws are made, largely for the benefit of a certain few.

Here we propose to append a certain number of paragraphs taken from the writings of authors and scholars of high rank at the present day, who have expressed themselves with more or less fullness and candor on the subject of school and college instruction. They come from strong-minded and reflecting men, and they show the trend of public opinion on this greatest of all public questions to-day. It is true that only a few have thus far declared themselves, but many more will be heard from later on.

These men whom we quote in connection with different points and phases of this question are all original thinkers, and unquestionably their thoughts are their own, but it is at all times interesting to note how often, and how completely, independent thinkers agree when they come to consider great questions with all the light to guide them and all the facts before them!

A large portion of the ideas herewith presented have been advanced by the author of this work, in different words of course, both in and out of print, within the last sixty years. To sum the matter up in a few words, he has believed during all that time, and when the question came up, he has taken the position bravely, that our school and college system, as it is and has been, is *seriously and fatally defective in its workings.* He is only sorry that, in view of his age, he has not still many more years in prospect in which to oppose these and similar institutions, so long as they are conducted upon the present unsatisfactory basis. He would add that, for twenty-five years, he was a teacher of the higher schools of New York, and his experience enables him to speak understandingly on the important questions before us.

A highly interesting and important work, in which new views are presented on Teaching and Education in an unusually able and effective manner, is *Practical Education*, by Dr. A. Pabst, Leipsig, 1908, one of the leading educators of Europe. This book is not a large one, but it contains a vast amount of valuable information, especially on practical, or manual, instruction in schools. It is a book, now in German, that might be translated into other languages with great benefit to the reading public. We have quoted freely from this work because the thoughts are such as will, no doubt, be interesting to our readers, and light will be furnished on a question upon which light is greatly need-

ed just now. This country, we are sure, has no such work, nor anything approaching it.

The following are translations from German:

The school must, so far as it is possible, be made a copy of real life, and the more its arrangements can fit in with this demand, so much the better will it serve as a preparatory school for life—99.

Employment which is connected with the things of the outer world, in other words, all real instruction through the senses and practical activity, has for the development of the mind a value incomparably greater than any learning from books—40.

It is one of several reproaches that is brought against the school of to-day, that it is exclusively a "learn-school," that it has seat benches only, but no tables and no rooms for many kinds of activities with which children should be employed. Pure "learn-instruction" is the more damaging the earlier it begins —40.

The schools of to-day have grown out of the schools of the Middle Ages, which had for their object to prepare the student for certain callings. There were also business schools, in which the education problem was neglected, being left to the house and family—46.

Ordinary teaching such as we have was left to the family at home. The hand is the sense organ similar to the eye and ear. The skill of the hand has its proper seat in the head and brain, and its development is likewise a form of spiritual or mental education—57.

Practical or manual instruction is the only instruction that the children receive cheerfully, without any force, compulsion or discipline—60.

If we speak of "work" in the school, we usually think not of hand-work, but of head-work, of learning. That even manual labor has its importance for education, was for a long time, and is still, overlooked, and

in many families, children grow up and never know the blessing of hand-labor in itself—89.

To our school culture, with right, the heavy reproach is made that it fails to give recognition to manual labor, and that it especially contributes to the prevalence of the notion that such labor is of little worth, compared with mental work. The work of the learned alone appears to be aristocratic!—93.

Really, it seems to have been nearly forgotten today that one gets the best education for life, *not* in school, but first through life, or living, itself—97.

The damage which school education, through its perpetual striving after uniformity, occasions to the natural gifts of the pupil, is closely connected with the prevalence of the "unholy idea" of "universal culture." This brings with itself the result that we think to find in the unfolding of the intellect, and the memory, the head-problems of the school. At the present day, a great part of instruction has degenerated into the simple idolizing of memory-knowledge, and it leads to an overburdening of the child-spirit with things to which the pupil feels indifferent, and which cannot contribute much to his mental capabilities or to the preparation for business or for life itself—98.

The school is not a self-object, and it should never be made to serve an object which is not placed upon it through regard for the child. *The object is to prepare children for life*—96.

A teacher of practical work should not make many words. There is, in the words of Raumer, "a wordless, practical wisdom which is unknown in school-learning" —61.

Referring to classification methods in schools, the author says: In a great school system, the striving of each individual teacher is to make of every pupil a piece of ware as nearly like the others as possible, and to deliver it over to the next higher class, as a product of education-art; and it is no wonder that this ware

bears the stamp of the factory in all cases. The equalizing effects of the system are all too apparent—63.

We have come to the conclusion that the gaining of knowledge is not the only, and not even the chief problem, in school instruction; and that knowledge taken from books has infinitely less value than the experience-knowledge which is derived from work-instruction. Therefore, the instruction which is obtained in the workshop, in the school-kitchen, in the laboratory, in the school-garden, has become a factor of such great importance in modern education. It brings the child into the closest contact with things, with reality, and it is properly called a reality-instruction —81.

In the words of O. Lyon; Life is finally the only and real schoolmaster, the great giver of orders for the school. The school is not a self-object, and should never become such. It is a preparation for life. For this object alone was it originally founded. We could do nothing better than to bring life itself into the school and to use it as a copy of the great school of nature—86.

To the educator, must the interests of the child stand higher than any political party. The weal of the pupil should alone be kept in view—96.

Neither the character of Pedagogy as science nor the practical education-art forbids us to make trials with experimental schools in which new pedagogic ideas upon their usefulness are brought to trial. However, the orthodoxy of our German notions in regard to schools and education, together with the stiffness of our whole school system, render such undertakings quite impracticable—102.

Had these germs come to full development, so would they have given to our collected education other directions than that which has been received through connection with the scientific school of the Middle Ages. What in the way of sound ideas is still

present in our latter-day education, struggling after form, is joined to those predecessors of our late experimental schools and pedagogic reformers—101.

In the last ground, the school is not properly the educator of the people. It cannot be so, for the first and really important education-factors are the *family* and surroundings, out of which the child goes. The experience of life, for education, is *far more important than the school*—97.

The influence of the school, rich in blessings as it is, would enter into reality much easier and surer, if as a "work-school" in which its own related-to-play, yet regulated, *practical labor* of the child forms the *counterpart of all instruction*—78.

Education does not come from words; at least children learn but little from words alone. Habit and practice are the best means of teaching the young. It is probably true that the child learns more in the first year of life than the man does during the whole remaining time—26.

Centuries long, educators have thought only on the future, believing that man should not be educated for earthly objects, but for the "other side" and a better existence. On this basis the present life has been converted into a sacrifice to the future—9.

That we in life so seldom meet independent thinking men, and that to-day the "originals" among men generally are so rare, is certainly in good part to be placed to the account of *education* which seeks to press each individual into a certain mould of "universal culture." To the building up of independent personalities this plan or scheme offers no room or opportunity, and our school has no time to devote to such individualities—63.

With our teachers, in our schools, *everything is class-work*.

We fail in many cases to find words in English to correspond to many German words, and to many com-

pound words especially, that are both expressive and appropriate. "Misverhältniss" is one of them. Speaking of school reform, the author says: "Such a period appears to have arrived since the *mis-relation* between school and life has gradually become so great, that it can no more be overlooked, and wholly of itself it presses to a solution which must lead eventually to an overthrow of the school machinery, our present educational system—109.

This opinion has come gradually to a breaking through, among educators, not only in Germany, but it prevails quite generally among the intelligent and far-seeing men in all culture-lands. On this one point all countries seem to agree: A fundamental reform of the education business must precede the renovating of the collected folk-life. In this direction, France has already taken the lead—109.

Religion has entirely failed to do its work, its duty. Why should not education step in where religion left off and go on with the work? Education—with the right system and the right men—can alone give us *better aims, higher hopes, and purer morals.*

Even the pupil's school-work should be a continued inquiring and discovering. In place of book-wisdom there must be experience-wisdom; not an imitation, not an echoing of the words of the teacher, but a knowledge that comes from labor that creates and from an intercourse with the outer world, especially with nature—79.

The nervous youths, weak of will and tired of learning, who go forth from our higher schools, are entirely unfit for practical life and for the demands of a business calling which may be placed upon them. They can hardly do more than to add to the number of unhappy mortals already in the world—100.

The only remedy for the damages resulting from such a state of things lies in a fundamental change in

our whole education system. It should not be done at once, but by gradual reforms—100.

We are of the opinion that the health of children, in the first school years especially, is seriously injured through school instruction and school methods.

PÄDAGOGIK UND DIDAKTIK

Lit. Dr. W. Rein, University of Jena, 1909

This highly important work takes a different direction from that of Dr. Pabst, but the ground that it assumes is well chosen and the discussion is ably conducted. A most interesting and valuable section of the book is that part which comes under the head of "School-Organization." The outlines of the history and development of schools and education in Germany are given in a manner that is highly interesting.

We have room for a few of the many striking passages, as follows:

Education extends to all branches of a people; while culture is confined to a small part—11.

Culture ideals are changeable, because its content is something that varies with the times—11.

Man is a part of nature—with a thousand threads he is bound to the organic life of nature—16.

Moral laws are not the product of an inventive brain—20.

Character stands at all times higher than intellectual culture—28.

If a people has only its material welfare in view, and thinks only of the winning and augmenting of earthly goods, so does it betray a low sentiment with which it must go down finally. And if a people believes it must first acquire property, in order to devote itself later on to spiritual affairs, so must it be seen to that, in its chase for gain, it does not lose all taste for nobler employments—39.

The best course seems to be, in the union of work-circles, to care for both the material welfare and spiritual or mental culture. Both stand in close connection with each other—39.

This one fact is incontestable: Given to us are feelings, sentiments, and from these sentiments, derived ideas or impressions, and with these finally, feelings and efforts are connected. There exists nothing outside of psyche (soul); outside of the spirit there is nothing real—75.

Our knowledge shows us nothing else but feelings, sensations, ideas, also only psychic (soul) conditions —74.

After Schopenhauer's doctrines, the will constitutes the inner, true, indestructible essence of man. The intellect, on the contrary, is a simple perquisite of our being—78.

The will, properly never obeys the intellect. Hence no ethics and no education is possible which moulds and improves the will. Every teaching works simply upon knowledge; it never defines or limits the will itself—79.

The difference of character is inborn and ineradicable. To the wicked, badness is innate, as poison is to the serpent—80.

The plasticity of the pupil is not limited to intellectual processes, but extends through them to the heart and the feelings—82.

What we represent and farther on name thinking, has gone first out of much simpler conditions and their mutual workings—84.

To imagine and to think is, even as feeling and willing, a secondary, derived phenomenon—84.

The following points in education are noted:

Compulsory education was advocated in Germany as early as 1530.

Public schools appeared with the Reformation; they were church affairs before that.

As early as 1716, Fred. William ordered school duty for all.

In the 14th century the University was not only the highest but a special school.

Special attention was given to education of girls in Germany as early as the eighteenth century.

EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE PÄDAGOGIK
(INTRODUCTION TO PEDAGOGY)
Dr. E. Dürr, University of Bern, 1908

That the author of this interesting work ranks among our advanced thinkers, and that he has mastered the subject on which he treats, we think will be rendered evident to any intelligent reader who takes the trouble to read and consider even the few brief paragraphs that we are able to introduce in this connection.

To give some intimation of the direction that the author has taken, we mention here, at the beginning, some of the special subjects that he has taken up in his treatise: He dwells less upon the improved methods of teaching than he does upon the more important question, *what should be taught?* Art is frequently referred to in the work, though it is not taken up as a special topic. As a whole, the book may be regarded as a psychologic inquiry, presented in plain and interesting language. The author's references to color or tone, and to music, are frequent, and in all cases what he says will be found instructive. His treatment of the subject of value is highly important. He dwells at some length upon such subjects as memory, attention, association, will—also upon time, space, and kindred questions. These are all topics on which the teacher should become enlightened, if he is not so already. The pupil is, for the teacher, practically an instrument, even a machine, and unless he fully understands its workings, he cannot manage it with complete success.

In general, the route from the knowing of the teacher to the understanding of the child is not so short as it is usually represented. It is not enough that the teacher clothes his knowledge in fitting words in order to be understood by the pupil. Words are conventional signs, as a rule bearing no manner of relation to the things which they are supposed to designate. In order to understand a word, one must have already in mind the idea or conception which that word impresses or implies. The communicating of ideas does not come from the mere pronouncing of words—3.

On no occasion are we able to see the simplest of bodies from all sides at one time—3. To get an idea of complicated things, we must get our notions in fragments, or by installments, and put them together in a sort of "creative synthesis."

Never should the language of poesy be given out as the language of truth—8. Too many explanations become necessary, and explanations uniformly weaken the text. The one who explains forgets that there are insights which to the undeveloped spirits are not accessible—8. The true teacher knows the danger of explaining.

The truth is never life-destroying in its influence where it is really known. The caricature of truth is alone damaging—8.

Even Plato called myth to his aid, when he would bring weaker spirits to the knowledge of the loftiest ideas—8.

Even the pure disciples of wisdom are men who, with the smallest amount of effort, look for the greatest possible achievement. But, away with the postulate of explanation, with the demand for the popularizing of science!—10, 9.

The limits between learning and inquiry should not be ignored—10.

Many are unable to grasp the idea of truth clearly and plainly. They cannot distinguish it from the idea

of reality, especially from the idea of nature-reality —10. We should avoid inculcating in the young the belief that there is nothing easier to recognize than the "truth."

No education can dispense with illusions, those called forth designedly and those appearing unavoidably. One could wish that in the pupil an adequate world-picture should develop, and this aim is not to be reached through the offering of truth in popular or scientific form—11.

Better than reckoning or calculation, is observation and experience—31. He who is born deaf may observe other men as much as he will, but never will he learn to see what the perception of a tone is, or what a sound is, or an accord, or a melody—22.

If all things were valuable, value itself would loose its character. Education should by all means have constantly in view all values, those for the pupil and those also which, through the pupil, might be secured, augmented and improved for society. Never should a higher value be sacrificed to a lesser—43.

Remarkable must it appear that in modern pedagogy the worth of bodily dispositions, of the presentation faculty, the expression faculty, in short, skillfulness and dexterity, should be developed so artificially! On account of their reaction upon spiritual life, they should be cultivated! As if it did not belong to the most worthful, to give to the pupil what education may! Too long already there has prevailed in this world, not the doing and being able, as the most important, but the knowing and *not doing*. What use to the painter is the finest idea, if technic fails to him, and if he be not able to present what he sees and feels? How unfruitful is the good will of many an idealist to whom always the power to act fails!—49.

One should not believe that bodily power and fitness, without educational influence, through life, could be produced of itself—50.

One cannot assert that the present usual organization of schools, and the teaching arrangement thereto belonging, is really satisfactory and effective. Even the higher schools send out students whose acquirements are not equal to their pretensions. Much of the education of these schools proves to be useless ballast (nutzloser Ballast), and the complaints made by the public are, to a large extent, *justified*—57.

The changes in taste, in active life, including the aesthetical as well as the ethical, are in great part due to custom and fashion. There is a fashion in thinking and belief as there is in the clothes that people wear. People are more or less affected, or influenced, by what other people say. Custom and association have a great influence upon the mind of man—63.

That even logical values are changeable, every one will concede who has occasion to compare the impression made by Hegel's philosophy upon his age with that made upon the present generation—64.

True or false, right or wrong, that means a course of thought, not because it calls forth logically pleasant or unpleasant feelings, but it gives objective signs or marks before all of the right and the wrong, and also of the true and false—64.

All morality begins with unconditional obedience to authority—69.

Especially in middle schools there is found the phenomenon, frequently, that the fulfilling of school duties does not agree strictly with the moral ideas of riper youth—72.

Pedagogy is the science of systematically influencing the soul-life of another with the object of maintaining, advancing and developing all the values that are compatible with each other—81.

CENTURY OF THE CHILD.

Ellen Key, New York, 1909

This work, recently published, was written by a Swedish lady; but we have no reason to apprehend that nationality has anything to do with a work of this character. The truth is the truth, whether it comes from Sweden or Finland, or from some country less remote.

It has become an anachronism at this late day to inquire whether a woman has a soul, or a mind, or whether she can write books. One of the best books of the present day, and certainly one of the most useful, is this "Century of the Child" by Ellen Key. It is written in an easy and independent style, by one who unquestionably understands the subject on which she writes. We quote freely from the book, because it contains many valuable truths that we cannot afford to pass by unnoticed:

Education must be based on the certainty that faults cannot be atoned for, or blotted out, but must always have their consequences—108.

Somewhere Rousseau says that all education has failed in that nature does not fashion parents as educators, nor children for the sake of education—109.

Lack of self-discipline, of intelligence, of patience, of personal effort—these are the corner stones on which corporal punishment rests—141.

The strongest constructive factor in the education of a human being is the settled, quiet order of home, its peace, and its duty. Open-heartedness, industry, straightforwardness at home develop goodness, desire to work, and simplicity in the child—162.

We need new homes, new schools, new marriages, new social relations, for these new souls who are to feel, love and suffer—163.

We must begin in doing for the child in certain ways a thousand times more, and in others a hundred thousand times less. A beginning must be made in the tenderest age to establish the child's feeling for nature—167.

What is an absolutely novel factor in our times is the study of the psychology of the child, and the system of education that has developed from it—185.

All work done under conditions of fatigue is uneconomic, whether one regards the quality produced or its value as an exercise—189.

Formerly, it was only the husband and father whom outside interests took from the home. Now the home is deserted by the wife and mother also, not alone for social gatherings but for clubs for self-improvement, meetings, lectures, committees—193.

If we take into consideration the way in which the modern school system uses up the children's time, and present social and club life take up the time of parents, we come to the conclusion I began with, that domestic life is more and more on the decline—195.

Desire for knowledge, capacity for acting by one's self, the gift of observation, all qualities that children bring with them to school, have as a rule disappeared —203.

As long as schools represent an idea, stand for an abstract conception, like the family and the state, so long will they, just as the family and the state, oppress the individuals who belong to them—206.

As a matter of fact, children often feel themselves deceived by illustrations—227.

High schools and colleges are absolutely destructive of personality—229. Nothing is done to help the longing of the pupil to see for himself, to read, to judge, to get impressions at first hand, not from second-hand reports.

The fact that our students acquire so little, even if they have passed through every school with excellent

marks, is a serious injustice that they feel during their whole life. The beautifully systematised, ticketed, checker board knowledge given by examinations soon disappears—231.

Our age cries for personality; but it will ask in vain, until we let our children live and learn as personalities, until we allow them to have their own will, think their own thoughts, work out their own knowledge, form their own judgments—232.

Education at home in the years when the emotions become harmonious and receive their decisive training is just as important for the child as is later on a pleasant sociable life with others of the same age—244.

Education in the first years must aim to strengthen individuality—248.

The school of the future, which will be a school for all, will advance general education, but the plan it follows will be adapted to every individual—260.

The scholar who sits down and listens to, or looks at, the demonstration or experiment of the teacher, does not learn to observe—261.

In art, in literature, and in religion, all instruction is a mistake until the young mind has chosen some part of it as an object to be known. Knowledge destroys, feeling creates life—265.

In the future school building there will be no class rooms—264.

To be able to use one's eyes in the worlds of nature, man and art, to be able to read good things—these are the two great ends to which home and school education should direct their course. If the child has these capacities, he can learn almost everything for himself—268.

It is a matter of experience that the small details of all subjects slip from the memory two months after examination—273.

The educator wants the child to be finished at once and perfect. He forces upon the child an unnatural

degree of self-mastery, a devotion to duty, a sense of honor, habits that adults get out of with astonishing rapidity—113.

Militarism and clericalism, both principles presenting authority as opposed to individual standards of right, are ever closely combined; but they are not what they are called—310.

What does it mean to be as entirely and simply taken up with the child as the child himself is absorbed by his life? It means to treat the child as really one's equal; that is, to show him the same consideration, the same kind of confidence that one shows to an adult. It means not to influence the child to be what we ourselves desire him to become, but to be influenced by the impression of what the child himself is; not to treat the child with deception, or by the exercise of force, but with the seriousness and sincerity proper to his own character—109.

The works in this country that may be said to be devoted to the "New Education," or to new ideas on the methods and objects of teaching, are certainly not very numerous. We are sure we never see them, and it is rare that we hear of them. Such books may be in print, and they may be in circulation, to some extent, but it cannot be that they have left any serious impression on the minds of the people. The nearest in the way of an exception to the rule in this case is to be found in a small work published in Chicago, under the auspices, we think, of the University of that city, John Dewey being the author. There is nothing remarkable about the book, but it is in the right direction. That is more than is to be said of some works in this country. Indeed, we come across a good many that do not seem to have any direction at all.

John Dewey is evidently possessed of the notion that something might be done, at some early day, even in America, to improve the aims and methods of our latter-day education. Like many others, Mr. Dewey fails to accept the doctrine that book-knowledge and book-study constitute the only education that we can have or should have at our command. He believes in manual training in connection with book learning, and even sometimes taking its place. We will quote a few sentences from his book, *School and Society*, to show what the author, Mr. Dewey, thinks on certain points connected with the subject:

When we turn toward schools, we find that one of the most striking tendencies at present is toward the introduction of so-called manual training, shop-work, and the household arts—sewing and cooking.

The place where children are sent for discipline is the one place in the world where it is most difficult to get experience.

Our present education is highly specialized, one-sided and narrow. It is an education dominated almost entirely by the mediaeval conception of learning.

Hardly one out of a hundred in this country ever attains to what we call higher education.

Our social life has undergone a thorough and radical change. If our education is to mean anything for life, it must pass through an equally complete transformation.

The introduction of active occupations, of nature study, of elementary science, of art, of history, in connection with our schools—these, and others, are not mere accidents, they are the necessities of the larger social evolution.

Each one of our schools should be an embryonic community life, active with types of occupations that reflect the life of the larger society.

There is very little place in the traditional schoolroom for the child to work.

We deal with children *en masse*, always as an aggregation of units. But the moment children act, they individualize themselves. *They cannot act otherwise.*

The child is already intensively active, and the question of education is the one of taking hold of his activities, and of giving them direction.

Children like to do things and watch to see what will happen. There is a desire to tell, to represent. Even the savages are so inspired. The child and the savage are always alike. Originally, we were all savages, it is known.

"Waste in education" is one of the author's chapters. But it would have taken a whole library to do the subject justice. Education begins with waste, and it ends with waste.

The school system has grown from the top down.

The college is shut off from contact with children and youth.

We want the child to come to school with a whole mind and a whole body, and leave school with a fuller and an even healthier body.

PHILISTINE AND GENIUS

Doris Sidis, Ph. D., M. D., New York

The above is the title of a work which appeared in New York in 1911, on the subject of Education in America, from which the following excerpts are taken:

Like man in the hands of the potter, so is man in the hands of his community. Society fashions the beliefs, the desires, the aims, the strivings, the knowledge, the ideals, the character, the very selves of its constituent units. Who has the control of this vital function of moulding minds? Fathers and mothers—5.

At home and at school we drill into the child's mind uncritical beliefs in stories and tales, fictions and pig-

ments. We give the child over as a prey to all sorts of fatal germs of mental disease and moral depravity —10.

We are still savage at heart. Our civilization is mere gloss, a thin coating of paint and varnish—13.

We spend on barracks and prisons (and asylums) more than we do on schools and colleges. The cost of crime is enormous—16.

We are charitable and help our mediocrities, imbeciles and idiots, while we neglect our talent and genius—18.

The waste of human life is in fact greater than in any previous age—20.

As in modern times, our college authorities justify the brutalities of football and prize-fights, so in ancient times the great moralists of those ages justified their gladiatorial games—23.

The fact is, man is bat-blind to the evils of the environment in which he is bred. He takes those evils as a matter of course—25.

Our college boys admire the feats of the trained athlete and scorn the work of the "grind"—28.

The fact is, we are still dominated by the law of the jungle, the den and the cave—32.

The principle of recognition of evil under all its guises is at the basis of the true education of man—40.

What can be expected of a nation that entrusts the fate of its young to the care or carelessness of young girls, to the ire of old maids and to officials with red tape and routine?—42.

Business men are no more competent to run schools and colleges than astronomers are fit to run hotels—44.

Our Regents are supposed to raise the level of education by a vicious system of examination—48.

Our country has clever business men, but no scientists, no artists, no philosophers, no statesmen, *no genuine talent and no true genius*—50.

School-teachers have in all ages been mediocre in intellect and (generally) incompetent. (Among the Greeks and Romans, teaching was an office reserved, mainly, for slaves and old men)—50.

Do not let your pupils fall into the ruts of habits and customs—58.

The spirit of inquiry, the genius of man, is more sacred than any abstract belief, dogma and creed—63.

Open the eyes of your children (and adults) so that they shall see and face courageously the evils of life —66.

The love of knowledge, the love of truth for its own sake, is entirely neglected in our modern schemes of education—72.

The school, higher and lower, has only one purpose in view—the training of the pupil *in the art of money-making*—71.

With Mill, we may say our schools and colleges give *no true education, no true culture*—73.

The home controls (and should control) the school and the college—75.

What is the use of a college, if not for its games? —79.

Literature, art, science, have no interest for the student; games and athletics fill his mental horizon —81.

Too much attention given to discipline in our schools—82.

In a barbaric age, as we are, we are afraid of thought—84.

Poor old college owls, academic barn-yard fowls, you are panic-stricken by the power of sunlight—89.

We must guard the child against all evil fears, superstitions, prejudices and credulity—92.

Our prevailing school system should be abolished, and with it should go the present psychologizing educator, the schoolmaster and the schoolmaam—105.

This vigorous writer has his own views, and he is not afraid to declare them. That is evident enough.

Pres. Andrews, Brown University, in 1897, gave expression to the following sentiments:

The majority of our students, even at maturity, are distressingly lacking in moral enthusiasm. They unduly prize *money, fame* and *success*. They are at peace with the world. Their sense of justice is lax. Great principles and great causes fail to appeal to them strongly. They know too little, they think too little, and they care too little about the highest things.

The evils of ignorance, feeble logic and moral apathy doubtless have their roots in more than one department of educational effort. Primary and secondary schools are not so good as they ought to be; neither are universities.

Enthusiasm in teaching is not fashionable any more. What is said and read in the class room does not take hold of men, life, the soul, and society as were to be wished. In the teaching there is little to appeal to the sense of conduct, to the sense of duty, in the pupils.

A great many teachers nowadays utterly repudiate their calling as creators of manhood and are anxious solely how they may be faithful to the subjects which they expound.

The following is from Chancellor Day, of Syracuse University:

Higher education as represented in universities and colleges is receiving much hatcheling. Some of its critics seem determined upon a revision of the entire scheme, and some, judging from certain utterances of the last National Education Convention, held in Boston, would do away with colleges altogether.

In the New York *Times* of September 10, 1910, an article is published, from the pen of Col. Chas. W. Larned, of the U. S. Military, containing, with others, the following paragraphs:

Since the Renaissance more and more has this conception prevailed, until the term now conveys no other idea than the study of textbooks and attendance at recitations and examinations. Before the revival, and for some time after, the education of a man and a gentleman meant something very different, in which the book entered not at all or little, and in which the cultivation and training of manhood and physical health were paramount.

In those days, with no other objective and even with an imperfect civilization the training of youth with its simplicity of method, its concentration of effort, its directness of application, and the advantage of a vital interest on the part of a pupil, achieved a positive and practical result in character, power, and physical strength commensurate with the effort expended. To-day the pendulum has swung to the other extreme so that with character, physique, and citizenship practically ignored, the youth of to-day undergoes a process, in the main, of mind-stuffing, with a little incidental mind-training which is neither adequate nor effective and which cannot claim the general approval of its own advocates.

Incident to the disturbing influence arises the loading up of grammar school courses with a variety of fads, experiments, and superficial courses, together with a corresponding scattering of interest and effort. Beyond all this, and most important of all, is the mutilated and inadequate conception of the real meaning of education in its comprehensive and vital relation to the well being and uplift both of the individual and society. The current and narrow conception of the function of this long tutelage to the schoolmaster and the don is that it is wholly concerned with the development of the mind and the acquiring of information.

Dr. Woodrow Wilson, formerly of Princeton, but now Governor of New Jersey, in an address published

in the New York *World*, December 10, 1909, made these remarks, among others:

What impresses one most in traveling about through the country is that the country is radically dissatisfied with the colleges. It is universally felt, not by the little coteries of men who love the place and cannot, therefore, be critical, but in those larger circles on whose view our very life depends, that the colleges have lingered at a past point of view and are trying to do something for which the country no longer has any use.

NORDAU

In a work of this character, at this time, we should find it quite difficult to notice, even briefly, all, or any considerable number, of the excellent works with which we happen to be acquainted. Those that we have quoted thus far are works which are calculated to strengthen our own position, or at least to illustrate our own views in some way. There are, however, two other works beside, both by the same author, to which we desire to call the attention of our readers for other reasons. We refer to *Paradoxe* and *Conventional Lies*, by Dr. Max Nordau, of Paris. The copies which we have are in German, published at Leipsig. They belong to a type of works found both in Germany and France, and they certainly are possessed of great merit.

These are the only works by this author with which we are familiar, though we know he has written several other valuable and popular works. For these two books alone we now speak. The books are ably written, and we do not happen to know where sounder or better philosophy may be found. The author seems to be on the right side uniformly in the conclusions at which he arrives. He does his own thinking and does it carefully and conscientiously. Of course, by those who do

not understand him and who no doubt know little about the subject under consideration, these works may not be found so interesting or so instructive as they would under other circumstances. That is perfectly natural. However, his works have gone through many editions, in several languages, and they have left a lasting impression upon thought in Europe.

Most works that are given to the press are sent there for some special purpose or to attain some particular end. Generally, it is the money that is expected from the venture, or there is some cause to advocate, or in some way there is some interest to advance. It is a rare thing that a book is written and finally published solely because it is the undoubted truth, and in order to bring it to the knowledge of men. As a rule, the world knows and cares very little about the plain and simple facts on their own account. As a general thing, writers borrow, copy and eventually appropriate whatever chances to answer their individual purpose. They have no means of knowing the correctness of what they assert, and so they draw upon their imagination or upon the books or papers that happen to come within their reach; or they merely rehearse what has been told them by some interested, or disinterested, party. No doubt they have some authority for all the sayings which they put forward. But what real efficiency or value is there in authority in any instance? Authority is what some man or woman, or possibly some child affirms. There is no other authority, *and there never has been.*

But the two works that we now notice are of an entirely different character from the ordinary kind. The author publishes not what some one says or writes, but what he himself thinks and believes. He is an ordinary man in most respects, like the rest of us, but he is out of the ordinary line in some respects. Thus, he writes simply upon his own authority; he

knows nothing really about other people, he only knows himself, in any true sense. He is a thinker, a worker, a student, who pursues truth for its own sake, and for that alone. He does not pretend that his thoughts are strictly his own, or that no one before him ever had such conceptions. He merely presents his statements as his impressions, his belief, and he asks the reader to stand up and make known what *he* thinks on the subject in question. This, we apprehend, is about as far as Max Nordau goes. He never pretended to be a prophet or a maker of laws. He is merely one of those common mortals known as thinkers or philosophers. He is also an interpreter of thought.

We get as much as the above from the prefaces to the writer's own works. In *Paradoxe*, first edition, the author says, why does he use the name "Paradox"? Because the work treats of problems that are considered without prejudice of any kind, because he is not dismayed or affected in anyway by decrees of the school, and because he is not dominated by the prevailing beliefs of the time. He will have attained his design, if he induces the reader to be mistrustful of all ready-made formulas, and at the same time is indulgent toward the honest opinions of other men. It should be remembered that there is always some doubt accompanying the most convincing proof. In all cases, the thinker should reserve his decision for himself, rather than for some authority. Finally, he says, in striving after truth, seeking is the principal thing, not the finding. He has done enough who has acted honestly and faithfully in the work performed.

In "*Conventional Lies*", the writer assures us that the alarming malady of the age is cowardice! And certainly this is so. This want of candor and manly courage extends the life of a lie, and prevents the advance of truth, immeasurably. The cultured world is one immense hospital, filled with sick people, as the writer

says. This work is a telling satire on Laws, Government, Customs, Morals and Religion. Indeed, we can find lies of all kinds, conventional and otherwise, among all classes and in all places—if the student only knows where to look for them, and if his vision is reliable. These lies are not always to be found in the open. Generally, they will be found in concealment, and it is a very common thing to see quite respectable people masquerading in the garb of truth!

CIVILIZATION

It is generally conceded among literary men that in remote times, when people lived like beasts in caves and sheltered homes, they knew nothing of thought and study. They had feeling and sense, like the lower animals, but the operations of their mind were confined entirely to the impressions they received in their daily life. They acted solely upon impulse and conviction, as the animals of the forest do at the present day. With them there is no such thing as reflection, no comparison of this thing with that, or of one event with another event. Abstract reasoning, at that early day, was something that was practically unknown. Men in those days had memory as we have now, but it was limited to simple things. They had no books to read, and there were no monuments or records to consult. Even poets, troubadours and story-tellers were unknown. Such things as letters and numbers were not in use, outside of India and Babylonia, and perhaps Egypt, until a few centuries since. A painfully long period, many hundreds of years, were passed in what might properly be called mental darkness.

The advance made in civilization has always been remarkably slow and painful.

It is a well established fact that with the discovery of printing, civilization moved forward with steady, and not with rapid strides. Cities ultimately appeared and they became a powerful factor in the development of the mind. Prehistoric man could hardly be called human, though it was always in the human form that he was presented to the world. He had scarcely any habits, attributes or endowments that distinguished him from the brute. To quote from Lubbock's "Primitive Condition of Man": "Travelers find it naturally far easier to describe the houses, boats, food, dress, weapons, and implements of savages, than to understand their thoughts and feelings. The whole mental condition of a savage is so different from ours, that it is often very difficult to follow what is passing in his mind." Savages have, like ourselves, a reason for what they do, but often it seems to us a very absurd reason. There is no natural, innate feeling in man as to what is right and what is wrong, what is proper and what is improper. It is something that comes from the circumstances and the nature of the case; it comes as a sentiment, from teaching, and it is not inborn. A negro says: "Am I to starve, while my sister has children that she could sell?" Among some races it is wicked, or at least wrong, for a woman to speak to her son-in-law. Among the Calmucks, a woman must not speak to her father-in-law, or sit down in his presence. Many savages have a dread of having their pictures taken, fearing they may suffer some harm. Others do not know what a picture resembles when they look at

it. When a man is sick, he imagines it is the work of the Devil, or of some enemy or fiend. Among many tribes, there is a great horror of twins. In drawing, some savages can make fine sketches, while others can make none at all. Very generally among natives, it is the men that are most extravagant in their personal adornment. Infanticide, especially in the case of girls, is very common among many peoples all over the world. The reason is the same as with us when we kill the females of young dogs and the males of fowls, because a surplus of these creatures is not wanted. With many wild races, most of our vices are held to be virtues—simply because the vices answer their purpose better than our virtues do. If a practice proves to be useful, it will naturally be adopted by those whom it serves. So, theft, arson, rape, and even murder, bring no reproach upon a man among savage races generally. The prevailing rule seems to be that no individual action is a crime; every man acts upon his own judgment, and he is ready to take the consequences as they come. Conscience and moral feeling of all kinds, among the wild races, are generally undeveloped.

No fact can be impressed upon our minds with better results than this: All our ideas of right and wrong, the true and the untrue, honorable and dishonorable, beautiful and hideous, and indeed all notions or beliefs that affect our conduct in relation to men, are really a matter of development. They have a slow but steady growth, under the influence of climate, location, and surroundings generally. What work could be more interesting to any intelligent student than one prop-

erly prepared on the early history of the mind? Later on, civilization comes forward with a different aspect and a different order of things. The circumstances of the case are different, the demands are different, the results are different. Civilization implies reflection; it implies thought and study, it implies effort and application. Men as rational beings must finally be awakened and aroused. They must be associated in some way with those of their race who are superior to themselves. Men cannot rise by their own personal efforts alone; their weight, their inertia, would naturally prevent their rising. Men must have friends and they may have enemies. Both classes are alike useful to the world in their way. Men learn only from experience—partly from their own experience and partly from that of others. Of course, as we might expect, the less we have of experience, the less we shall know.

The great service which civilization performs for mankind is to be found in the accumulation of facts, that sum of knowledge which makes its appearance as time advances. Letters and the press have rendered such a result entirely practicable, and in fact they have made it absolutely necessary. Under the present arrangement, nothing is lost or forgotten; the man dies, but his memories live. Cities go down and are lost to view, but nevertheless they continue to exist. Their debris serves as a higher platform on which to rear prouder and grander cities at some distant day in the future. This superimposing of cities in the course of time, is well enough known, one city being piled upon the other, in some cases, like stratified rocks.

When we come to look back and glance over the history of the world, noticing what has been done in the name of civilization, and with its sanction, we find that we have a subject before us that possesses more than usual interest and importance.

We notice, first of all, that while civilization does much for mankind, the results which it produces are not equally happy for all classes of people. Some seem to have the inside, while others are compelled to content themselves with the outside. We notice also, at this very late period in the history of the world, that very much depends upon the laws and who makes them. Originally, the laws were made by God, who was occasionally seen among men and who appeared to take more or less of an interest in the comfort and welfare of his children. He spoke, as is the custom among gods, through the medium of his priests, or his judges and prophets—always, be it observed, through ordinary men.

After a time—some centuries, more or less—God seems to have gone out of business, and he was seen no more by men, either by day or by night. He made no more laws, or at least he published none. Things moved along with more or less uncertainty for quite a long period and no one was so presuming as to say who should make laws. As a matter of fact, many centuries ran by and few laws were made. And the few that were made were not needed.

There never was any question as to who was, or is, to obey the laws. The "under dog," the common folk, the man without power or prerogatives, the taxpayer, the slave, the women and children, these are the people

who must obey the laws! Indeed, there is nothing else for them to do. They are "The hewers of wood and drawers of water." Of course, they must obey the laws at all times and under all circumstances.

For a time—no one knows exactly how long—the Pope, with his delegates, made the laws, especially for the Christian world and those who come in that category. Centuries passed by, and in due time we had constitutional government, with constitutional laws, with which to govern people. There might reasonably be some question whether the making of laws is a privilege that can rightfully be delegated to this or that person, or to any set of men. But it is a fact well known that the making of laws has been so delegated, and it is so delegated still. It was found to work like a charm, for some people, and naturally enough the practice continues. The more laws that are made, the greater is the demand for laws, and the more of them there will be made yearly. No wonder that laws increase at a fearful rate, and taxes multiply beyond all reason.

But have the people nothing to say? It would seem that they have not, for they make no sign and enter no objections, at least none thus far that receive any attention. They appear to have surrendered at discretion; or possibly they have the utmost confidence in the machine as it is now working, and they fear no evil. They certainly do not trouble themselves about their rights. It may be that they imagine they have none. They do not happen to belong to the elect, and so they have learned to expect no favor. Naturally enough, people go on paying taxes as usual—just from

the force of habit. People who are not in the habit of receiving favors, usually expect none.

Civilization means an accumulation of rights and privileges, in certain directions, for the benefit of a few favored individuals. Such favors are never intended for the public generally. Under government, in a state of civilization, everything tends to the center, and nothing goes to the periphery. What goes to one man, cannot of course go to another man. That would be quite opposed not only to custom, but also to the usual laws of nature. Most assuredly, what a man surrenders voluntarily, he cannot afterward claim. We can see how matters stand in the civilized world to-day by simply looking around and noting how things appear on our own account.

There are men with rights and men without rights, so it has always been in the history of mankind, in civilized life; and so undoubtedly it always will be. Those who are without rights amount to nothing. It is no wonder at all that they count for nothing; they are nothing and they can achieve nothing. They are things only, with names. They do not think, they do not know; they seem to have no occasion for any of these things. They are people who neither receive privileges nor grant them. What purpose do they serve in this busy and selfish world of ours? This is a democratic form of government that we live under, and the first question that is usually asked is: "What are we here for?" Everybody wants a piece; that is simply natural.

Even to own property is a privilege for those who have it. We own nothing unless the state sanctions

our claim. We can do nothing unless we have a permit, express or implied. We are merely employees working for our board and clothes—not very good board and rather cheap clothes. Again we ask, what does civilization imply? It means slavery under the law. Some people claim that it is not slavery, but that must be because they have had little experience, and not much acquaintance with the subject under consideration.

Under the law, under the constitution, under civilization, as we have often intimated, everything is put into the hands of a very few people who start as our *agents* and end by becoming our *masters*. This is the history of mankind taken as a body down to the present time. Indeed, there is no other condition on which we can have civilization; and without civilization, followed as it is necessarily by the subordination of man and the concentration of forces, *men could never secure riches and power*. Riches and power are matters of quantity, like knowledge, and while wealth accumulates rapidly in one place, it must of course spread out so much thinner in other localities. All men cannot be rich any more than all men can be learned. Evidently there is not enough to go around.

It is well known, as said before, that the power that one man secures another man can't exercise and so it is with accumulations of all kinds. Nothing new has come into the world since the time of creation. Things are being readjusted continually, but nothing new appears and not an ounce or an atom is ever added.

The good things of this world are for the active and ardent alone. Those who fail to look after their

personal interests will find at last that they have no personal interests to look after. That is the way that matters go at all times. If a man is not born a nabob or a prince, or if through some trick or mischance he fails to become one, he might as well not have been born at all. He is made of dust, and to dust he must return. And it matters little how soon that may occur. Such people are simply in the way of other people. They can be thinned out, it is true, by machine guns and other implements of warfare, but that implies more or less trouble and expense, and there are other methods that are easier and less objectionable.

Civilization must be a delightful thing after all, for those who happen to enjoy its privileges. But what are the benefits to be derived by those who belong to classes that are not privileged? A poor man may live in a large city and still lack the necessaries of life. In fact, people die from starvation in the great centers of population just as they do in the Desert of Sahara. We have no car of Juggernaut in this part of the world, but we have plenty of cars of other kinds. We know that Samson did great execution with so simple a weapon as the jawbone of an ass. If he were living to-day, with one of our modern motor cars, he might ride up and down in our streets and occasion far greater damage than he could possibly with any ordinary weapon of war. However, he would need to get a license from the state. But the state will license almost anything, even to the selling of whiskey, if it only secures the requisite *fees*. Indeed, our whole government is built up, in all its departments, on the money-making basis. The best government in the

world could not, or rather would not, run a minute without money! The government talks well, and makes lofty pretensions. But what kind of an example does it set, either for the young or the aged? We pause for a reply, and anybody may answer that chooses.

The ordinary reader will hardly be able to realize how much is to be learned from the history of Rome, Greece and Egypt, when we examine their records critically and intelligently and are able to appreciate the lessons that are presented for consideration. The instruction given in these cases is perhaps not unique in the history of nations; but it affords an illustration of the rise and fall, the growth and development of races that will not find its exact counterpart or parallel in any ordinary volume. And yet the career and experience of these peoples, in all essential particulars, is substantially the same as that of every other ambitious and progressive race. And why should there not be a sameness in results in all these cases? Races, or nations, are merely collections of individuals, each one of whom has an origin or growth practically identical with that of every other individual. They have grown up on the same soil, and they are subject all through life to similar influences and conditions. Why should their destiny be different?

We certainly make a great mistake in assuming that the history of any one people can be given as something distinct and apart from that of some neighboring people. It now begins to be seen that we cannot give the history of Rome, with any propriety or

success, without necessarily giving a great deal of history that does not belong to Rome as a city or an empire. When we write of Rome, we must give its early history, and we cannot do that without including at least the whole of Italy. We must write of the Pelasgians, the Etruscans, the Sabines and the Samnites, and others with whom Rome had her early struggles and from whom she received much valuable instruction.

We must include not only Greece, with which Rome had constant intercourse, but the Moors, the Mahometans, the Goths, the Gauls, the Slavs, and the Germans, all of whom, in the course of centuries, did very much in the way of leaving an impress not only upon Rome but upon the whole of Italy. Egypt, too, we know, was a powerful factor in the same connection. How shall we draw the line and say with any propriety that this is Rome and that is not Rome? We shall find a great deal of Rome in Spain, in France, in England and Scotland, and in Germany. We shall find great temples that Rome built in Egypt and Asia Minor, and when we get back to Rome again, we shall find very much there that has come, or been brought there, from other countries. How shall we ever know when we are really in Rome and when we are out of Rome? When we write about Rome, we should at least know its boundaries and be able to state where it begins and where it ends. Even when we are in the vicinity of Babylon, we are able to find the remains of grand structures that were built by artists and workmen that were sent out from Greece and Rome.

We might refer still further to the case of Spain. For hundreds of years the Romans held this country as their own province. Later on, the Goths came and supplanted the Romans, taking possession of the country and holding the greater portion, with varying success, for two or three centuries. Near the beginning of the eighth century, the Moors came over from North Africa, and overthrowing all opposers, held the best part of Spain for 700 years.

There is much in Spain to-day that is Gothic, much that is Moorish, and much that is Roman. How shall we decide when Spain was really Spanish, and when it was something else? England, too, we know, had its own experience. To-day the English Channel separates England from France; some centuries ago this channel connected these countries, as Normandy was a part of England, just as Alsace is German to-day, though up to 1870 it was French.

If we were better acquainted than we are with the peoples who have lived, grown up and finally gone down on or near the shores of the Mediterranean, we should find them much more closely related to each other than we have all along supposed. Of course, the Semitic peoples—the Phenicians, the Carthaginians, the Moors, the Syrians, the Chaldeans, the Hebrews, the Arabs, as we know, were all people originally of one common stock—one family, with one religion, one civilization and a common belief or culture. They may be said to be as closely related as the Danes are to the Swedes, the Germans to the Dutch, the Spaniards to the Italians. The Egyptians belong to this same Semitic branch, and the Persian or Zend race

may be placed in the same list, though not so nearly or so directly related as the others. The Turkish or Tartar race must likewise be mentioned in this same connection.

These races were not only of one common stock, they were moved by the same spirit, the same thought, the same belief, the same religion, in all its general aspects, the same laws, the same customs, and the same philosophy generally. Their numerous alphabets were all of the same origin, and in most respects they were similar. Even the Greek alphabet is not essentially different from the Arabic or Hebrew. These races may be said to have spoken the same language, with important variations. These are the people who have given us the thought, the philosophy and the *religion* that we boast of to-day. They were all, strangely enough, strictly Semitic and Oriental in the first place, with Greek and Latin adaptation and transformation later on. It should be noted, finally, that thought, belief, religion, culture and civilization are uniformly all *one and the same thing at last.*

We may add in this connection that, properly speaking, civilization is not a matter of land; it is not a matter of people or climate, and the same observation is true of knowledge. None of these things have anything necessarily to do with land. Civilization especially is a matter of cities, of people, of measures, of laws, and finally of talent and disposition. As a rule, the more land a nation has, *the more it wants,* and the

more it is called upon to defend. Surplus land has always been a burden, and it is a burden to-day alike to men and nations. Babylon and Nineveh were among the most powerful city-states this world has ever known. But the small portion of the valley that these cities appropriated to their own uses constituted only a garden spot, and for that it was chiefly used. Egypt, with all its power and glory, drew its sustenance from a small strip of land about seven miles wide and, we will say, 500 miles long.

It does not require land to give power or prestige to any state. Athens, Rome, Venice, Genoa, Babylon and Carthage, that did so much to develop and direct the world, were rather cities than kingdoms or empires. The invader seldom finds use for land. He can't cultivate it, and he cannot carry it away. He can walk on it, or ride over it, and that is as far as its uses ordinarily extend, for an invader. When it comes to cultivation, it is found easier to buy products than it is to raise them. What the invader wants is strongholds, and it is often found that he does not even care for these. The value of some inaccessible rock is largely in the imagination. It is often found that it is better to flank fortresses than to capture them, and so it is in the case of cities. Indeed, it is better not to go to war in the first place.

Does human nature change, does the sun change, does the moon change, do the stars change? These questions are like all other questions, they can be answered several different ways, according to what you think, what you know, and *how you view things*. For practical purposes, human nature does not change,

neither does the sun or the stars, and yet we know that given time enough, *all things change*. Even the sun is constantly wearing away, and in due time—a very long time—it too will disappear. Does the river change? As a river it does not; as water, it does change every moment. So it is with nations, and with all things.

How is it with peoples and with countries? There is Egypt for illustration. It is called Egypt to-day, as it has been for two or five thousand years. But it is a very different Egypt from what it was. Even the people do not speak Egyptian. They speak Arabic, they write Arabic, they discuss in Arabic, they are taught Arabic in their schools. Of the Copts, the representatives as they are of the old Egyptians, there are only about 100,000 left, supposed to be one-twentieth of the whole population. The English hold military occupation, but the Turks are the landlords. They collect and disburse the taxes. This may be Egypt, but it is certainly a different Egypt from what they had when the Arabs ruled the land, or the Persians, or the Greeks, or the Romans. We notice that names last long after the country, or the people, disappear. What is true of Egypt is true of every country in the world. They have all had their ups and downs; they have been conquered and re-conquered repeatedly. People have been moving in and moving out, and dying and being buried, for hundreds or thousands of years. And still we call it the same country! It is surprising. We see the facts a little more strongly in the case of Egypt because they have been in business so long. The Americans have not much to show in this line, because they have only been here for something over a

hundred years. But they will have their troubles too some day.

Even Turkey is only nominally Turkish. There are more foreigners, especially Greeks, in that country, than natives to-day—and particularly in Constantinople, which for hundreds of years was Roman by conquest. To-day it is practically Greek by settlement or occupation. What shall we say of America?

KULTURGESCHICHTE ROMS

(CULTURE HISTORY)

Dr. Theodore Birt, University, Marburg, 1909

We have seldom come across a more interesting, we may say a more charming, volume than the one with the above title. It treats of the history of Rome and its people from an unusual standpoint. Ordinarily, when we take up a work on the history of any country, and especially of an ancient people like the Romans, we expect to read chiefly of wars, conquests and bloodshed. But the work before us is certainly an exception to the rule. It has only 160 pages in all, omitting the index, and yet it contains more of interest and value, for the earnest student, than Gibbons' Rome or Hallam's Middle Ages, with all their ponderosity.

The work under consideration tells us how the Romans lived and fared, and what their means and methods were; other histories that have come to our notice have usually taken the achievements and conquests of the Romans as the subject of discourse. Of course much has been written before on the ways, works, customs and notions of this remarkable people, but we have never yet seen these facts presented in a

manner so systematic and effective as we find them in this excellent work by Dr. Birt. It is written plainly and intelligently, and it is exceedingly instructive. We will take time to notice a few points, among many that have attracted our attention:

We judge that people generally, even those who are most intelligent, in America particularly, know very little about the customs, ideas and fashions that prevailed among the old Romans. For instance, how many people know that when a Roman called himself dressed, he was really, according to our notions in the case, practically undressed? He wore no coat, no vest, no trousers! He seldom even wore a hat. In fact, like Roman gentlemen generally, he rarely had a hat, or headgear of any kind, to wear!

The leading article of wearing apparel for a Roman citizen, and to which he was at all times partial, was his shirt, or chemise, or tunic, or whatever name the reader may choose to give to the garment. In theory this article, originally, constituted the whole of a Roman gentleman's wardrobe! He never bothered himself with a "telescope" or bandbox, as his wearing apparel was so limited in extent! The tunic was usually of wool. Then there was the toga. This was not so much a part of his dress as something to throw over his dress, having the nature of a cloak, or gown or blanket. Its color was white, and its material wool. It was a long piece of goods thrown over the shoulders, around the chest and then allowed to drape down to the feet. The same white sheet or cloth prevails today all over the east, especially among the Arabs and

Moors, in Syria and in Egypt. Our clerical robe and the blanket of our Indians and the Mexicans is a counterpart of the same piece of goods.

The toga gave to the Roman a very distinguished appearance. It was a sign of manhood, and boys were not permitted to wear the garment until they had reached the age of fifteen or sixteen years. The legs of the Roman were bare, even hose not being introduced till a late date, by the Germans. Shoes in the form of sandals were worn, a sort of open-work affair, leaving the toes exposed.

We have had occasion to note before that the Romans were an excessively religious people. Our word religion itself is a Roman term, meaning a binding, a tying.

It is not generally known that the Romans worked only in the forenoon of the day—when they worked at all—beginning about 9 A. M. But as a people, they were very early risers. Everybody knows that the Spaniards have, now as formerly, their *siesta* of two or three hours after midday. But it is not generally known that it is a Roman custom, that was always observed by that people scrupulously. The Spaniards can thank the Romans for bullfights, and many other institutions. Among the Romans, the afternoon was given up to baths, conversations, promenades and visiting. Bathing came to be looked upon as a religious duty and was never neglected.

The Romans were little inclined to learning on its own merits. They simply had an aversion to hard work of all kinds, and they did not care to bother with details at any time. It was a common thing for slaves

in Rome to be learned men, and many of them were teachers and artisans.

In its proudest and most prosperous days, Rome was really and practically the world.

Wagons or vehicles were not allowed in the streets in the day time. The work done by them was in the night, beginning at 7 P. M.

They had no stairs in their homes—only occasionally ladders. There was a large court in the interior, shut out wholly from the view of the street, and surrounded by rows of rooms. There was no chimney and few windows. Fires were rarely seen, and yet December and January afford many cold days.

Dr. Birt notes one important fact among others in Roman history, that Greek Philosophy, full four hundred years before Christ, taught the broad doctrine of the brotherhood of mankind, without regard to race, origin or location. There is no sense at all, or justice, in the claim often put forth by Christians that this doctrine was their own private property! The doctrine is Greek, beyond all doubt, but not a Greek doctrine exclusively. Thoughts and doctrines and beliefs are things that cannot be appropriated at any time by any one people. They are simply in the air. They come and they go, and they never belong to anybody in particular.

RÖMISCHE KULTUR

Dr. Hans Lamer, Leipsig, 1910

This work, highly interesting as it is, from the happy manner in which the subject is presented, is rendered all the more attractive by the 132 fine half-

tones which the book contains. To those who have visited Rome these pictures are especially serviceable, bringing back, as they do, many of the leading features of that famous city without the necessity of visiting it again. Everything in the work is highly satisfactory to the reader indeed.

BABYLON

In many respects, the most remarkable valley in the world, is that which lies between the Euphrates and the Tigris, in the western part of Asia, on the road between Persia and the Mediterranean. On the north it is bounded by mountain ranges and elevated plateaus; on the south by the low-lands of the Persian Gulf, and on the west by the desert regions of Arabia. The climate is warm the year round, and in the summer the air is hot, dry and oppressive, almost intolerable for any but the native Asiatics, who seem to be extremely partial to the burning rays of the noonday sun. They dress light and work little, and hence perspiration and fatigue do not enter into the problem as they do in cooler climates or higher latitudes.

The lower part of the valley has long been known as Chaldea, and the upper part as Mesopotamia or Assyria. The rivers Tigris and Euphrates are mountain streams, both running south, and hence they are much more powerful and more interesting at one season of the year than they are at another. The Tigris is the more rapid of the two, the Euphrates being more sluggish in its movements. Both change their course from time to time, and finally the waters of both are lost in the Persian Gulf. This lower basin of the val-

ley, as might be expected, is constantly filling up with sand and soil from the rivers, making new land at the rate of a mile in 30 to 50 years. The head of the Persian Gulf is 130 miles lower down, or nearer the sea, now than it was some thousands of years ago, under the first Chaldean monarchy. Or in other words, the head of the Persian Gulf was 130 miles farther inland three or four thousand years ago than it is now. The rivers are each over 1,000 miles long, and are navigable for steamers for much of the distance. They are not wide, but usually deep.

This interesting avenue is much like the valley of the Nile in many particulars. In both cases the soil is exceptionally fertile, and is especially favorable for the raising of grain. Both valleys are narrow strips of land running north and south, that of the Nile being a deep cut in the limestone rock, with high perpendicular sides, extending from Cairo to Thebes, and even beyond, the distance being, as said before, something over 500 miles.

It is easy to see why Egypt, Assyria and Chaldea were able to endure so long as they did. They were both protected by their location. Egypt was near the sea, and yet some distance from any seaport. It had few powerful neighbors, and none that were dangerous. Egypt must have been often molested, if not subjugated, by Ethiopians from the south. Chaldea was exposed in the same way, and must have suffered from attacks from the same source, through the Persian Gulf. There is no question that both Babylon and Nineveh were often attacked by hordes from Africa. From the shores of the Mediterranean, they

were farther removed by land, and hence they were not often assailed by enemies from that direction. The Chaldeans could get out much easier than others could get in. Nineveh and Assyria were in the north of the valley, and Babylon in the south.

In looking over the treasures of Chaldean or Babylonian art that have been buried for thousands of years and have recently been discovered, we are surprised that there is so much that corresponds with our own uses and our own designs. But why should we wonder at any such similarity? Are not all peoples similar in most respects? They live under the same conditions all through life, to a greater or less extent. Why should we not find the same customs, the same practices, the same dress and the same utensils, among other peoples, no matter how remote or how strange to us? The same climate and scenery, the same rocks and rivers, the same wants and inclinations, will always tend to produce similar results among other people, no matter where or when we find them. Are we not ourselves people like other people? Even the gulf that is supposed to separate the savage from civilized man is wholly imaginary, a fancy merely that is born of our conceit.

The Babylonians also were no doubt men precisely as we are. They surpassed us in many arts, and many they possessed which we know nothing of. In science, too, they had made great advancement. But that was 3,000 to 5,000 years ago. Time and place seem to have little to do with the history and habits of people, when justly compared. So it is in language. There are differences in all languages, as there are similarities in all

languages. They are all produced in a similar manner, by similar people, under similar circumstances.

And then, too, we must note finally that the people of Babylon and Nineveh had their experience in war, just as all peoples do who decide to take a course of lessons in wealth, power and civilization. They conquered and were conquered many times. Sometimes they had a King from home, like Egypt, and sometimes they had one that was sent from abroad. They had their vicissitudes—plenty of them, certainly! All that a people seems to gain by going up a hill on one side, is the privilege of going down the hill again on the other side. No one was ever so strong that he was not able at last to find some one who was stronger. There is an end to the chapter, as every people finds in its experience at last. No one remains on top of the hill all the time. That would be monotonous.

DIE BABYLONISCHE GEISTESKULTUR

(SPIRIT-CULTURE)

Dr. H. Winckler. Berlin, 1907

This is a work of more than ordinary merit, containing, as it does, many important facts and developments in Chaldean and Babylonian history, a field in which very little was to be expected. It is admirably written, and the book is one of great interest, on a subject that has thus far given us but little either in the way of instruction or amusement.

Recent excavations, in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, have been rewarded with remarkable discoveries, and much light has been given to the world from a region where before little was found beyond

doubts and difficulties. From the time that the cuneiform inscriptions were mastered, as they were finally by learned and gifted students of ethnology, our knowledge of the records of the ancient world was carried back three to five thousand years farther than ever before. But important as the subject is, and much as there is to be said in this connection at this time, we can barely touch upon those discoveries here. Our aim is simply to indicate the trend of the work before us, and to give some intimation of the treasures that are to be found in this volume. We also wish to call the reader's attention to the great advancement made latterly in the study of Civilization.

Dr. Winckler, page 2, remarks that the history of colonization is full of examples of the sad effects resulting from the lack of knowledge of the true condition of affairs in uncultivated lands, on the part of those who call themselves "highly enlightened." Science begins to recognize the fact that the European, with his uniform coat or stovepipe hat, is not necessarily the topstone of the pyramid, with the lower steps representing the lower civilizations, down to the savage, who is supposed to be the lowest creature of all!

It is coming to be understood at last, among serious, sensible and thoughtful men, that all the science, all the culture, all the learning, all the wisdom, all the worth, and indeed all the wealth of the world, is not to be found in Europe, in Asia, or in any other cultivated land, either of the present day or of the centuries that preceded our time. Even Egypt and Greece had more wisdom, more real worth, and in

many departments greater artistic skill than we have; and now it is beginning to appear that five thousand years ago, Babylon and Nineveh, to say nothing of other forgotten cities, of which we have yet learned very little from the few facts that have been given us from time to time, in a very sparing way, were in many important respects, in civilization, actually our superiors! Really, we shall find, when the facts are fully understood and duly considered, that any one age has as much to boast of, and as much to be ashamed of, as any other, considering wealth, wisdom, virtue and culture on one side, and poverty, corruption, iniquity and crime on the other side.

We find the same spirit, the same world-conception, the same teachings, in the inscriptions in and about the Pyramids as we find revealed in the oldest Babylonian archives—and both imply the same foundation-principles as the Islam presents to us in Egypt to-day. In both Egypt and Chaldea we have like phenomena from the beginning of our historical records—11. It is evident enough that we may have the same creed, the same religion, the same policy, the same customs, in different, even remote countries, at different periods of time.

All civilization is one, all thought, all religion, all belief, and *all basis of action in man is one*—only with unimportant variations, resulting from location and exceptional influences. One soul, one spirit, pervades the world, the universe. All things, all events, all occurrences are connected together, in the history of the world, and properly they cannot be considered apart from each other.

It seems to be a fact that cuneiform writing was in use in the Euphrates valley for fully 3,000 years, with no important change in character or form during all that time. But the people who used this writing changed several times—16. So, we see, the people may change and not their civilization. But the foundation of a new state means the establishing of a new religion—17.

Babylon and Babylonia were ever busy with playing a political or governmental part, but Babylon was most important as the seat of a new doctrine, like Rome in the Middle Ages—21.

The Euphrates valley is to-day waste land, for want of water and cultivation—41. In the days of Babylon's prosperity, this valley was very fertile.

A surprising phenomenon to moderns is the powerful, deep-sinking influence which religion was accustomed to exert upon mankind—44. Law, with its application of force and power, men at times are inclined to resist as something unjust and improper; but their religion they are ready to die for, if necessary. This is the lesson that history affords us over and over again. Ethnology has much more to give in the way of light and instruction.

Down to the present day, Syria has been the land of sects and religions. All over the East, the patron god always makes his home in the city of the conquering people. When Judea, or Syria, was strong, God, our God, made his home in Jerusalem. Such was the thought in the East.

Dr. Winckler's work gives the reader a clear insight into the character and relations of the religions and

beliefs of the East. That they are all related to each other, to a greater or less extent, is most unquestionable.

A fine point brought out by the author is the importance of Myth, even in connection with the truths of history—135. The understanding of the essence of legend shows us that the applying of mythical motive belongs to the old form of narration, and we cannot disconnect tradition entirely from such accounts. The biblical accounts do not speak in the manner of our history-knowledge of to-day to a reading circle which has learned to think abstractly of scientific matters. Even to-day, in the accounts of popular history, legend cannot be wholly dispensed with. Legend is partly ornamental, but it embellishes the main story and thus arouses and maintains the interest of the reader.

We should, perhaps, not be too particular in drawing the line between what we may call real and what imaginary. Legend is only one of the forms in which a story comes to be presented. It is a serious mistake to suppose that a story can be related in only one way, or presented only in one phase or form. Even a person's likeness may be taken in a hundred different ways, under a hundred different conditions—and the result would be, of course, a hundred different pictures, as different as things could possibly be!

THE ARAB RACE

No race that is known to us has a history that is so interesting and so instructive as that of the Arabs, or the Moslems. They have been greatly misrepresented, because they have been so generally misun-

derstood. It is a very serious error on our part to undertake to judge people entirely by our own peculiar standard. Every race, and every individual, operates according to his own rules of life, his own creed, his own sense of duty and his own ideas of propriety. What has the opinion or belief of some other person to do with our line of thought and our rule of action? We have often said, and again repeat, that circumstances make right and determine what shall be considered correct in any particular instance. The Arab is not industrious in our sense, because he has not the cares and duties that we Americans are accustomed to take upon ourselves. Every Arab is emphatically a free man, and why should he condescend to make himself a slave to work? What duties there may be that need looking after, in Arab communities, must be attended to by the wife and children.

The true Arab is a natural born gentleman, and that is the part that he always takes it upon himself to perform. Speaking generally, he leads a robber's life, and he does not deny the accusation. That is his business, and it is the way in which he was brought up and educated; and that is the prevailing custom of the country in which he lives. It is the way other folks do, more or less, in all countries. What other rule of right should he follow? What do we enlightened people follow as our code? We do as other folks do, and that is the way that everybody does. The Arab robber robs strangers, only enemies, *other folks!* He never robs himself, never robs his own family, his friends, his sect, or his clan. He robs in a regular business way, with a due regard to the feelings of his

victim, and he makes no pretensions for a moment to be any better or worse than other people. That is precisely what we do in our case, and what is done in every enlightened country to-day—we rob people continually, in a quiet, business way. However, we seldom use such a harsh, blunt term as that when we speak of the matter. That is one of the chief differences between an American and an Arab.

The Arab is always very hospitable, even to strangers, but we are not hospitable to anybody. Indeed, the Arab has a host of virtues that we could not boast of, and naturally enough he has some vices also. He does not deny the fact. It might be observed, safely, that the Arabs as a race are a bright, promising and intelligent people, far beyond the average. They are not highly educated in our sense, although they are fond of learning, and among them many devoted students will be found. It should be remembered that education in Arabia and education in America are two distinct things. When the people in Moslem countries go to school, they simply learn to read and understand the Koran; and when they wish to understand what the law is, in this or that case, they consult this same book.

The best type of an Arab as we know the family to-day is the Syrian. He might deny the relationship and declare that he is not an Arab. Doubtless he would call himself a Syrian, as he certainly is. But residing in Syria, or being born in that country, does not necessarily imply that a man is a true Syrian. Occasionally an Englishman is born in that country. The Syrians to-day speak Arabic, they write Arabic, they think

Arabic, and nothing else, except possibly a little English and French, concerns them. There can be no doubt, the Syrians are Arabic. Of course, the stock is mixed, very much mixed; it is so in all lands, and in Syria among the rest.

The young Syrians are, we should say, the brightest, quickest and most interesting people to be found in Asia to-day. If you want a dragoman to help you along on your route, with the hopes of returning safely in due time, why, get a Syrian if you can. They do well at almost any business. The Moors are also an interesting people, but they are more languid, more thoughtful, and they are by no means so promising as the young Syrians, or as are even the young Egyptians.

We regard the whole Arab race as an unusually interesting branch of the great human family to which we ourselves happen to belong. They have done much for humanity—a great deal more than they have had credit for—and they are decidedly capable of doing a great deal more when the opportune moment arrives. What is wanted in this case, first of all, is to emigrate, and finally settle down to business among people that will set them a good example. Of course, if they persist in staying where they are, they will remain what they were. *There is everything in a people's surroundings.* We are glad to know that many young Syrians, of both sexes, are being educated in Europe every year. As to the Arabs proper, on that point, we are not informed.

It is no part of our plan to give a history of Arabia or of Arabians. We give some of the leading charac-

teristics of this people, and a few points in their history, merely because they serve to illustrate the truth of many positions that we have taken, in this and preceding works, on questions in philosophy and religion. We know of no people that has had a career so important, or at least so instructive, as that of the Arabs, or the Moslems. The development and progress of the Mahometan religion is itself most wonderful, and most illustrative for those who are making a study of thought and its advancement. There is no doubt an abundance of fraud and falsehood in the story as told by those who have been converted to a belief in the Mahometan doctrine, but we miss some of the striking features that we find in the history of some other religions. Mahomet himself never pretended to be more than a prophet. He did not claim to be a God, or the son of God, as had been done in similar cases before.

What we chiefly learn from the history of the Arabs, is the course that is usually taken by culture and learning in their progress among men. Much as we condemn war, and much as it is abhorred, it must be confessed, that thus far in this world, we get no truth, no wisdom, no religious creed, no progress in any way, without resistance and conflict, or in other words, *without war*. The moment we stir, we are in somebody's way, and we are shocked to learn that in our thoughtlessness or inattention, we have really trodden on *somebody's toes!* Of course, that meant trouble, war, in some form, either serious or otherwise—unless we amply compensate for the damages occasioned, without delay.

Suppose we have gotten a new thought, a new plan, a new creed, a new enterprise? Well, now we must have war surely, and it cannot be avoided with any amount of care or precaution. It is always war, it always has been war all through life, and it must necessarily continue to be war, under the present dispensation. As a people, our chief business is *to get into war*, or *out of war*, or to *prepare for war*. What would a nation be without a period of slaughter some day or other? To say the least, it would go out of practice, and that of itself would be a matter of great importance. There is actually nothing like keeping in practice.

There is only one way to avoid war, and *that is to keep out of it*. But is that the best way? That is indeed the whole question, and every one must answer it so as to meet his own wants, wishes or conditions. If we did not have war, we certainly should not have wealth, learning, culture or progress. Are these things actually worth what they cost? *Does the net result of any war ever pay expenses?*

One of the most encouraging characteristics of the Arab is his willingness to learn. The race thus far has not been distinguished so much by its inventions as by its willingness to accept good advice and valuable suggestions from any source, whether these come from their conquerors, or from those whom they themselves had vanquished. No matter whither they went with their armies, to Egypt, to Syria, to Spain, or to Greece, India or Persia, they were always getting new ideas or gathering something for future use. In every way, they aided and encouraged schools and learning wher-

ever they happened to be located. This they did much more generally than the Romans did in their conquests. Wherever the Moslems ruled, there sooner or later great schools flourished—in Bagdad, in Mecca, in northern Africa, and in Spain. In the latter country, with their long residence, they achieved much for both agriculture and horticulture, as well as for the industrial arts. They introduced many new plants, shrubs, fruits and grains into this peninsula.

Owing to the limits defined and the instructions laid down in the Koran, art was always hampered under Moslem rule, and necessarily, it took on at last a very peculiar form. With the followers of Mahomet, neither painting nor sculpture ever flourished as it did in Egypt, Greece, Chaldea, or even as it did in some parts of Spain. The Moslem, as we know, was never permitted to make images, or representations, of any living creature. Indeed, so far did piety carry the Turks, after subduing the Romans and Greeks and gaining possession of the Mosque St. Sophia, at Constantinople, they promptly went to work and mutilated some of its finest pieces of art work in the interior. They destroyed the nose and eyes of some figures, and the faces or heads of the four cherubs which were placed conspicuously in the angles of the dome of the great temple. In many other places similar mutilations may be observed by any visitor who takes the pains to look for the evidences.

Such devastation, by conquering armies that are invading a country, is not without a parallel in many parts of Europe. We can find plenty of cases, in the cathedrals of Europe, where the heads of statuary

have been removed by some foe in a fit of piety and rage. We have never tried to ascertain the exact number of statues that have thus been rendered headless, but we sometimes think that perhaps the number of heads that are off is greater than the number of those remaining in their proper position, especially in the cathedrals of England.

We might remark in this connection that there are some lions carved out of stone and grouped around the fountain in the Court of Lions at the Alhambra. They are called lions, but they would pass for sheep, or dogs, or large-sized cats. We think perhaps the artist in this instance had followed the instructions of the Koran strictly, and he evidently understood quite well that if he undertook to represent some animal, it must be such a creature as could be found nowhere in the world. If that was the purpose of the artist, he certainly succeeded.

In view of the poverty and desolation of the country in which the Arabs lived, and especially in view of the limitations laid down in the Koran against all images and imitations, we consider it very remarkable that they have any art history at all and we wonder that, among them, education should ever have gained any foothold. And yet it is known that in the course of long centuries they have, as we shall see before we finish this article, done quite a little for art in some few departments, and they have even made considerable progress in learning, especially in the early centuries. What they have done already under great embarrassment, gives us an indication of what they may

yet do, under more favorable conditions, somewhat later on.

To appreciate the situation of the Arabs, we should consider the obstacles in their path and the difficulties that they had to encounter. We should remember that when Mahomet began his ministrations, 600 years after the birth of Christ, and over, his people, the Arabs, were not devoted to the arts as arts in any form. Not only the religion of the people, but also the sentiments of the people themselves, were opposed to all arts. The same was true of the Hebrews as a people. They wanted no "graven images" of any kind, and many of them could not even endure paintings.

The Arabs, in Mahomet's time, lived in a barren, treeless waste, and they lived as such a people might be expected to live, stopping at one place one day, and leaving for some other place early next morning. They built no homes, for they needed none. They lived in the open air, when not so fortunate as to own a tent. They had no churches, for they had no use for them. Mahomet himself built the first mosque, at Medina, and it was a very plain commonplace affair, without dome or minaret. It was simply an enclosure, with a wall around it, and open to the sky above.

It should be borne in mind by the thoughtful student that no art, no science, no religion, no philosophy can maintain its existence for any great length of time —much less can it be making any real progress— without faithful nursing and careful attention from some source. It is like the plant in the garden which needs assistance or protection at all times, either from nature or from man. Without cultivation, it soon de-

cays. This is equally true of learning and culture. Without due recognition from the people, they are sure to decline promptly and steadily. We notice this in the history of all peoples, all structures. We notice that there are periods of decline, for learning, in all countries, and again they have periods when the movement takes decidedly the other direction. We have seen it in France and Germany, and we have seen it in England and America. The cause is not always apparent, but the effect is quite unmistakable.

A country like that of the Romans, devoting all its thought and energies to war and conquest, has very little time or inclination for learning or inquiry. When a people devotes its whole thought to some one thing, they do not usually have much time to devote to other things. So, some centuries since, the Moslems were noted for their knowledge of Astronomy, Mathematics and Medicine. Their schools in Bagdad, Damascus and Cordova were famous, and they were visited by scholars from all parts of the civilized world. But finally they were carried away by religious zeal, and the transition from religious zeal to conquest, with a view to gain, was both easy and natural. From that time on, learning received less and less attention from the Moslems, and it has been steadily declining ever since. Indeed, we do not know that there ever has been any noticeable affinity between religion and science anywhere in the world. It will be remembered that their foundations are different, and their objects quite unlike.

It is no wonder at all that the results at last, with the Mahometans, were just what they proved to be.

While they were fighting the religious battles, for Mahomet, his family and the Koran, in Western Asia, northern Africa and Southern Europe, they had but little time left, and little opportunity, to give serious attention to their own bodily or spiritual welfare. It was with them as it usually is with other people under similar circumstances, while they were turning their whole attention in one direction, they could not be turning their thoughts in another direction at the same time. Something must go amiss in all such cases, and in this instance we certainly find no exception to the rule.

The Moslems in various ways have wasted a large share of the energies with which they were endowed by nature. They might have done better—ten times as well as they did—if they had only had the *disposition!* This is the way with people generally, and it is apt to be especially so with those who are favored with gifts by nature. But we have no doubt the Arabs will come to the front at last. So far they have had no organization, no centralization, no master-mind to lead them in the right direction. There are plenty of those who stand ready to lead the people, any day, in the wrong direction. The Arabs are too much like the American Indians; they do not like masters, they will not obey orders, and so they cannot be utilized very well in any emergency. They are moved alone by religious zeal, and they put their trust in clans, tribes and families. They are good soldiers for a short sally, but they are worthless for a long siege. What they want is the booty, and when they get that, they are anxious to run home quickly, if they have a home.

But the Arab has plenty of reserve energy, and it would be strange if he did not give a good account of himself some time in the future.

The Moslem has done something for architecture, indeed, in some parts of the world; in India especially he has done much. The evidence of his work, his skill and his constructive ability are to be found not only in Arabia, India and Persia, but notably in Egypt, and particularly in Cairo, where according to the claims made, the number of mosques, including some of the finest specimens of their class, is said to be four hundred, which is a larger number than can be found in Constantinople. In northern Africa, not far from the site of ancient Carthage, are to be found the ruins of Moslem temples that equal in interest anything to be seen either in Asia or Europe. Then there are Moorish edifices in some of the cities of Spain, in Granada, in Seville, in Cordova and in Toledo, to which we have referred on other pages, and finally there is Constantinople.

The Moslem has done much, as we have said, but the Arab is an idle fellow, alike by constitution, by habit, and by education. It is too much to expect anything important from him till he gets grievously pinched—*as he surely will some time later on!* What the Moslems have thus far built chiefly is the mosque. When a Moslem prince finds that he has a sum of money at command, he goes directly and builds a mosque—no matter where, if he only builds it. And what is a mosque? It is one of those instances where the annex, or the appendage, is more important than the rest of the structure. In the case of the mosque,

the minaret, or the four or six minarets, as it happens to be, is much the biggest half of the institution. Take the minaret away, and all you have left, in most cases, is a good sized square box. Sometimes this box is mounted with imposing domes, and sometimes not. They are not as high as our steeples, but they are much larger around at the base.

But the minaret is really something to boast of. It is something new—something that no other sect has nor cares to possess. It is pretty, it is graceful, it is tall, it is elegant. If there were no minarets, how could the good Turk, or good Arab, or good Moor, as the case may be, ascertain the proper hour for prayer? In this country the devotee would be sure to be ten or fifteen minutes late, or perhaps an hour late, and that would be serious.

However, those minarets cost money, and it seems a large sum to pay just to furnish a man with standing room while he calls the people to prayer, at short intervals—five times during the day, and twice at night. Blind men are selected for this office, so that they may not overlook the houses of the neighborhood. By the way, there is no scarcity of blind people in Cairo, nor in Egypt generally. It should be noted here, finally, that in building mosques, everything must be done according to pattern and rule. So there is no chance here for new ideas or bold conceptions, and so no progress or development need be looked for in this branch of architecture for some time to come. Progress implies complete freedom of action in the first place, and that is what people do not find in Moslem countries when they come to found a mosque.

The Moors, or the Moslems, unquestionably, surpass all the other peoples of the globe in decorating the interior of homes and palaces. They use stucco of an unusually fine quality, and their wood carving that covers the ceiling of large rooms, as seen in Toledo, in Seville, and other cities, is decidedly remarkable for its artistic merit. Most beautiful and most wonderful evidences of Moorish taste, skill and industry may be found to-day in the Alhambra, back of Granada, in the palace at Seville, in the mosque at Cordova, and in the Moorish buildings at Toledo, as they were left at the close of the fifteenth century, when the last of the Moors returned to their former home in north Africa, after a residence and rule in Spain, in different parts of that country, that lasted very nearly 800 years.

The interior decorations to which we have been referring, if we may judge from their effect upon the ordinary observer, are certainly remarkable in a high degree! The horseshoe arch, which is the striking feature of all Moorish interiors, is decidedly unique among the usual forms of this class. Of course, there are arches and arches, but there is only one horseshoe arch, and the Moors, or Moslems, have that, as they have the minaret and the flattened dome. This arch, supported as it is on either side by short, slender columns with cubical caps, is repeated over and over again, and alleys and avenues are formed, in the mosque, that extend almost as far as the eye can reach. The prospect which they present has no equal or parallel in any other style of architecture known to civilization.

Stucco work, as we have intimated, predominates in all Moorish interiors. Hardly a spot is overlooked or neglected anywhere in the whole apartment. Arabesque, fretwork, filigree and tracery are the novelties, and these, raised in relief, cover every accessible spot, above, on the sides, and even on the narrow surfaces of the arches. Sentences are often selected from the Koran, and embodied in Arabic script they are entwined with other figures and thus produce a most unique, and at the same time most pleasing effect.

The lower part of the side walls, extending up from the floor four to six feet, is reserved for a dado which is covered with beautiful enameled tile; appearing as it does in rich colors most artfully blended it produces a charming mosaic! Then there are, especially above, niches, and pendants, and stalactites which impress the visitor forcibly by their anomalous forms and strange locations, and yet they leave a most happy effect, after the feeling of surprise has passed away.

The last feature that we have to notice briefly is the color of everything that strikes the eye! Where shall we find color that is combined, composed, and blended with such exquisite taste and skill as we find in the Moorish palaces, or in the homes of princes in Moslem cities? The colors are uniformly of a mild, soft and delicate character—white, light blue, orange, red or pink, and rarely black. Gilt is used in places, and especially when Arabic script is presented.

We feel that something should be said here on the uses and value of stucco, a material which is employed freely in the interior adornments of all Moorish architecture, but which is used as yet very sparingly in

America. There is a prejudice in this country against stucco, simply because it is cheaper than what is known as hand-made goods. So people prefer hand-made lace to the other kind, and hand-painted china to that which is not hand-painted. We have a sort of prejudice against half-tone pictures, which are cheap, in comparison with steel engravings and wood cuts. These latter engravings imply a vast amount of labor and therefore they cost considerable money. But no one would claim that they are so very much better for that reason. As a matter of fact, the best of wood engraving is very coarse work compared with the finest half tones. Even some chromos have more merit than some oil paintings.

And so it is with stucco. It is very silly, to say the least, to condemn stucco, or to depreciate it, merely because it is done very quickly and with a small amount of labor. Stucco is neither better nor worse than hand carving; in fact it has nothing to do with hand carving in the first place. Each has its own place and its own office, and properly speaking they are not to be compared with each other. Stucco costs less than carved work does, and therefore less money is demanded for it. But all this has nothing to do with the real value. That comes alone from its uses, and the saving that it makes.

It is poor judgment and ill-directed economy to persist in using silk in cases where paper, costing much less money, might answer just as well. We today in this century are using stone, brick and wood, for buildings in which cement would answer quite as well, and it would cost much less money. We are just

beginning to use cement in place of stone, while over Europe and the East, and throughout Mexico, among the Indians, adobe has been used in buildings for various purposes for hundreds of years past. Adobe, or cement, or stucco, in any of its well known forms, is much more durable than either wood, brick or stone. It is much better for inside than outside work, but it answers well for both. It can be used like stone in blocks, or it can be put on the outside as a coating of plaster. This has been done, and is being done extensively, in all the cities of Europe and Asia to-day, and so it is throughout Mexico.

Stucco, especially on the outside and exposed to the weather, is liable to peel off, and it needs to be restored from time to time. But we must remember that wood also decays, and so does brick. All over the eastern hemisphere we can find heaps of stone, the remains of tumble-down structures that long since went the common way of ruin and destruction. If stucco has to be repaired, so does stone work. No structure, no matter what its material, can stand an indefinite time without attention. The cathedrals of Europe, built uniformly of stone, in the most permanent manner, have to be watched continually, and the decomposed blocks have to be replaced by sound material to prevent the structure from collapsing at some unlucky moment. It will be remembered that the proud tower of St. Mark's in Venice went down all in a heap, not many years since. The loosening of a single stone often causes great destruction. To-day the wonderful columns of the temple of Karnak, in Egypt, that have stood so many centuries, are tumbling down

one after another, because the lower parts of the column constantly decay and give way.

People, especially in America, have but an imperfect knowledge of the nature and uses of stucco. They know it is cheap, and that is not denied. But its true value they do not understand. They should bear in mind that all pottery, and even brick or tile, has the character of cement or stucco, that is, originally, before glazing and burning, it consists of a soft, plastic material which can be so moulded as to take on any form. It can be stamped by a die with any impression; and finally it hardens and becomes practically as solid and as firm as stone.

And how much does the world owe to the existence of cement and brick! The finest effects in art are in porcelain and pottery, which in the soft state can be moulded and given any form, and it will receive and retain any color or tint for any length of time. We might mention that the stucco that was put on by the Moors, on wood, is easily repaired, because it was put on in blocks, or squares, like tiles, and so nicely fitted that there was no appearance of any joint or seam when the work was completed.

In concluding this part of our subject, we wish to impress upon the reader the fact that there is no essential difference between ceramics, including faience and majolica ware, and the Moorish decorations of the Alhambra and Seville. Ceramics is defined as an art which includes the production of all objects formed by moulding, modeling, and baking clay, such as vases, bas-relief, cornices, cups, articles of porcelain, terra cotta, and pottery in general. Faience art and Moor-

ish art are essentially the same, but the materials and some of the conditions are different. In faience, the material is fine potter's clay, with enameling and baking implied. With the Moors, on the other hand, the material was mainly stucco, and there was no baking or enameling, except in those parts of the room where a mosaic of beautiful enameled tile is the predominant feature. The moulding and modeling of the material into artful forms or designs in relief is practically the same in ceramics as in the Moorish decorations. The artist in faience puts his figures on the outside of porcelain ware; the Moorish artist moulds his designs and places them in proper locations in the room. It might be remarked that centuries since the Arabs excelled in the art of fine porcelain.

DIE KULTUR DER ARABER

Dr. Joseph Hell, München, 1909

The contents of this work is arranged and prepared with the utmost care, and many excellent illustrations add to the value of the volume. As a faithful review of the leading features in the Culture-History of this remarkable race, we know of no work that will be found more acceptable than this by Dr. Hell.

TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS

In a closing work like this, on Modern Thought, we could notice no topic of greater importance to the public than that of *Trials at law and Punishments*. We have dwelt upon this subject in former works, more or less fully, but it is still uppermost in the mind of the author. We could not say that the study has made

any perceptible progress in this country, thus far, and the reason is that the public has found no time as yet to give to the matter that serious consideration which it certainly deserves.

But it must be borne in mind that this is to be counted at all times *among the leading questions of the day*. It may be ignored or neglected for a time yet, but it is sure to come forward as a *living, burning issue*, before many decades have passed.

We cannot do better at this time than copy what is said in this connection in the author's pamphlet on *Self Control*, published in the year 1898. He has nothing to add to this just now, and nothing to withdraw; every word of it is true, and a great deal more might be added, with propriety, in the same direction. What is contained in this article is not mere speculation, it is the undoubted truth.

The idea of punishment is purely religious, and in no way is it of a judicial nature. It is the source of all oppression, all injustice, all corruption. Ludwig Pfau:

What are trials at law? What are they for, what do they prove, and what do they amount to at last? Do we have trials at law in order to secure justice for those who apply? Do we go straight to work to give a man what we know to be due him? No, we quibble, we prevaricate, we parley, we procrastinate, we make long excuses and ask queer questions; we introduce a great number of witnesses and employ a great many forms, contrivances and ceremonies. Our whole effort is to make the complainant's path a thorny and expensive one, and to keep him from getting justice just as long as possible. That is legal practice, not only in this country, but in every civilized land to-day. Every man is at the mercy of the lawyers, the judges and the

officers of the court—and the treatment that he receives depends upon how these people feel and what they conceive to be their interest or duty. Justice must be accepted as they interpret the law, and it must be taken at such times and in such proportions as it pleases them to have it served out to this or that litigant. We are poor, feeble creatures, and there is nothing that we can call our own—everything we have is mortgaged, and we ourselves belong to the state. We are called a free people, but our freedom is of an extremely uncertain and limited character—we are simply free to do what our rulers are willing to have done. But all slaves have liberty of that kind.

But let us get down a little closer in our inquiry and consider the true character and value of trials. What are trials? As a rule, they are nothing but ceremonies. What is really proven, what is demonstrated when the trial is ended and the verdict given? Nothing, absolutely nothing. As a matter of fact everything is left precisely as it was before the trial. If a man has been tried for murder or arson, he is no more guilty, and no less, after trial than before. It is true there has been a trial, a proceeding, a ceremony—but that is all. Ceremonies never prove anything, if for no other reason, from the mere fact that they are only ceremonies.

After the trial, we proceed as if something had been proved or demonstrated. We say the prisoner has been found guilty, guilty of murder perhaps, and we get ready to hang him at once. However, we do not hang him at once. We allow the lawyers to make a little more money out of the poor devil before he dies by permitting them to go on with an appeal. It must not be forgotten that while these trials are serious enough for the prisoner and the taxpayers, it is quite a lucrative business for those who are employed on the trial. But why hang a man after trial any more than before

trial? We have not proved him guilty by a long distance, unless we have extorted a confession from him by threats, or gained it by some trick or some hypnotic performance for which detectives are famous. No, not in one case out of a hundred, in murder trials, do we know whether we have found the right man guilty or the wrong man—and what makes it all the worse, *we do not seem to care*. There is just as much money in hanging an innocent man as a guilty one, and the crime is *expiated* just the same in one case as the other. It is the expiation, the sacrifice that we are after, and we are not much troubled whether the man that is hung is innocent or guilty. We seem to follow the old Jewish practice of sacrificing victims, and the purer, more innocent and more unspotted the offering, the better is the sacrifice. Are we exaggerating in the least in the statements made on this subject? Is it not the truth, and nothing but the truth, that we are stating?

What is proved and really determined on a trial? Nothing. We call this man and that man as a witness, men always more or less interested on one side or the other, and the court hears what each has to say on the subject. But what has that to do with the question of guilt or innocence? We hear people say a great many things every day, but we rarely consider that what they say is proof. They may be mistaken, as any one may be, they may not be able to see things in their proper light if they tried. They may find it to their interest to lie, or their prejudices may be so strong one way or the other that they could not tell the truth if they wished. But, it will be answered that the people who testify on trials make their statements on oath. That is very true, but what does an oath amount to at the present day? To just about as much as an affidavit taken by a notary public and no more. Men who are in the habit of telling the truth at home will tell the

truth on trials, and others cannot be relied on. But who are the men that testify on trials? They are all sorts of folks, good, bad and indifferent. Sometimes they are the cheapest kind of material imaginable.

The question again recurs, what can be considered to be demonstrated by such testimony as we find produced on trials at law? Be that as it may, it is the kind of evidence that always settles the business. One man swears to one thing, or perhaps a dozen men swear to one thing, and then one man or a dozen men, or perhaps only a half dozen men, swear to just the opposite. The judge, or the jury, is said to weigh the evidence. Weigh it how, or with what? The author ventures to say that is a mistake. Men do not weigh testimony—they cannot. Judges never weigh testimony, they merely take it upon themselves to decide that this fellow lied and the other man told the truth! They do not weigh anything, they merely take their choice between witnesses. But if the prevailing theory is correct, that what is sworn to on a trial is true, what right has a judge to say that such a man lied? It looks like an arbitrary proceeding—it is an arbitrary proceeding. How does the judge know that the witness lied? He does not know it—he merely imagines so, believes so, decides so. That is all there is of it in any case. The jury also weigh testimony, and they have a queer way of doing it, too. They debate and vote on the question. After a while the weaker men give in and the stronger prevail, and they bring in a verdict of guilty. But what does that prove? Or perhaps some obstinate, self-willed fellow holds out and will not agree with his brethren. What does that prove? Which is right, the one that holds out or the eleven that agree?

What is a verdict good for? We have seen that it proves nothing. It is only a permit for certain men called officers to trespass upon the defeated party with

impunity—either to take him by force and put him in prison or to so torment him that he will disgorge and pay a sum of money called a judgment or fine. That is what a verdict amounts to. It is with trials as it is in war—men stop not because they are beaten or compelled to stop, but because they have had enough and do not choose to carry resistance any farther. Men in war might fight till they died, but usually people in both cases prefer not to go quite as far as that. Besides, the public steps in and gives its opinion that if a man is finally beaten in his suit, he ought to submit and settle up.

But it must not be forgotten that the man who is beaten never gets justice, or at least he is never satisfied. He submits not because he finds he is wrong—he never finds that—but because to submit is for him the lesser evil. A trial has absolutely nothing to do with a man's guilt. If we have the power and the disposition to take revenge upon a man in any way, it is quite unnecessary to go through with the formality of a trial at law, which cannot alter the facts of the case nor change the status of the parties in the least. A trial neither gives to any one new rights, nor can it deprive any one of rights that were possessed originally. It must not be forgotten that every man who acts in private matters upon his own judgment has practically tried the case precisely the same as if it had been tried in court. He has considered the evidence and rendered his decision. That is simply what is done by the court in legal cases.

How would we get along without punishments? That is the great question that unsettles ordinary people. They have never tried the experiment, and so how should they know? They have never tried kindness or forbearance, in place of violence and resentment. But why not make the trial now? Why not do better ourselves, and then see if others will not fol-

low our example? Suppose we are uniformly kind and forgiving, suppose we treat those who have done wrong as those who have merely made a mistake, or who, being misled, have been guilty of an error; suppose we treat criminals as men, with all the rights of men, is it not reasonable for us to hope that we shall soon have a better condition of things than at present? Moreover, let us begin by removing the causes or the inducements that lead to wrong-doing on the part of others, and we may be certain that if no seeds of evil are sown, no harvest of evil will be reaped.

The great step forward towards solving this problem is rather to prevent crimes and enable people to avoid being injured by others in the first place, than to devise means by which to punish men after the wrong has been perpetrated.

HIS SATANIC MAJESTY

In speaking of this "delectable individual," it is well known that people uniformly refer to him as the "Old Devil." If anything wrong comes to light in this world, it is generally charged to the account of this evil personage, and nothing is ever said of the work done by the little devils, or by "the woman in the case." However, that part of the subject is not worth discussing in this place, and so we drop that matter without any farther comments. One Devil is all that is required for ordinary business transactions; we have never heard for a moment that the Devil was neglecting his duties, or that he was not giving prompt and intelligent attention to all matters that come up before his majesty for final adjudication. The experience we might add, is different in our state courts, where, as we know, the calendars are usually crowded, and it is not at all uncommon for cases to remain undecided for several years in succession. That is the difference in the business habits of people.

The Devil keeps no book account, but it is well known that he has a reliable memory. He evidently believes that, if his work were "well done when 'tis done, 'twere well it were done quickly." There are no appeals in his court. Whether the matter is decided justly or unjustly, when the decision is made, that is the end of the business, and the Devil promptly moves his court to some other locality. We sometimes think that is not a bad way at all. Appeals are good things, for the court and the lawyers, and not quite so good for the clients who are expected ultimately to bear the burden.

We have chosen the Devil for our topic at this time, for the reason that his career and history are highly instructive, and we may add, extremely interesting also. The Devil, it is true, is not a human being, but after all, it is very difficult to decide just wherein the real difference lies between this being and some ordinary mortal. It is confined, chiefly, we apprehend, to the mere matter of personal appearance. When the Devil has an outing, he appears usually in a regalia that is rather unique, but as a rule, it must be conceded, when it comes to principles of action and rules of conduct, there is not such a very great divergence as one might expect between what is Devilish and what is strictly human. The Devil acts from purely selfish motives, and a member of the human family generally pursues the same line of policy. It is customary for people in all the walks of life to look out for themselves in all cases, and that is precisely what the Devil himself is doing every day.

But what is particularly noticeable is the Devil's growth and activity, and his rapid development even under adverse circumstances. We are assured over and over again by the philosophers that "nothing comes from nothing," or "from nothing, nothing comes." But it is clearly otherwise in the Devil's

case. He is here on deck and we are assured on pretty good authority that *he has come to stay.* Indeed, all the signs and symptoms point to a prolonged visit from this noted personage. It is well not to pretend that he is nothing, or that he comes from nothing. His genealogy seems to be established on a good substantial foundation, and there is no doubt at all that he is a *laster.* He is really a very important factor; he is a potentate, a ruler over a kingdom, according to historical accounts. How shall we say that he came from nothing? That is a gratuitous and hazardous assumption. How shall we pretend to say whence he came or whither he goeth? We do not know about that—in fact nobody knows. But want of knowledge never interferes with our making assertions when we happen to feel so inclined. When people get a notion into their heads, they are always ready to deliver their opinions, whether they know or do not know what they are talking about.

The Devil, like other beings, has been slandered repeatedly, and that is not at all to be wondered at. When people do not happen to like our performances, they never miss saying a bad word for us, whenever an opportunity is offered. In the city of Damascus, not far from the Bazar, we are shown an enclosure, where there is a great accumulation of small stones weighing a pound or more. We are told by the guide that one of the lovers of Fatima, the King's daughter, was originally buried there. The faithful followers of Mahomet had a prejudice for some reason against this young man, and every time they pass his grave, they never fail to cast a stone or two into the enclosure. This proceeding is typical of what is going on at all times all over the world. People have some grudge against us, and so they take the trouble to throw a stone into our garden whenever they pass by. The Devil knows how it is himself; no doubt he has done the same thing more than once.

There is no question, for us at least, that the Devil is a reality, as much so as anything that the world has yet produced. It is true we know nothing of his birth, his parentage or his early history; but as much as that may be said of many other beings that have lived and passed away, without leaving any certain evidence of their mission or their ancestry. As a matter of fact, the Devil has been potent all along in the affairs of this world, and he has exercised a far greater influence over its destiny than any other being living or dead. Reality, in a case like this, does not arise from birth and death but from the influence exerted upon the history and development of mankind. Confucius, Mencius, Zoroaster, Socrates and Solon lived and died, as other men have, but what particular interest has their existence for us? What do we really know about them, more than we know of the Devil? What did they know of us, or what have they done for us? What difference would it make to us to learn that they are living today, or that they died a thousand years ago? And so it is with the question of Christ's existence, or that of God or Mahomet.

Our interest is usually confined solely to what appeals to us, or affects us, to what we feel and what we believe. The Devil we know and believe in, because we see his works daily. It is true we have never seen him personally, but there are plenty of others who have seen him. He is the "Evil Spirit," the "Great Destroyer," the "Arch Fiend," the "Fallen Angel." He is spoken of as the "Adversary," the "Calumniator." Indeed, his aliases are numerous. It is true he is usually invisible, but so are the great powers of earth generally. Heat is invisible; elasticity, electricity, sound, pain, sorrow, they are all invisible. At least, they are never seen by the naked eye. In the case of spirits, it may be noticed that what people think they see passes for the same as what they really do see. We

remember meeting a young man in our early days who had seen the Devil, or at least who believed he had. He was walking along the middle of the highway, one dark, rainy night, when suddenly a stranger stepped to his side and walked with him without saying a word. The young man tried to start a conversation by remarking that it was "quite sloppy," but he got no response. All at once the stranger turned aside, leaped the ditch and the fence and disappeared in the darkness. Just at the last glimpse, the young man caught sight of the cloven feet, and then he knew it was the Devil! What better proof, as proof goes, could a person ask for than evidence like this? If we cannot believe what we see and what we hear, what shall we trust?

In those days, it was a very common thing for credulous people to see the Devil, when they happened to be out late at night, but latterly this Fallen Angel does not seem to travel quite as freely as he did formerly. His habits evidently have changed, and perhaps people's views have changed also. We know the world does change its belief from time to time. For hundreds of years, a large portion of mankind believed in witchcraft as fully as they do to-day in the sun and stars. Of that belief there is now hardly a vestige remaining. Not such a great while ago people were burned for witchcraft, as men are hanged to-day for murder. *Beliefs do change—there is no possible doubt of that fact.*

The Devil is undoubtedly a development of the brain of man—*and none the less real for that.* Minerva's origin is a parallel case. We must confess that we have no special acquaintance with this Evil Genius; we know him only from reputation, from history, from the "speech of the people," as most of our knowledge has come to us. But we certainly know a great deal more about him than we do of Mark Antony or Julius

Caesar. We had no personal acquaintance with these two men, and still we do not deny their existence.

The Devil is just as he is made by man, his patron. He is in the strictest sense a creature of man's imagination. His achievements are merely what man thinks that he has accomplished. His figure and personal appearance follow precisely the delineations of man. There is nothing anomalous about such a being. All the images, figures, conceptions and creations with which man concerns himself trace their origin back to the same source—the fertile brain of man. If it were not for our imagination we should know nothing, *absolutely nothing*.

There can be no doubt at all about the Devil's reality or identity. It is true, he is not so much in evidence as he was, but that may be owing to the fact that his mission is nearly accomplished. Let us trace his career and development a little farther: In speaking of the creation, in Genesis, where we find a brief memorandum of the creatures and objects that God made, we notice that no mention is made of any such being as a Devil. At that early day, and for a long time thereafter, such a character as the Devil was not known. Where he was concealed, or what he was doing at that time, we could not conjecture. Certain it is, he had not then arrived at the scene of action, and the Lord was master of the whole situation. There was no "Lying Spirit," nor "Adversary," in those days. It is said by those who have inquired into the matter, that the Devil's name is only mentioned four times in the Old Testament, and the reference that is made is, in its nature, strikingly indefinite.

As the whole story of the Devil is a pure fabrication, or conception of man's mind, as before intimated, it is not at all strange that he is painted variously by various people. The Europeans paint him black, while the Africans paint him white. Every man really has

his own Devil, as he also has his own God. The figure of the Devil as represented by intelligent people generally varies but slightly. He was evidently patterned originally after the Satyrs of the Greeks and Romans. He has the head and body of a human being, but the rest of his make-up—his horns, his ears, his tail, and his cloven-feet—these must be referred to the lower orders of creation. These are monstrous features in the make-up of a remarkable piece of spirit-construction.

Those who read and inquire must observe that the character and constitution of the Devil as given to the world in books and presented through the fancies of men are certainly a product of man's imagination. Every nation, or individual, adds a little, or takes a little, from the picture, in order to have the likeness correspond with his own individual conception. Much of the character and figure of our modern Devil must be referred to the Persian view of this demon. Some people get along without any Devil; others again combine God and the Devil in one being, as the Hebrews did for a long time. The Persians believed there were two kingdoms, one ruled by the good spirit, Ormuzd, and the other by the evil spirit Ahriman, a Devil in spirit and in truth. The Jews after a time seem to have adopted the Persian view, and so it comes that we really have two gods, as the Persians have, one for Evil, and one for Good.

However, it is well, to bear in mind that the picture of the Devil as he is represented among Christians to-day is taken largely from Paradise Lost. Or in other words, it is Milton's Devil that the Christians have finally accepted as their model for the Spirit of Evil. Strictly speaking, Satan or the Devil, belongs to the New Testament.

The history of the Devil furnishes a most instructive illustration of the development of man's thought; it shows the origin of an idea and the growth of a

conception in time. In no case is this character any one man's production, or any one man's work. It results finally from the combinations and contributions of ages. So it is to a greater or less extent with *every thought, every idea.* God has had a history precisely parallel to that of the Devil. God has continually grown in the minds of the people, changing from time to time, and varying in this or that respect, as in the case of the Devil. Whenever people come to get a new conception of the world, they change, necessarily, their ideas of God and the Devil.

Following closely upon these changes, come new ideas of duties, rights and obligations as between man and man. Our ideas are all linked and associated together, and a change of one involves, uniformly, a change in all the others. However, it often happens that a long time elapses before man, the ordinary man, becomes actually conscious of the change that has occurred in his own convictions. Like the morning dawn, light in this case breaks in slowly and quite imperceptibly.

We consider it quite proper to close a work of this character, devoted as it is to Modern Thought, with a brief history of the Devil, as we have done, for such a sketch is the history of all thought, all art, all science. All history is devoted exclusively to reputations, to what men and things are supposed to be or imagined to be, by men, rather than what they really are.

It is true the Devil is a Myth, a Fiction. But as we have noticed all through the present work, every person and everything is a Myth, a fiction at last. Every object in nature is merely what it is imagined to be, when properly understood. We have found that the whole world is established entirely on opinions. Undoubtedly, the Devil is as real and as substantial as any of earth's creatures, and as such he deserves a place in history. He may not have a marble slab in Westminster, or a prominent place in the

Pantheon, but when we come to enumerate the agencies that are at work constantly in building up this world and tearing it down, we certainly should not overlook the greatest agency of all, the Devil!

Even Kant admits, *Critique of Pure Reason,* that "man himself is a phenomenon, a shadow"! Certainly so. But why stop with Man? Everything is a shadow.

Nothing has any significance or importance when standing or acting alone. If there be something to be seen, there must be something that sees, and some instrument through which the perceiving is done. Where there is passivity, there must be activity likewise. If there be any laws of nature, these facts just stated or assumed must certainly come in that category.

No matter where we look, or when we look, it is always with precisely the same experience in every instance. We always see our own world, and we *never see* the world that is perceived by other people. It is our thoughts, our own feelings and conceptions that concern us always, and when our thoughts and ideas change, as we have so often noticed, the world at the same time changes its form and appearance. Indeed, the world could not possibly change for us, unless we know it. Nothing could be more true or more important than this remarkable and quite unexpected development.

We naturally think that our ideas of things correspond with the things themselves, but there is no evidence of any such harmony anywhere in nature. We think that an object impresses us, but we know, as we come to reason, that this is only a vain conception of ours which sooner or later must be discarded. "The ideas and images *in men's minds* are the visible powers that constantly govern them."—Locke.

It is certainly time that we got new views of the World, which, we may be assured, is not what we think it is or say it is now. It is not something substantial,

something that lasts. It appears solid to us only because it feels solid, which is no good reason at all. It is not truth alone that has no form or character. Nothing has any form that may be considered permanent. That we have observed on all sides. What is truth? Only what we think and believe. This we feel obliged to repeat over and over again as we do with notes in music. Good things should be repeated and prolonged. They should never be gulped down, as people are wont to do when they eat in too great haste, or when, perhaps, they are an hungered. Small doses often repeated are much better than large doses taken at long intervals.

RESUMÉ

In looking over the following paragraphs, one may occasionally be found repeated with more or less change. But no matter. They are all vital truths, and we should be glad to repeat any one of them a hundred times, if that little item of expense would ensure their receiving the attention that they unquestionably deserve. There is a volume in every one of them, if taken in their entirety and with all the consequences that they involve. To the world at large, they are all new, and they are all great facts that have never yet been generally known or recognized by the masses. Of course, we understand very well that there are a few thinkers scattered here and there who have heard of them and who hold them, perhaps, in high estimation.

With this note of explanation, we present a resumé of the author's leading thoughts and principles as they are found elaborated in the present work, and in "New Views on Old Subjects," which was published in 1910. They are given in a condensed form, mostly as brief and pertinent paragraphs, in order that they may leave a more lasting impression upon the mind of the reader.

They are all independent propositions, and are hence subject to no rule of order.

The greatest of all studies is that in which the main question is: *How to live?*

What seems true to ourself is our truth. There is no everlasting truth—and there never was. There is no authority for any truth; authority has nothing to do with truth in any case.

Truth is purely a matter of opinion—and at all times it is wholly a personal affair.

Everything is easy; one can do any trick, provided he knows how.

The author happens to have no high regard for law in any form or at any time. An act may be legitimate, and still not proper. Law has absolutely nothing to do with either right or justice. Nobody consults the statute books to ascertain what he ought to do. Sometimes people consult such a book in order to see what sin may be committed with impunity. That is as far as men usually go.

We call things good merely because we like them. There are no other good things for us than such as we like. What we do not like of course is *bad*. Nothing else is bad, for us. Some people call celery bad, while others are quite fond of it. Some like cheese, while others detest it. That is the difference in people, rather than in things.

Man's belief controls all his action; belief is everything for man, and it makes him what he is.

What do we mean by calling things "new"? Only relatively new, new for some people, but not for others. Nothing is new for everybody.

As a rule in practice, the right of one man is the wrong of another. It is gratifying to know at last that the Sun of Liberty is rising.

There should be a radical change and a readjustment on the Marriage question. Up to the present

time, we have been on the wrong track, on this matter, quite generally, and we are wrong still. For those who are fond of discussion, a fine opportunity is offered here.

Why should men ever give? Why should they ever do anything without some object or some return in view? Very few sensible people are in the habit of doing anything of the kind.

Charity favors penury and multiplies paupers, by the encouragement that it gives to this class. Let those give who choose to give. There is no obligation either way, to give or not to give.

It is a serious mistake to suppose that words convey thoughts, or that they even have a meaning. Words standing alone have no signification. They are simply signs, and all their power is assigned to them by men. No two people have the same idea of the same word in any case.

All our life we are busy with thoughts and opinions —sometimes our own thoughts, and sometimes the opinions of other people. All that any man can offer at any time, on any subject, is *merely his opinion*. Even science or theology is merely an accumulation of men's opinions.

Historians are fallible, not infallible. They are all writers of fiction, when properly understood. Historians are made of clay, like other people.

People should be very careful what they assert. As for the author of this work, he is not fond of theories in any case. But, indeed, what is all science but theory, inference, conclusion? People should be slow to assert what they do not know. But if writers stopped with what they know, what diminutive books they would have to offer to the world! It is what people *do not know* that fills our books. Writers are like painters. They never paint and present facts as they certainly are—*nobody does that*. Artists of all kinds, as

is well known, uniformly present their productions as they want them presented. It is the effect that they are after, *not the facts of the case.* Everybody has his notions, and to him they are the dearest things on earth. He would not part with them for any ordinary compensation!

History has some truth, but so has fiction. Again we remind the reader that historians are simply artists, who write, as others paint, merely for effect.

In all writings we get only the beliefs and thoughts of men. Truth is largely a manufactured article. Generally, it is merely what somebody thinks or says.

Religious belief is fundamental. What a man believes about God, or the gods, determines to a large extent what he must believe in other directions.

Our conclusions in all cases are purely matters of inference—we infer this or we infer that, always. The senses never deceive us; they never judge or decide.

The state of a man's mind, and his early education, have a great deal to do with the shape and coloring that he gives to the objects that he beholds, or to the interpretation that he gives to the books he reads.

There are a thousand views, or more, of any one object, and all depends upon the point from which the views are taken.

Everything in nature is constantly changing its form and appearance. Nothing in this world stands out alone or disconnected. The character of people never changes, though their conduct may.

From the eye, or from the senses directly, we learn very little.

The earth changes and revolves. Why not the seasons and ourselves, necessarily?

We notice but few points in any object—in fact we can never observe more than one point at a time.

We learn, we progress, because we are inclined to imitate. We like to act in unison with the movements

of others. Every motion is contagious. If we see a man look up, we also look up. We want to see what others see, and do what others do.

We are constantly reaching conclusions. They are in all cases inferences that we have formed after observing certain things. All the character that objects have we give to them when we form our opinions.

Groups have no character of their own, no qualities. It is individuals only that count. Nothing can be counted twice—once in the group, and once as the individual.

Nothing has a fixed value or character. We know that the values of things, as is the case with ourselves, are continually changing. Weight, we know, is constantly varying. Color changes. A body weighs less in water than in air.

Properly, there are no parts of things. All parts are really complete things. A half is a whole number of smaller size. As there are no parts, there can be no whole. The whole is merely all the parts.

There are no simple, single things in nature. But the elements of things are not parts; they are independent.

Nothing can be proved or demonstrated.

Time, distance, size, motion, and many other things, exist only in our mind. They are only things to think of.

Bodies have nothing to do with size, as they have nothing to do with time or distance. What is the size of a bridge or a house? Size is something that merely appears, and of course it constantly varies. It is something that is never found in pictures, which, as we know, never give any idea of size.

No man has a character of his own. His standing is determined entirely by what people say of him.

Educating the young is one of the ways of spending money and furnishing employment. There are other points in the case, but these are the main things, it will be found.

There is no such thing really as connection or relation of things. There is no change of things, no increasing or diminishing of things.

Education, in America at least, stands upon false and unstable foundations.

As a rule we spend our lifetime in unlearning what, in early life, we were taught amiss.

Worship of ancestors, and things of the past generally, still prevails all over the world. *Education is a fetich.* For the present it takes the place of our God.

Do we see things as they are? *Assuredly not.* We see things only as they appear to us, and as we feel.

Do things have qualities? Only as they are assigned by ourselves. We call a man tall merely because he looks tall to us. There can be no quantity of a thing. At least, the only quantity of a thing is the whole. A part of a thing is really nothing. In this world, incomplete things are myths.

All greatness consists of what people say or think. When do we see objects as they are? At ten feet, or one hundred feet, with a microscope, or with the naked eye?

Truth is merely what men believe. And what is right? *Merely what men believe to be right.* There is no such thing as right for all men, at every stage of the world.

Morality is merely custom, which varies with different men, at different times, and under different circumstances.

Why condemn a man for his morality, which is only a matter of opinion?

All thinking is feeling. We never get beyond our opinions—*no man ever does.*

Our pains and sorrows are wholly matters of opinion. If we could forget our sorrows, we should have none.

Contrasts have a powerful influence, when used as a background.

A man is poor who has many wants that he cannot supply. No others are poor. A man who wants nothing is practically rich.

Truth is truth only so far as we accept it as such. Dr. Cook's story was true till people came to believe otherwise.

It is all in the way we view things. We call this good and that bad. Others, perhaps, say just the reverse.

A thing must be fixed and stationary, it must also be unchangeable, to have a character. Objects that are fleeting cannot be seen or examined, and therefore they cannot be appreciated.

Our ideas of value are all founded on illusions. Everything about us is the work of man. Without man, and the mind of man, all is *chaos*.

We are subject to illusions constantly. Phantasms are our daily amusement. Our whole life is simply an illusion.

Time and distance are mere developments of the brain. They are things that we see in our mind.

There is no connection between any two things or two events. There is no relation between them in any way.

To seem is everything.

There are no results, because there are no real causes.

Things never mingle, never change, never really develop or disappear.

What is color, what makes color what it is? It is changing constantly. Every fleeting shadow makes a difference in the color of objects that stand in the light.

Things may be relatively so, and positively not so.

Dress makes of the wearer a new creature. A person who observed a party in bathing remarked that he could not tell their sex, because they wore no clothing. We are the product of our surroundings.

Criminal laws and criminal punishments have ceased to be popular among sensible men, though still quite prevalent all over the world.

The great man is nothing. He is great only so far as people call him great. He is the product of natural influences.

Fame does not last—*nothing lasts.*

If you add 2 and 3 and get 5, the 2 and 3 are absorbed in the process and disappear. If you mix two things, as two colors, nothing new appears, because the things mixed are not lost and they do not really disappear. It should be remembered that you cannot actually add, and you cannot mix so as to get a new result. You cannot multiply, repeat, increase, or divide in any case.

Nature has no laws. In its processes it always varies. It has no order, no system, no plan. It never does two things, or makes two things alike. It recognizes no species, rank, class or order.

In the case of truth, the best that we ever get is an approximation. All science, all mathematics, is based on assumption. Man starts always with a theory, a scheme, of some kind. It is his own particular idea that delights him at all times.

Science will never progress very rapidly or satisfactorily, when its most important claims are founded, confessedly, on pure *fallacies,* bare assumptions.

Properly speaking, there is no such thing as motive. There are no causes of things, and no results.

Everything is a picture or a poem, if we know how to read or interpret it. The cathedral of the Middle Ages is a grand picture, indeed, the grandest of all, for those who can read and understand what they see.

The fountain of all knowledge lies in ourself.

It is a delusion to believe that we are taught by other people. We learn from our own individual efforts.

The clearness of one man's vision is no help to another man. To learn, the pupil must be aroused in some way. He must at least study.

It must be remembered that many people cannot read, and so of course they should not be expected to understand what they see. Presenting to a man a new thought, a strange idea, is like talking to him in a foreign tongue. To ask him to see what we see clearly is really asking too much.

Fear of the Lord has ceased to be the beginning of wisdom. Doubting the scriptures is now considered to be one of the first signs of coming wisdom.

We have always had masters to do our thinking, as we have had priests to do our praying. Must this practice continue?

We visit too much; we lose too much time in various ways. We feast, and we are feasted too much.

What we call wrong, the Greeks called right. That is simply the difference in peoples.

There must be, and there will be, a change some day. A general shaking up, making over, and moving forward, is sure to come, not long hence.

It is curious that people do not require knowledge to give them an opinion, or to enable them to form a belief.

In the dark, we are all equally blind. There is not so much difference between those who see and those who do not see as a person might imagine. We also might see in the dark, if our eyes were like the photographer's camera. Our seeing is determined by the medium through which we see, and by the obstacles encountered.

We must begin to take a new view of life.

We need sickness quite as well as we do health, and storms as much as we do fair weather. Truth and error, good and evil, are all equally important. They are certainly all equally natural. There is no wrathful God in nature.

It is vitally important that we should have correct views of nature. The world is good or bad as we look at it, and as we happen to believe.

What is evidence? Nobody knows—nobody cares to know. *There is no real proof in any case.* Still we go on condemning and executing, with or without evidence.

Circumstances make a difference with men. When the Christians were few and feeble, they were very tolerant. As their numbers and strength increased, cruelty and intolerance developed.

All evidence is simply what men say, and what men say is always merely their opinion. We never get more than an opinion at any time or from any person. In fact, an opinion is the only established reality in practical life.

Crime, we know, is wholly a matter of opinion. After all, people are bad only as we believe them to be bad.

What men believe to be right, is right, for them.

Nothing really changes—nothing ever can change.

Civilization is the end of the chapter. After civilization comes chaos, uniformly. Even civilization itself must end at last.

In music, what we want is melody, fineness, clearness, sweetness, simplicity. Instead of that, we usually get the anvil chorus. Even savages are intensely interested in both music and colors.

Fix things as you may, they will uniformly be found to cost all they are worth.

We are strong only relatively, strong only so far as others are weak.

When growth ceases, decay begins. Growth is largely only repairing of damages. While life lasts, repairing continues in some form. When we cease to go up hill, we begin to go down hill.

Even kings do not wear crowns all the time. Except on state occasions, a Derby hat is more desirable than any crown.

Work can always be made a pleasure, if you choose to consider it so. There is really no harder work than writing a good book—and at the same time, there is no greater delight.

It is a pleasure to save; it is also a pleasure to buy what is wanted or needed.

The only way to be independent in this world, is not to want anything of anybody at any time. To get nearer to complete independence, lessen your wants.

Fact above all other facts is this: No man accomplishes anything alone—there is no result from a single cause. Hence no man deserves any credit for what he assumes to have achieved. There are no personal achievements.

There is always pleasure in thinking. By thinking we get new thoughts, and with new thoughts we have a feeling of progress. We may be happier for thinking, but not actually wiser. Thinking gives us no new information.

Regularity is for man, and irregularity is for nature. Nature has no well trimmed avenues or finished parks. Nature shears or trims no trees. Dead branches fall occasionally, and there is no trimming beyond that.

When people worship God, they really worship men under an assumed name. The gods of Greece were heroes, or transformed men. When we are commanded to love God, the meaning is that we must obey man and his mandates. God is only an idea, and the whole intelligent world now appreciates that fact.

The work that is usually well done, is the work that people are accustomed to do for themselves. When men do their own work the country prospers.

Helvetius observes that the same words do not mean the same thing in different places—a fact that it is well to bear in mind. And still men are always governed by words, which, we well know, have no meaning of their own.

The first condition of good judgment is good memory.

All the evidence at command combines to prove that everything is perishable at last; and still people continue to insist that truth, and some other things, are certainly imperishable!

Were it not for a poor memory, people would not forget so many things which it is important for them to remember. Even wrongs endured are often forgotten quickly.

The cheapest, best, and most lasting of all educations is that which is obtained at home.

People should follow sense in all their movements, and disregard fashion generally. Sense is always of service, but fashion rarely.

Facts concern individuals, and they never apply to bodies of men. Rules and laws are for machines only, and not always for machines. A rule that is equitable for one man, is not usually equitable for two men.

As a matter of fact we never learn anything new, we merely add to, or develop, what we knew before. It is well known that those who know nothing can learn nothing. They have nothing to develop, nothing to add to or build on.

What is done can't be undone; if a man does wrong, the consequences must follow. No amount of atonement will help the matter.

There is no truth for everybody—there never has been, and there never will be, so long as people think and believe for themselves.

It should never be forgotten that whatever is said, or thought, or found in print, is at best the dictum merely, or the opinion, of some man or men, and it should be weighed accordingly. Even the Bible comes under this rule.

Ambitious writers are fond of introducing systems of their own making, but it is well to remember that nature has no system. System implies plan, judgment, regularity and design and *none of these things belong to nature.*

The first step toward learning is inquiry. Those who have no questions to ask, need not expect to make any advancement in knowledge.

Forms alone change, says Schopenhauer, and Kant says the same thing.

Do not talk of complete things. There are none—or at least, nature has never made any, and probably it never will. Before nature completes, she usually begins to tear down, and that is a practice that never seems to end.

Education makes us what we are—*Helvetius.* It may be said that education is largely a matter of practice.

Our mental phenomena are determined by our bodily feelings. Even our dreams depend upon the condition of our body, and especially upon the stomach.

A man's expression is always to be found somewhere else than in himself. What we own, what we feel, what we are, is nothing if not known and realized by others. What signifies what we do, or what value has what we know, if nobody is aware of the fact? Suppose we own the whole earth, that is, suppose we claim to own it, if our claim is not acknowledged? Or what does the claim amount to, if the facts are not known?

Again *we live only in others.* Alone, man is nothing; he does not even exist. We count for nothing, except

in so far as we are expressed or understood *by others.* What would this world be without echoes and reflections? Most certainly we should have neither sound nor light. What people think and say of us is everything for us. It is our whole history. What we say of ourself is nothing, what others say is everything.

What shall we denominate equity in our dealings with men? Do we punish men uniformly for the sins they commit? Only rarely! Most criminals are never detected, and others are passed by unnoticed. So it is in rewarding the good. Many acts of goodness never come to the attention of the world, and often such acts seem to give us no concern.

No matter what we do, we are always outside of things. A nail does not penetrate a board, but a hole in the board. So we do not enter a building, we enter an opening, or a room in a building.

What is the use of pouring more ideas into the hopper of the human mind, when it is not able to dispose of the ideas already there? The case is one of impaired digestion, and it should be so treated.

What we know, what we think and feel and believe is of the utmost importance to us; what others know and think and believe is quite another matter.

The most positive of all human beings is the one who imagines that he knows it all, but who in reality knows very little. It is quite impossible to teach such people to any appreciable extent. To learn, one must put himself in position to learn. Some people are inelastic and inflexible. Of course they will never learn, and we should never expect such a result in that direction.

Whenever we come across a man with whom we differ in opinion, we should not jump up in a rage and call him a liar or a fool. That is no way at all. Say to him: I do not agree with you; I have never been accustomed to view the matter in any such light as

you do. Before I change my views on the question, I shall need more study and more evidence. Every fair man will concede that this is the sensible way to do in such cases, whether he himself follows that course or not.

We cannot help others; we can do this or that for them, but that is not helping them in any true sense. The efforts of individuals never commingle; they never lose their identity. What one does has no connection with what another does or has done.

Opinions are never to be either counted or weighed. What has the opinion of *one man* to do with that of another man? What weight has the opinions of a thousand, or a million of men, if they are not posted on the facts at issue? Men count according to what they have learned, and what they know.

The opinion of people is not proof, or evidence, but it is as near to proof as men ever get.

When Rembrandt was alive, his pictures never ranked very high; now they bring fabulous sums. That is simply the effect of sentiment or feeling, as is the case with value always.

The prevailing ambition in this country is to get upon some road when we start out on the journey of life, but we seldom stop to inquire whether it is the best route that we are choosing or whether it is just the opposite. We quite forget that while there are a thousand roads before us, only one is the best or most desirable. This is a fact beyond question.

When reasons for action are so numerous and so cheap, as they are at present, what is to hinder people from having a satisfactory reason for every phenomenon? As a usual thing, men seem to have a reason or an explanation for all that they see, and when they fail to find a good one, they are not slow to adopt a poor one. For centuries, in the not distant past, all evil, all sickness or diseases, and mishaps of all kinds, were

charged up as the work of witches, demons and evil spirits of various kinds. Now we have an entirely new series of causes and reasons. Most of nature's hard work, in the way of pulling and hauling, is supposed to be the work of gravitation. No one knows exactly what gravitation is nor how it works. All that we ever know about the processes of nature is what is *assumed.*

"With fashion against him, an artist is a miserable pauper; with fashion in his favor, he may buy mansions and estates."—*Hamerton.* Here lies the secret of value. It is never to be found in things themselves. As we have said so often already, all qualities, all gifts, all possessions come from outside sources. Of itself, nothing has even so much as a character or expression of its own.

We cannot give people thoughts—nobody can do that. Thoughts come from within, never from without. We cannot help people to see things, or to do things. What we do, they do not do.

In every portrait, some mark or feature will be found that reminds one of this or that person. That is all the connection that is or ever will be found between the picture and the object pictured. Good pictures make us feel, make us see, make us think. But really they represent nothing. *Thinking does it all*—those who do not think, do not see, do not feel or perceive. For such people, neither pictures nor books have any value.

To get a better idea of the character of truth, we should have a better conception of the nature and use of words; and in this connection we introduce what Dugald Stewart quotes from Bailly: "The import of words changes with the times, their signification enlarging with the progress of knowledge. Languages are every moment perishing in detail from the variations introduced by custom: they grow old like those

that speak them, and like them *gradually alter their features and their form.*"

No man is a complete man. Every individual is only one of a species, an insignificant part of some worldly group, made up of innumerable factors which are at the same time quite like and quite unlike each other.

What impressed Schopenhauer most of all was the instability and the final nothingness of worldly things. And with all his weaknesses, this philosopher was a strong-minded man.

True wisdom comes more from the heart than the head.—Shaftesbury.

It was Burke's idea, and he was right, that a very great proportion of the words which we employ habitually have no effect to raise ideas in the mind. They are ordinarily used mainly for filling and ballast.

Judgment is usually right; argument is usually wrong.—Mansfield.

A demonstration is always something intuitive.—Locke.

Most men of learning are very superficial.—Schopenhauer.

People usually read books to amuse themselves, but often merely to be able to talk with and amuse others. They become so tired of themselves!

The greatest gift that ever comes to man, is that of *anticipating the future.* Any one can see things after they occur—only a few people can see things before they happen. But it is a power that may be acquired, to a greater or less extent, by every man.

Abercrombie, in his *Intellectual Powers*, makes a statement which is curious enough for the distinguished philosopher to make, in speaking of the controversy between the Nominalists and the Realists. He declares that "The question is of no practical importance"! He would have come nearer to the truth,

much nearer, if he had said that all questions are of practical importance, and it makes some difference to the world, always, which way they are decided. It does make a difference, often a very great difference, with a man how he decides any question and *what he believes.* Truth and error have never yet had a place on the same plane, and probably they never will. Even if it be true that both have a purpose to serve, in this world, it does not follow that they are alike in character.

All our modern science is founded on the acceptation of mechanical cause and effect as a basic fact of consciousness; but when that gives way, the entire structure will cave in, and a new edifice will have to be reared. * * * *It is in man, finally, that we have to look for the key and explanation of the changes that we see going on around us in external nature, as we call it. Civilization, Cause and Cure.*

What a wonderful influence custom exerts daily upon all our thought, and belief and action—a hundred times more than we believe for one moment! Rhythm, also, has a wonderful effect upon man's thought and action.

Every man contains in himself the elements of all the rest of humanity—and the same is true of all the rest of earth's creatures. Carpenter.

Many books—a good many books—some large and some small, are written every year; but the biggest and best of them have only a few truths of value scattered here and there; and even these truths will be either ignored or forgotten a few centuries hence. Such is fact as opposed to fiction.

How very differently things appear to us when we see or hear them for the first time, compared with the same things seen or heard many times before! There is more in the condition of the observer than in the things observed.

PERSONAL

As I have reached my 81st year, and this being the eleventh work from my pen, I might state that it is not my intention to publish any additional work on any subject. I might, if my life were spared, write several more, but I feel that I have done all that could be required of any one, under the circumstances. I have already devoted all the time that I could spare, from my business and my profession, to the service of the public.

Never having had any inheritance or subsidy of any kind on which to rely, I had to earn my money in all cases before I could spend it. My family had to be supported in the first place; I needed books for reference, and many of them. Books, it is well known, cost money. My studies extended into several different fields, and my wants in the book line were greater for that reason. A large proportion of my works were imported, as the information that I specially desired could be found only in some foreign language.

My travels in search of facts and truth which carried me to all the most important countries in America, Europe, western Asia and northern Africa—to many of them repeatedly—cost me large sums of money, but it was the only possible way by which I could be enabled to master my lessons as they should be learned. To know the world and its people, we must go where they are. It will not answer to depend wholly on pictures and tradition.

As I am nearing the close of a long and active life, I feel myself amply compensated for the sacrifices that

I have made, when I notice that nearly all my thoughts on the subjects on which I have written have been taken up from time to time and endorsed by eminent men in other countries, and especially in Germany. How far they may have read my books published at different periods, from 1858 down, or whether they have ever seen them, I never shall know. Indeed, I am not concerned at all about the matter. It is quite enough for me to know, as I do know, that, in a most remarkable manner, their thoughts and mine agree, on all important questions of philosophy. All thinking men will uniformly have the same thoughts, on matters of interest, sooner or later, if they will only take the trouble to study and inquire for themselves. Really, we shall find that this is all one world, with one sort of people, having one and the same thought, *when we finally come to understand each other.*

I have the satisfaction at this time of indicating to an intelligent and inquiring public just how the matter stands in reference to thought at this time in the history of modern civilization. We can know only so far as we think, inquire and compare. If we are content with merely studying single things apart by themselves, we never shall advance in knowledge to any appreciable extent. Men who never put forth any exertions, rarely, if ever, master any subject.

Where people get their ideas, or how, is a matter of slight concern to me. The question that does concern me, is the one whether the doctrine that they have decided to advocate is right or wrong, or whether it is founded on truth or on falsehood. That they agree or disagree with me, is something about which

I feel no anxiety whatever. I am simply in favor of truth and *opposed to error.* To spread my name or fame abroad, or to achieve notoriety in any manner, has never entered into my ambition for one moment.

The fate of one man, or a dozen men, is not so important, but the fate of truth, fairness, justice, propriety and good judgment are matters of great moment to all mankind. Through good judgment and discreet action, they are certain to prosper; through error, through carelessness and inattention, through indifference to their fate, not only now but in the future, they are sure to fall at an early day, and speedily disappear.

That I am in full accord with the thinking and conservative men of the present day, is a fact that is well established; and if the world at large does not fully appreciate what I have written, that must be taken simply as an indication that many people love darkness rather than light, and that they have at all times a natural fondness for ease and contentment. They are certain, however, to be aroused ultimately, and they will see things clearer, some time later on. Some things cannot be hastened, and this revolution in thought is one of them. It should be borne in mind that writing books does not change men's opinions, as *no amount of evidence can compel a man to believe. What others see, and how they see it, is something that lies entirely beyond the control of God or man.*

This one thing, and one thing mainly, I desire to add at this time. From my youth down to the present moment, I have always sought to live and act like a fair and sensible man. I have always stood up boldly

for Justice, Fairness and Humanity, and, finally, for the complete freedom and independence of all mankind. For the making of laws, at any time or under any circumstances, I have been able to see no excuse whatever. Law always excludes justice; it has nothing to do with justice at any time. In the name of law, men never ask whether a step is just, but whether it is possible or practicable. Law is strictly a business arrangement—it is simply *means to an end.* Laws come uniformly from authority—for which there never was, and there never can be, any excuse or justification.

Men teach more effectually by example than by precept. Good lessons cannot be enforced successfully by law; indeed, no one pretends that teaching is, in any form or in any manner, the mission of law. Its chief effort is, in practice, to have one man's will supplant the will of another person. With laws and decrees, comes the *slavery of mankind.* It may be, and it generally is, prudent to obey the laws, but every intelligent man should at least know their origin, their character, their purpose, their power and their ordinary results.

In closing these remarks, it is proper that the intelligence and fidelity of the author's daughter, Mrs. A. D. Smith, in reading and correcting the proofs of this volume as they came from the press, should be, as they are now, duly acknowledged.

JACOB WILSON.

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